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ABSTRACT 
 
Toward a Normative Theory of Rationality. (May 2008) 
Preston John Stovall, B.A., Montana State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Robert W. Burch 
 
 This project offers an articulation of rationality in terms of normativity—that 
what it means to be acting rationally, in thought or in deed, can be understood via a 
notion of being bound or obliged to certain behaviors given a prior structure that delimits 
what is rational to assert in a discourse or perform in a society.  In the explicit 
articulation of the role of norms in limning rationality, this project also emphasizes the 
opportunity and obligation to self-critically assess the value of the metalinguistic and 
metapractical standards that license rational assertions and behaviors. 
After an introduction, section 2 examines the role of rational constraint in Kant’s 
account of representation, concluding that the transcendental story his philosophy leaves 
us with impels us to look for an immanent socio-linguistic account of the normativity 
that obliges us to think and behave in certain ways, rather than lodging the force of 
normativity in transcendentality.  Section 3 then examines Robert Brandom’s inferential 
semantics by addressing prominent responses to Brandom’s program, making explicit 
two ways in which normativity operates in inferentialism—one at the level of object-
language in the articulation of the propositional commitments and entitlements that 
 iv 
specify propositional content, the other at the level of the metalinguistic appraisal of the 
standards that drive object-language inferentialism.   
 Section 4 turns to the theoretical status of normativity and its role in practical 
behavior, where it is argued that a notion of normativity can underpin a theory of 
intentional states.  Examining positions on naturalism, the author proposes that a causal 
account of intentionality, made explicit by the prescriptive nature of the theory 
advanced, provides a naturalist view of normativity for which norms are in explanations 
of social states as laws are in explanations of physical states.  Hence the obligation to 
self-critically reflect on and revise the norms that delimit ethical behavior in social 
systems is understood as commensurate with the obligation to self-critically reflect on 
and revise the norms that delimit warranted assertions in epistemic discourse. 
The conclusion offers some remarks on the prospects for rational revision in both 
a discipline’s discourse and a society’s standards of behavior.  
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1. INTRODUCTION: NORMATIVITY AND RATIONAL 
CONSTRAINT 
 
This project grew out of a desire to understand normativity.  More specifically, 
this project represents a desire to understand the role of normativity in the philosophical 
projects of the Pittsburgh philosophers Robert Brandom, John McDowell, and Wilfrid 
Sellars.  The contemporary philosophical literature that forms the focus of the third 
section of this thesis makes use of normative terminology in ways that make it appear, 
prima facie at least, as though understanding the role of normativity in this literature will 
provide the student a good grasp of the Pittsburgh program in general.  It is clear, 
furthermore, that there is a systematic program of some sort here.  The work of 
Brandom, McDowell, and Sellars all adopt an approving tone toward the work of 
Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the latter figure especially not 
usually thought integral to an understanding of contemporary philosophical problems 
and their potential resolutions.  One object of this thesis is to articulate—via an 
examination of normativity—one way Kant and Hegel can be understood to offer 
contemporary philosophy more to consider than is often currently supposed.  For 
contemporary philosophy is marked by the concise examination of very particular issues, 
whereas Kant and Hegel were system-building philosophers of comprehensive scope. 
  
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of The Review of Metaphysics. 
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In the remainder of this introduction let us canvas a first approximation of the 
notion of normativity.  The word itself refers to rule-following of some form or another.  
But rule-following itself is a comprehensive notion, apparently admitting of rather 
different applications.  There is conventional rule-following, as represented by the rules 
of a game or rules as to whether or not we drive on the right or the left side of the road.  
There is linguistic rule-following, ensuring that by following the conventions of a form 
of discourse we are able to communicate with each other.  There is logical rule-
following as, perhaps, the necessary linguistic and conceptual relationships that ensure 
our utterances are sensible no matter what form of discourse in which they’re used.  
There is ethical rule-following, as the prescriptions and prohibitions of a society 
encapsulated in the “thou shalts” and “thou shalt nots” of a moral or legal code.  We also 
have aesthetic rule-following, represented by obeying the canons of value that delimit an 
artistic movement and the mediums that express it.1 
                                                 
1
 In a lecture given at Harvard on April 30, 1903, later entitled The Three Normative Sciences, 
C.S. Peirce argued that logic (by which Peirce understood scientific methodology generally), ethics, and 
aesthetics are capable of an ordered definition beginning with aesthetics. The Essential Peirce: Selected 
Philosophical Writings, Vol. 2 (1893-1913), edited by the Peirce Edition Project, (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1998): 196-207.   Peirce’s argument, roughly, comes down to the claim that logic is a 
form of ethics insofar as logical prescriptions are essentially prescriptions of behavior of a peculiar sort.  
As the only non-circular end that can be pursued in behavior is one that recommends itself as an 
“admirable ideal” (201), ethics itself is a pursuit of aesthetics.  “If this line of thought be sound, the 
morally good will be the esthetically [sic] good specially determined by a peculiar superadded element; 
and the logically good will be the morally good specially determined by a special superadded element” 
(201).  Without belaboring Peirce’s argument, I think it is important to keep distinct the differences 
between ethics, aesthetics, and logic or epistemics.  One advantage of bringing to bear the notion of 
normativity on this issue is that it provides us with a category able to subsume epistemics, ethics, and 
aesthetics without supposing they reduce to one or another subcategory.  It seems reasonable to suppose, 
for instance, that the normative injunction “Graham Priest is wrong to deny the principle of non-
contradiction” is different in kind from the normative injunction that “Hitler was wrong to pursue the Final 
Solution”;  while we might be inclined to say that accepting the logical principle of non-contradiction 
comes down to an issue of aesthetics, it seems to do rather much disservice to our notion of ethics to say 
we censure Hitler’s behavior ultimately because it was aesthetically displeasing. 
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One of the benefits offered by a focus on normativity is the chance to bridge the 
systematizing philosophies of Kant and Hegel with the particular philosophical 
commitments of the contemporary scene.  If a sufficient specification of normativity can 
be provided within the confines of a theory of conceptual content or semantic meaning, 
as will be pursued in the third section of the current work, then the prospect opens for 
the application of this theory of meaning across different normative disciplines.  It may 
be possible, in short, for us to specify what should be done, what should be believed, and 
what should be valued within one and the same theory of rational discourse—a rational 
discourse comprising ethics, epistemics, and aesthetics, goodness, truth, and beauty.  It is 
in this attempt to specify rational discourse in terms of a notion of normativity that I 
have entitled this thesis ‘a normative theory of rationality’.   
As a first approximation, therefore, we can understand normativity as a notion of 
rational constraint.  Rational constraint itself operates as a function of the context that 
defines a discourse.  The normative canons that rationally constrain judgments in 
aesthetics do not operate as canons rationally constraining judgments in epistemics.  
Similarly, a judgment within a particular discipline only bears normative force when it is 
constrained by the reasons that license that judgment as a judgment permitted by the 
norms of the discipline.  So the judgments available to a critic of cubism will bear a 
normative force insofar as those judgments are couched in the language rationally 
constrained by the standards that delimit the discourse of artistic criticism of cubism.  
Our object in the third section will be to show not only how such normative standards 
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operate as rational constraints within a particular discourse, but to specify how such 
standards can themselves be made explicit and subject to higher-order appraisal. 
For the idea of being bound to reasons seems to imply a degree of objectivity for 
reasons themselves.  But if normativity is a function of the linguistic standards of a 
particular discourse there seems to be nothing to ensure us that our linguistic standards, 
our rational discourse, is sufficiently structured by extra-social, extra-subjective, 
constraints to make our standards rational ones and not merely conventionional.  
Addressing this issue will form a key component of the discussion in section 3, where 
we examine the contemporary linguistic program on normativity.  Before looking at this 
contemporary work we will first examine a historical antecedent to the contemporary 
linguistic normative program by focusing on the role of normativity in Kant.   
In particular, our focus in second 2 will be on the role of normativity in Kant’s 
account of representation.  Here we will discuss the way Kant understood that the 
categorical structure of experience—a structure wholly determined by the a priori 
conditions of self-conscious experience—was nonetheless sufficiently rationally 
constrained so as to ensure objectivity.  In spelling out the Kantian notions of 
normativity, we will come 1) to understand the way rational constraint in Kant is 
purchased on condition of necessitating a transcendental story, and 2) to motivate the 
view of linguistic normativity as an alternative to Kant’s transcendentalism.  This will 
lead us into section 3 where our focus will be on the role of normativity in Brandom’s 
inferential semantics, integral in spelling out his theory of propositional or conceptual 
content.  Finally, section 4 will endeavor to tell a story of how normativity, the rational 
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constraint imposed on our assertions and their propositional contents, can be extended 
beyond the linguistic realm into the domain of at least the higher animals.  Rather than 
focusing on an account of conceptual content that stops at language-use, as Brandom 
does, this thesis is concerned to argue that conceptual content as so construed by 
Brandom can be extended to nonlinguistic animals.  In section 4 we will examine the 
way conceptual content, though specified by language and rationally constrained by the 
normative standards of a particular discourse, nonetheless can be understood to exhibit 
dimensions of normativity that extend beyond language into the realm of self-conscious 
intentionality.  The experience of self-conscious organisms qua evolutionary organisms 
in tension with an objective environment can be understood to offer its own conditions 
of rational constraint on actions, beliefs, and values. 
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2. THE NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF KANT’S ACCOUNT OF 
REPRESENTATION:  EMPIRICAL, TRANSCENDENTAL, AND 
SEMANTIC CONCEPTIONS OF RATIONAL CONSTRAINT 
 
2.1 Introduction:  Kantian Normativity 
 Focusing on the normative dimensions of the Critique of Pure Reason requires us 
to specify how the categorical structure of a rational subject’s experience of the world is 
understood by Kant to be a necessary structure.  Sometimes phrased as the issue of 
Kant’s theory of representation, the normative reading of Kant’s philosophy focuses not 
on the fact that we merely happen to experience the world in particular ways—as if the 
categories and pure intuitions were just a Kantian descriptive inventory of experience, 
able to be filed on a shelf somewhere between Leibniz and Carnap.  Rather, the 
normative reading of the Kantian program emphasizes that the categorical structure of 
human experience delimits how a human subject must experience the world, not how 
one merely does.2   
While in the abstract a normative reading may seem an appealing way to talk 
about the necessary structure of human experiential knowledge, teasing out the 
particularities of the normative dimensions in Kant’s philosophy is not so 
straightforward a task, and a variety of approaches have been proffered in the last few 
                                                 
2
 Kant in fact self-consciously restricts his discussion to human beings, and leaves open the 
possibility that other rational creatures might experience the world in different ways—especially if they 
were in possession of an intellectual intuition.  See Immanual Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Norman 
Kemp Smith, trans.  (Hong Kong:  The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1978), with reference to B139 p.157, A230-
1/B283 pp.249-50, and A286-7/B342-3 pp.292-3. 
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years.  The interlinked philosophical projects of Wilfrid Sellars, John McDowell, and 
Robert Brandom all share an interest in this side of Kant’s philosophy, and their work 
forms a sort of locus for clarifying this endeavor in the literature.  Though they develop 
this reading in slightly different ways (and it appears McDowell and Brandom in 
particular disagree about certain key ideas)3, their common aim lies in the supposition 
that the force of Kantian normativity sheds light on key areas of contemporary 
philosophy—especially in epistemology and semantics.4 
 But as one might imagine, not all are in agreement regarding a normative reading 
of Kant’s philosophy.  For one thing, it is not always clear where the Kantian exegesis 
ends and the peculiar philosophical commitments of the interpreters begin.5  But it 
should be just as valuable to consider extra-interpretative concerns about the role for 
Kant’s thought in contemporary philosophy as it is to make sure we are reading Kant 
charitably.  In fact, we might suppose that reading a figure charitably according to his or 
her intentions naturally develops into an extension of that reading to the fruitful 
application of his or her thought to our own concerns—especially in the figure of so 
                                                 
3
 To be precise, whereas McDowell is content to discuss Kant’s views in terms of representation, 
Brandom adopts Kant for the purposes of an inferentialist semantics, and thus sees the issue of 
representation to be subsumed under semantics.  Brandom connects this point to the way Kant traces the 
categories of experience (representation) back onto the pure concepts of the understanding exhibited in the 
logical structure of the judgment (semantics).  Toward the end of the current paper we will examine this 
semantic reading of Kant a little more closely. 
4
 Instances of this project can be found in Robert B. Brandom’s “Kantian Lessons about Mind, 
Meaning, and Rationality,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 44 (2006), Supplement:49-71, in 
John McDowell’s  Mind and World,  (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1994), and in Wilfrid 
Sellars’s “Some Remarks on Kant’s Theory of Experience” The Journal of Philosophy, Volume 64, 
Number 20, Sixty-Fourth Annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division 
(October 26, 1967):633-647. 
5
 Brandom is explicit in “Kantian Lessons about Mind, Meaning, and Rationality” that his project 
has not been an exegetical one—it is a reading that “deserves to be controversial and is arguably 
tendentious” (page 71). 
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brilliant a philosopher as Kant.  This being so, I will argue here that the normative 
reading of Kant’s account of representation in the Critique of Pure Reason is largely in 
line with Kant’s own aims, and to indicate in what ways this reading has relevant 
implications for contemporary philosophical work. 
2.2 The Problem of Rational Constraint 
A fundamental concern to address in examining the normative reading of Kant’s 
theory of representation is the extent to which a conceptual structure, residing within the 
subject, can be incorporated within a philosophical account of representation that 
accommodates the sort of rational constraint necessary for representation to be objective.  
If the normative force of our representational account is attributed to the subject’s 
necessary conceptual framework, we need some non-subjective constraint that ensures 
the subject’s use of this conceptual framework in experience is suitably objective. 
 One of the more alluring prospects for objectivity comes from the suggestion that 
Kant’s transcendental idealism leaves room for rational constraint in the form of 
transcendental objects, the noumena of the supersensible world, as the ultimate source of 
the content of representation.  The problem with this approach is it seems to conflict 
with Kant’s explicit prohibition against giving the noumena any positive role.6  
Nonetheless, it has become a point of reflection for a number of philosophers working 
on this issue.  Jennifer Mensch argues against the need for noumenal objects, instead 
attributing to Kant a coherence theory of truth, so that the criterion of success for our 
individual acts of representation is their intersubjective agreement, not their 
                                                 
6
  See e.g. Critique of Pure Reason, B307-8, pp.267-70. 
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correspondence to transcendental objects.7  Brandom’s account of rational constraint 
involves a similar gesture toward the need for social coherence.  His approach is 
linguistic, however.  In this he takes a cue from Sellars, who by 1967 was already 
discussing Kantian normativity in connection to a ‘transcendental linguistics’ meant to 
“construe the concepts of meaning, truth, and knowledge as metalinguistic concepts 
pertaining to linguistic behavior.”8  Developing this Sellarsian program in connection 
with McDowell (and with no small debt to Hegel), Brandom suggests that the rational 
constraint on our representations is satisfied in virtue of the fact that we are not 
responsible for the conceptual content of the commitments we place ourselves under in 
making a judgment—this content is fixed by a society of language-users.  While one 
normative dimension to my uttering the proposition “This paper addresses Kant’s 
philosophy” is captured by the fact that in uttering it (if sincerely) I make myself 
responsible to the propositional implications that can be inferred from my assertion of it, 
this can be the case only because I am not responsible for the meaning of ‘this paper’, 
‘addresses’, ‘Kant’, ‘philosophy’, and the meaning of the whole.9  These meanings are 
fixed by a community of language users, and my utterances are rationally constrained 
insofar as I constrain myself to the linguistic norms of the community I am talking to.10 
                                                 
7
 Jennifer Mensch, “Kant on Truth.”  Idealistic Studies, Volume 34, Number 2 (Summer 
2004):357-381, page 169. 
8
 Sellars, “Some Remarks on Kant’s Theory of Experience,” 646. 
9
 Brandom, “Kantian Lessons about Mind, Meaning, and Rationality,” 62-4. 
10
 One can see in this reading a shade of Kant’s theory of freedom and morality.  According to 
Kant, as phenomenal entities we are always subject to the laws of causation and thus are completely 
determined as phenomenal creatures.  Yet we can take ourselves as ends in ourselves and thereby bind 
ourselves to the rational law—only in so binding ourselves do we truly become free. 
 10 
Should social coherence satisfy our need for rational constraint then we might be 
able to offer a reconstruction of Kant that clearly avoids any need for reference to 
transcendental objects.  But it should be clear that such a reconstruction fails to represent 
Kant’s philosophy on its own terms.  It may be that the social element allows us to adopt 
a normative account of representation while satisfying rational constraint without appeal 
to a mythical Given or a noumenal object, but when discussing Kant’s normative 
account, this picture shies away from the difficulties his view seems to leave us with.  
For this reason, it is better when considering Kant’s philosophy to deal first with his 
difficulties directly.  McDowell in Mind and World takes these difficulties head on, 
concluding that Kant seems committed to a role for the supersensible.11  But by the time 
McDowell has given the Woodbridge Lectures (published in The Journal of Philosophy 
in September 1998) he has come to regret some of his earlier reading of Kant.12  Once 
we clarify just what McDowell should rightly refute from his Mind and World 
characterization of Kant’s transcendentalism, we can focus on the justifiable worries that 
remain. 
In essence, McDowell’s error was to allocate for the noumena—the 
transcendental things-in-thmeselves—a positive role in accounting for experience in a 
way Kant explicitly prohibited.  Compare, e.g., Kant’s assertion that “The concept of a 
noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the 
pretensions of sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment…it cannot 
                                                 
11
 McDowell, Mind and World, 42. 
12
 John McDowell, “Lecture I:  Sellars on Perceptual Experience” in The Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. 95, No. 9 (Sept. 1998): 431-450, page 446. 
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affirm anything positive beyond the field of sensibility”13 with McDowell in Mind and 
World:  “In the transcendental perspective, receptivity figures as a susceptibility to the 
impact of a supersensible reality.”14  Later, Kant’s conception of experience is 
characterized as “a story about a transcendental affection of receptivity by a 
supersensible reality.”15  Kant is manifestly not committed to the idea that experience 
depends on some sort of input from the noumena, the “supersensible reality”, as 
McDowell in these passages (and a handful of others) appears to assert.  Kant is, 
however, explicitly committed to a philosophical position wherein the notion of a 
noumenon is deduced as a logical consequent of the nature of phenomenal experience.  
Once we have made this distinction and distanced ourselves from the suggestion that 
Kant believed noumena played some sort of role in giving rise to phenomenal 
experience, we are left with a question as to whether or not the transcendental story Kant 
tells is one whose deduction of noumena is something we should be content with.  In 
what follows I will spell out the worry regarding Kant’s transcendental story that 
remains in McDowell’s Mind and World once we have reminded ourselves of Kant’s 
rejection that the noumena played any positive role in his account to representation, a 
worry over the need for even a formal role for unknowable things-in-themselves.16 
Even if we (correctly) do not read Kant’s role for the noumena as one of 
supersensible objects impacting our senses, there still seems a need for Kant to posit the 
                                                 
13
 Critique of Pure Reason, A255/B310-11, p.272: 
14
 McDowell, Mind and World, 41. 
15
 Ibid, 95. 
16
 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for directing me to McDowell’s retraction of Mind 
and World’s supersensible reading of Kant, and to Robert Burch at A&M for suggesting I generally clarify 
my understanding of McDowell’s position. 
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noumena as something required by his system.  The distinction of all objects into 
phenomena and noumena fulfills the requirement of ensuring certainty regarding the 
structure of experience as appearance.  Given the way Kant sets up the relationship 
between sensibility and understanding in the Copernican turn, the basic structures of 
experience become a function of our cognition.17  But if the pure forms of intuition 
(space and time) and the pure concepts of the understanding (the categories) are 
knowable a priori as the necessary contributions of our capacity to represent a world, in 
what way are these faculties constrained by the objectivity of the world?  “[H]ow can the 
empirical world be genuinely independent of us, if we are partly responsible for its 
fundamental structure?”18  That is, how can we be sure that our experiences of the world 
are objective, rationally constrained in a way necessary to warrant the title “knowledge”, 
if our experiences along the dimensions both of sensibility and understanding are 
essentially structured by the subject’s contribution?19  Kant accounts for this rational 
constraint by bifurcating objects into phenomena, which are the spatio-temporal-
categorical objects of our experience, and noumena, which are beyond all possible 
experience.  This leaves Kant with a position where the normative force of 
                                                 
17
 Incidentally, I suppose this reading gives us one way of understanding the idea behind Kant’s 
metaphor of a “Copernican Revolution” in philosophy.  Just as certain movements of the planets once 
understood as functions of the planets (their retrograde motion) became instead a function of our 
contribution on Copernicus’s heliocentric model, so too does Kant’s consciousness-centric model explain 
certain elements of experience as our contributions instead of being functions of the objects themselves. 
18
 McDowell, Mind and World, 42 
19
 Stephen Engstrom’s “Understanding and Sensibility” in Inquiry, Vol. 49, No.1, (February 
2006):2-25 makes the case that Kant’s account of cognition requires that the spontaneity of the 
understanding be unconstrained by, though not independent of, the receptivity of sensibility.  Thus, while 
the spontaneous application of the understanding’s pure concepts is spontaneous insofar as this application 
is not constrained by the content received by the intuitions of sensibility, nonetheless this application does 
depend on the presence of intuitive sensible content in order for the pure concepts to “get a grip”, so to 
speak, on experience.   
 13 
representation—the fact that we are rationally obligated to characterize our knowing the 
world in spatio-termporal-categorical terms—obtains only because what we experience 
is a world of phenomena, “beyond” which must be posited noumena.   
“Beyond” in the last sentence is in scare quotes for the reason that the noumena 
cannot bear any spatial relation to phenomena—indeed, they cannot bear any categorical 
relation to phenomena.  The transcendental story in Kant is in many ways rather 
counterintuitive.  Strictly speaking we cannot say of the noumena that they exist—for 
existence is one of the categories subsumed under the heading of Modality in the Table 
of the Categories, and thus has application only to phenomena.  But nor can we say of 
the noumena that they don’t exist, for non-existence is the correlate to the Category of 
existence.  For the same reason, we cannot say of the noumena that they are possible, 
impossible, necessary, or contingent.  To so characterize the noumena for Kant would, 
quite literally, be a category mistake.  This leaves the noumena looking rather 
mysterious, even if we grant their purely formal role in Kant’s system.20  But without the 
transcendental postulate and the restriction of representation to mere appearances, the 
normative force of Kant’s program will not go through.  It is this architectonic or formal 
role for the noumena that motivates McDowell’s worry over Kant’s transcendental story. 
                                                 
20
 The transcendental story has been problematic since Kant first put it forth, and Fichte, 
Schelling, and Hegel were all driven to reconceive the force of Kant’s philosophy in a way that did not 
rely on the bifurcation of the world into knowable appearances and unknowable things in themselves 
(much of this relied on the attempt to tease out a theory of intellectual intuition, a hypothetical faculty 
which will be discussed below).  Hegel in the Introduction to the Science of Logic would remark: “[Kant’s 
philosophy] is like attributing to someone a correct perception, with the rider that nevertheless he is 
incapable of perceiving what is true but only what is false.  Absurd as this would be, it would not be more 
so than a true knowledge which did not know the object as it is in itself.” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 
Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press 1976). 
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In Mind and World McDowell will argue that something like social “second 
nature” can ultimately save us from the need for a Kantian transcendental story 
explaining the normative force rationally obliging use to conceptualize the world in 
particular ways.  Second nature for McDowell offers an account whereby the rational 
obligation to categorize our experience in the ways we do is grounded in the social 
conventions that give us determinate schemata for knowing—paradigmatically in 
learning to use a language—conventions that we are naturally raised up into as a 
function of social maturation, just as natural maturation allows us eventually to eat solid 
foods.  But we can appeal to second nature as an alternative to the normativity purchased 
by Kant’s transcendental story only if we move beyond that dimension of the Kantian 
philosophy.   Graham Bird thinks this reading of Kant is simply wrong,21 and argues that 
it turns on a traditionalist view of Kant that is mistaken.22  Instead, Bird defends a 
Kantian account of representation that, as with Mensch, rejects a positive role for the 
noumenal, while doing so without appeal to intersubjective social agreement. 
 Against lodging rational constraint in either a transcendental story or a social 
realm, Bird argues that Kant’s view is able to locate this constraint in the empirical 
realm of appearances.  McDowell’s transcendental worries are supposedly overinflated.  
Kant has adequately accounted for rational constraint on the objectivity of our 
representations in requiring that the spontaneity of the pure concepts of the 
understanding meet with receptively-activated intuitions in sensibility—only through 
                                                 
21
 “I shall suggest later that there is no good reason to suppose that he [Kant] did, or had to, 
appeal to the realm of the supersensible in the way that McDowell claims.”  Graham Bird, “McDowell’s 
Kant:  Mind and World,” Philosophy, Volume 71, Number 276 (April 1996):219-243, p.224. 
22
 Ibid, 226. 
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these intuitions do the concepts gain particular application, and it is this need for 
intuition that constrains our representations, occurring completely within the empirical 
world of appearances.23  The noumenal realm plays only a formal role in Kant’s 
epistemology, as a conceptual component of the architectonic machinery.  Noumena do 
not play a material role for Kant in our knowing the world—the act of representation is 
not one whereby sensibility and the understanding ‘act on’ some noumenal material 
given to it.24  On Bird’s understanding, Kant draws the noumena/phenomena distinction 
between epistemology and morality—we make substantive use of the supersensible in 
taking ourselves to be objects of the moral law, but we cannot make such use of the 
supersensible in our representational endeavors.  Bird criticizes McDowell and the 
traditional account as attempting to draw the noumena/phenomena distinction inside 
Kant’s epistemology, as if there were some noumenal material available for 
representational use.  Once we recognize that a deployment of the noumena as offering 
supersensible content acted on by our cognitive faculties cannot be a charitable reading 
of Kant, there still remains open the question as to what role the transcendental story 
plays as a formal requirement for rational constraint in Kant’s account of representation. 
To summarize and make our way toward Kant, one desideratum required to 
satisfy a normative reading of Kant’s theory of representation concerns specifying the 
way our experiences of the world are constrained in a way necessary for those 
                                                 
23
 See Bird “McDowell’s Kant,” page 233, and on page 242:  “For Kant they [references to ‘a 
noumenal world’] have a role as conditions for the possibility of experience, including moral experience, 
but even in that moral context they still locate normativity in the world of appearances not in that of 
noumena.”   
24
 Ibid page 229, and on page 231: “Kant’s vocabulary…indicates again a claim about the formal 
conditions presupposed by some aspect of experience, and not a material reference to some supersensible 
item which chronologically precedes it.” 
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representations to merit the title ‘objective knowledge.’  Kant supposes that the forms of 
representation embodied in the categories and the pure forms of intuition are a priori 
elements of our understanding.  They are not elements of our representational capacity 
that are discovered or acquired in experience.  Rather, they are necessary conditions for 
the possibility of any experience to begin with.  Were the categories and space and time 
acquired through empirical verification, our philosophical justification of them could 
only oscillate between dogmatism and metaphysical skepticism.  Kant’s unique 
resolution to the dogmatism/skepticism dilemma rests on the normative status of the 
categories and space and time.  Because they condition the very possibility of 
representational experience, they are forms of representation that we must accept in any 
experience whatsoever.  The normative force of the categories and the pure intuitions, as 
what must be accepted if representation is to be possible, strikes a resolution between 
naïve realist dogmatism and Humean skepticism.  Against dogmatism we recognize that 
because the categories condition all possible experience they are not merely selected ad 
hoc as a function of their proponent’s psychology.  Against skepticism we understand 
that because no experience at all would be possible outside the bounds of the categories, 
then at least these core elements of our experience of the world are beyond doubt. 
 But now we run into an apparent problem of idealism, and it is here that the issue 
of constraint comes to the fore.  Should we accept that the forms of representation are a 
priori conditions for any possible experience, what assurance do we have that their 
employment is constrained in a way necessary for knowledge of an objective external 
world?  For our representations to be something more than pure constructions of the 
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subject, there must be some rational constraint placed on our employment of the these a 
priori conditions in representation.  They must be more than mere concepts spun in a 
void—they must have grip with some independent objects, which in being brought to 
bear on these objects, give our representational content objective status. 
Kant was alive to these concerns.  From the Second Edition’s “Transition to the 
Transcendental Deduction of the Categories” 
There are only two possible ways in which synthetic representations and their 
objects can establish connection, obtain necessary relation to one another, 
and, as it were, meet one another.  Either the object alone must make the 
representation possible, or the representation alone must make the object 
possible.  In the former case, this relation is only empirical, and the 
representation is never possible a priori…In the latter case, representation in 
itself does not produce its object in so far as existence is concerned, for we 
are not here speaking of its causality by means of the will.25   
 
Here Kant addresses the concerns of dogmatism/skepticism and mere idealism.  Were 
the categorical structure of our representations justified in virtue of arising from the 
objects we meet with in experience (the first possibility), our adherence to these 
categories could be justified only through their empirical origin, and this opens us up to 
the problems of dogmatically clinging to them or skeptically doubting their justification.  
Kant’s view is rather that our representations “alone make the object possible.”  The 
categories delimit any experience whatsoever, and because of this their application 
acquires a normative force they cannot have if derived from purely empirical acquisition.  
At the same time, we should not take this to mean that a representation “produce[s] its 
object in so far as existence is concerned”—objects must be independently given, in 
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 Critique of Pure Reason B124-125, page 125.  Unless otherwise noted, all stylistic renderings 
of passages from The Critique of Pure Reason and all inserted remarks are preserved from the Norman 
Kemp Smith translation. 
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some sense.  But in what sense?  In the context of the discussion between Bird and 
McDowell, should we ground the independent existence of these objects in our 
experiencing them in intuition, that is empirically, as Bird suggests, or by appeal to the 
transcendental realm of noumena, as on McDowell’s reading?  One might wonder if this 
discussion as so framed delimits the only options available. 
It is my contention that there are two primary dimensions of normativity in Kant’s 
account of representation. Clarifying these two dimensions will allow us to see that the 
transcendental realm provides rational constraint on the objectivity of representation at 
the architectonic level of Kant’s conception of representation, assuring certainty 
regarding the forms of appearances, while particular instances of rational constraint on 
representation are satisfied by empirical experience without the need for noumenal 
intervention.    We will mark the distinction between rational constraint at the level of 
individual representations and rational constraint in terms of architectonic structure by 
focusing on two key sections of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: the “Refutation of 
Idealism” and “The Ground of the Distinction of All Objects in General into Phenomena 
and Noumena”.  In the former Kant addresses accusations that his philosophy could be 
understood as representing objects as purely subjective constructions of the mind.  This 
text will allow us to see that Kant accounts for the presence of permanent objects outside 
of the subject, and thus of rational constraint on our employment of the categories and 
intuitions, all from the standpoint of empirical appearances.  The latter details the 
architectonic need for a notion of noumena.  This section, together with references in the 
Critique to the certainty of our representations occurring only on condition of their being 
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indexed to objects as phenomena, indicates the way in which the normative force of the 
categories and intuitions is purchased by Kant at the cost of applying only to a 
phenomenal realm, set opposite a notion of unknowable things in themselves.   
In what follows my aim will be to show that when we read Kant carefully there 
are in fact two equally important dimensions of rational constraint present in the Critique 
of Pure Reason.  McDowell and Bird are not so much in disagreement as they are talking 
about these two different dimensions—the former from a consideration of the 
architectonic role of the noumena, and the latter from a consideration of the empirical 
role of phenomenal objects.  In bringing McDowell and Bird into rapport I will show 
that Kant’s account of rational constraint (of the normative force of representational 
concept-use), while potentially offering important lessons regarding the role for 
normativity in contemporary philosophy, nonetheless on its own terms leaves us with an 
unsatisfying result—a transcendental realm cut off from human knowledge.  From this I 
will suggest that the move from transcendental Kantian normativity to socio-linguistic 
normativity is not only a productive advance from Kant’s philosophy, but one that offers 
the prospect of preserving much of Kant’s insight. 
2.3 On the “Refutation of Idealism”    
 
One of the fundamental aspects of Kant’s philosophy is his argument that self-
consciousness implies being conscious of a world.  As Gordon Brittan Jr. puts it, “Kant 
teaches us there is no I without an it.”26  On Kant’s understanding of what it means to be 
determinately self-aware, consciousness must be aware of determinate other things.  The 
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 Professor at Montana State University, from a course on Kant. 
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idea seems to be along the following lines.  If I am to know myself in certain 
determinate ways, I must define myself against what I am not, because it is only in 
determinately relating myself to other objects that I can understand how I am a 
determinate entity myself.27  Hot things show me to be susceptible to burning sensations, 
to know myself as angry I reflect on the conditions that make this anger possible, I know 
myself as a student in virtue of my work, my identity as an American is structured by…, 
etc.  Thus, to be conscious of my existence as determinate is to be conscious of my 
determinate relations to something independent of me.28   
Notice that this all operates on the level of the empirical world, the world of 
appearances.  The objects I experience outside me, and the senses of myself determined 
by them, all subsist at the level of phenomena.  This fact squares with Kant’s condensed 
argument in the “Refutation of Idealism”.  In this portion of the Critique, however, Kant 
is driven to show not only that inner experience requires outer experience, but that this 
outer experience is real, as things independent of the subject. 
The required proof [of an independent world] must…show that we have 
experience, and not merely imagination of outer things; and this, it would 
seem, cannot be achieved save by proof that even our inner experience, 
                                                 
27
 This point marks a central insight of Kant’s philosophy—that tracing the presuppositions of 
self-consciousness back to their logical requirements provides an apodictic measure of a subject’s 
knowledge of its objects.  This was an insight thoroughly conceptualized by Hegel.  See my “Hegel’s 
Realism:  The Implicit Metaphysics of Self-Knowledge,” The Review of Metaphysics, 61 (September 
2007): 81-117 for an in-depth treatment of this insight as central to Hegel’s notion of Absolute Knowing, 
and of the way the Hegelian side of this program might be useful for contemporary philosophy. 
28
 In an extended footnote at the end of the Second Edition’s Preface, Kant makes essentially this 
point. 
“[Being conscious of my existence in time] is identical with the empirical consciousness of my 
existence, which is determinable only through relation to something which, while bound up with my 
existence, is outside me.  This consciousness of my existence in time is bound up in the way of identity 
with the consciousness of a relation to something outside me, and it is therefore experience not invention, 
sense not imagination, which inseparably connects this outside something with my inner sense.”  Critique 
of Pure Reason, Bxl, page 35.  Bracketed remarks inserted for clarity. 
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which for Descartes is indubitable, is possible only on the assumption of 
outer experience.29 
 
These things in outer existence are not taken at the level of transcendental objects or 
noumena, however, as Kant’s formulation of the thesis makes clear:  “The mere, but 
empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of 
objects in space outside me.”30  Space, after all, is a pure intuition of sensibility, a 
function of empirical representation, and thus objects in space are not objects in the 
transcendental realm.  In the proof of this thesis Kant emphasizes that the empirical 
objects in space outside us must be understood as external things, and not our mere 
representations.  “[P]erception of this permanent is possible only through a thing outside 
me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me; and consequently the 
determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of actual 
things which I perceive outside me.”31  The force of ‘mere’ and the emphasis on 
representation in this passage contrasts with ‘a thing outside me’.  If our representations 
of the world were ‘mere representations’, with no reference to a thing outside me, then 
the idealist wins the day.  But if representations are possible only on the condition of an 
external thing outside my empirical consciousness, then the idealist position cannot be 
sustained.   
The experience of things outside me is, from the side of the application of the 
categories, a spontaneous act of my understanding.  But this spontaneous act cannot on 
its own lead to the experience of an external world.  Experience depends on the 
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 Ibid, B275, page 244.  Bracketed remarks inserted for clarity. 
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 Ibid, B275, page 245. 
31
 Ibid, B275-6, page 245. 
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application of the categories to the impressions received through the pure forms of 
intuition—space and time.  These impressions occur via the receptive faculty of 
sensibility; and receiving an impression is not a spontaneous event as the application of 
the categories is.  My self-awareness as a determinate empirical thing presupposes my 
capacity to represent to myself things outside me, and insofar as my representations are 
possible only on the dual activity of spontaneous concepts applied to sense-impressions 
received in experience, this representational capacity itself presupposes the existence of 
things independent of me. 
 But again, all of this has occurred at the level of phenomena, empirical 
experience, and not with reference to any noumenal or supersensible world.  In this 
sense Bird is correct in defending an empirical source for rational constraint on the 
objectivity of our representations.  Yet Kant also has an explicit commitment to a 
noumenal realm, and we must turn to this overarching commitment to understand the 
extent to which it provides a rational constraint on Kantian normativity in the way 
considered by McDowell. 
2.4 On the Distinction between Phenomena and Noumena32 
 
The spontaneous use of the understanding’s concepts are constrained in being 
applied to the data that come in intuition to the faculty of sensibility.  For without this 
intuitional constraint, any supposed representation would ‘mean nothing’.  From both the 
                                                 
32
 One of the more troubling aspects of Kant’s section on “The Ground of the Distinction of all 
Objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena” is the extensive revision it went through for the Second 
Edition.  In the following discussion I assume that the two versions share essentially equivalent ideas, 
Kant’s reason for rewriting the section being for clarification purposes rather than to change the content.  
While I focus on the Second Edition’s treatment, I take it that supplementation by First Edition passages is 
acceptable given this assumed continuity.  Nonetheless, I will make explicit which edition individual 
quotes are from. 
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First and Second Editions:  “We therefore demand that a bare concept be made sensible, 
that is, that an object corresponding to it be presented in intuition.  Otherwise the 
concept would, as we say, be without sense, that is, without meaning.”33  Because the 
pure concepts are given representational actuation only through the intuitions of 
sensibility, the scope of our knowledge of objects must be limited to things as 
phenomena—appearances that are structured by concepts and intuitions.  But the 
understanding’s concepts have a scope of potential application that extends beyond the 
form of sensible intuitions, and because we have no corresponding intuition upon which 
to ground them, we must explicitly restrict the scope of their application to the world as 
appearance.  The spontaneous application of the categories can conceivably extend 
beyond sensible intuition, though with no corresponding intellectual intuition to give 
content to this extended conceptual application, extrasensible concepts acquire no 
meaning—they are ‘without sense’.  The understanding’s pure concepts can be 
actualized only in connection with the empirical intuitions of sensibility, and so they 
only have meaning with respect to possible intuition, that is, limited to the world as 
appearance. 
This limitation directly results in the necessary separation of a world of knowable 
phenomena, structured by the concepts of the understanding and the intuitions of 
sensibility, from an unknowable world of noumena beyond the empirical conditions of 
sense and applied conceptuality.  From the First Edition Kant is explicit in marking the 
noumenal/phenomenal distinction as integral to his philosophy.   
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Now we must bear in mind that the concept of appearances, as limited by the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, already of itself establishes the objective reality of 
noumena and justifies the division of objects into phenomena and noumena, 
and so of the world into a world of the senses and a world of the 
understanding…For if the senses represent to us something merely as it 
appears, this something must also in itself be a thing, and an object of a non-
sensible intuition, that is, of the understanding.34 
 
Our way of knowing noumenal objects would arise only if we had an intuition that could 
fill in some content for the formal application of the pure concepts.35  Kant denies the 
human capacity for intellectual intuition, however, and this requires that we understand 
the noumena as something wholly unknowable.36  While Kant denies any role for 
positive knowledge of noumena, limited as we are by our capacity for merely sensible 
intuition, he explicitly commits himself to a perspective that derives their possibility.37  
In this negative use the noumena serve only to restrict us from applying the pure 
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 Kant makes essentially the same point (that the restriction of representation to appearances 
implies a realm of things in themselves) in a passage inserted in the Second Edition, though its wording is 
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 “Doubtless, indeed, there are intelligible entities corresponding to the sensible entities…but our 
concepts of understanding, being mere forms of thought for our sensible intuition, would not in the least 
apply to them.  That, therefore, which we entitle ‘noumenon’ must be understood as being such only in a 
negative sense.”  Ibid, B308-9, page 270. 
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concepts of the understanding to areas where no possible corresponding intuition can 
give them content.  From both editions of the Critique: 
The concept of a noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept, the function of 
which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility; and it is therefore only of 
negative employment.  At the same time it is no arbitrary invention; it is 
bound up with the limitation of sensibility, though it cannot affirm anything 
positive beyond the field of sensibility.38 
 
 The sections on the “Refutation of Idealism” and the “The Ground of the 
Distinction of All Objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena” should motivate us 
to recognize two things in Kant’s notion of rational constraint on our representational 
capabilities.  In the first place, the “Refutation of Idealism” makes clear that Kant 
believes the rational constraint placed on our ability to objectively represent objects 
through our subjective capacities is satisfied from within the empirical world.  My 
empirical experience of my determinate self requires representation of an outer world, 
and this representation is possible only on condition of objects existent outside me—
through “a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside 
me”.39  While this is all taken up at the level of the empirical world of appearances, 
structured by the a priori nature of the pure concepts of the understanding and the pure 
intuitions of sensibility, nevertheless the empirical operations of our cognitive faculties 
are rationally constrained in virtue of the fact that concepts are actualized only on 
acquiring content via intuition.  Bird is correct to see the rational constraint on particular 
representations arising from within Kant’s phenomenal account. 
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 And yet, in the discussion of phenomena and noumena, we clearly saw that a 
supersensible world plays an integral role for Kant.  Though they have only a negative 
use, curbing our tendencies to speculate beyond the bounds of possible experience, 
noumena are nonetheless ‘no arbitrary invention’, for ‘intelligible entities’ 
corresponding to our sensible impressions ‘doubtless exist’.  What remains to be shown 
in Kant’s account is how the noumena play a metaconceptual role in fortifying the 
normative force of his theory of representation, ensuring certainty regarding the structure 
of our phenomenal experience of the world. 
2.5 The Certainty of the Structure of Representation as Appearance 
 
For Kant, so long as we recognize that the objects of our representations are 
known only as they appear to us, and that we have no grasp of what objects might be in 
themselves, we can be certain of the way they must appear.  By limiting our 
representational capacity strictly to phenomena, with the concurrent postulation of 
noumenal things in themselves outside our reach, Kant can declare that the pure forms of 
intuition and pure concepts of the understanding have certain application with respect to 
phenomena—for they are the very conditions that make phenomenal experience 
possible.  These conditions in their limited application allow Kant to claim our 
“synthetic representations and their objects can…obtain necessary relation to one 
another”. 40   
This necessary relation obtains only in virtue of the transcendental status of the 
categories and the pure intuitions, as conditions that make possible any experience 
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whatsoever.  “For whence could experience derive its certainty, if all the rules, according 
to which it proceeds, were always themselves empirical, and therefore contingent?”41  
Were the categories justified only through empirical acquisition, we could only be 
contingently sure of their objectivity—and so we would be faced with the oscillation 
between dogmatism and skepticism mentioned earlier.  But because Kant grounds the 
categories in the transcendentally necessary conditions for any possible experience, we 
can have certainty of the categorical structure of these experiences as appearances.42  At 
the same time, we must restrict our knowing capacity to what we experience as 
appearance, and while we posit a realm of noumena, we can have no knowledge of it.  
The Transcendental Deduction of the First Edition contains a clear argument for the 
connection between the transcendental status of the categories, their application to 
appearances, and the certainty this provides.43  From the “Summary Representation of 
the Correctness of this Deduction of the pure Concepts of Understanding, and of its 
being the only Deduction possible”: 
If the objects with which our knowledge has to deal were things in 
themselves, we could have no a priori concepts of them.  For from what 
source could we obtain the concepts?...But if, on the other hand, we have to 
deal only with appearances, it is not merely possible, but necessary, that 
certain a priori concepts should precede empirical knowledge of objects.44 
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At the end of the Second Edition’s Transcendental Deduction Kant posits a third option, 
between representation making objects possible and objects making representation 
possible.  Some might suppose the categories were supplied to minds by a divine 
Creator, who ensures their representational application to objects in the world.  In 
discounting this option, Kant reiterates the point on certainty made in the First Edition 
quote above.   
…there is this decisive objection against the suggested middle course, that 
the necessity of the categories, which belongs to their very conception, would 
then have to be sacrificed.45 
 
Were we to suppose that the categories matched objects in themselves by Divine Fiat, 
we lose the assurance that they have necessary application, and so we lose the certainty 
of our representational structure.  What allows us to be certain of representations is the 
way they are structured by the transcendental conditions of experience, and this requires 
that we understand them as appearances, phenomena, set against the noumenal things in 
themselves.  Kant’s philosophy has purchased certainty for the categorical structure of 
our representations, but it has done so at the cost of applying them strictly to 
appearances, necessarily removed from things in themselves.  Armed with this 
clarification of the role of normativity in Kant’s account of representation, we can return 
to the discussion between Bird and McDowell in order to clarify at what levels their 
analyses of Kant are directed.  Following this, we will examine what this reading of Kant 
offers for contemporary philosophy, and how we might be inclined to react to it. 
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2.6 Dimensions of Normativity   
 
Bird’s discussion of the misplaced focus on transcendental objects as the source 
of representational constraint suggests that the traditionalist account of Kantian 
constraint has tried to leverage noumena into a material element of Kant’s philosophy, 
where really the noumena play only a formal and negative role for Kant.46  On this 
characterization, the material role that noumena play for traditionalists is as a sort of 
‘transcendental matter’ that is received in sensibility and acted on by the understanding.  
But this is just to give the noumena a positive role, attributing to it a power to ‘cause’ 
instances of representation that we can have no way of justifying.47  Bird suggests that 
we see the noumena as playing a formal role for Kant—his talk of noumena is “a claim 
about the formal conditions presupposed by some aspect of experience, and not a 
material reference to some supersensible item…”48  Bird instead encourages us to see 
rational constraint on representation satisfied at the phenomenal level.  As we saw in 
“The Refutation of Idealism”, Kant’s account of the dual role of passive intuitions and 
spontaneous concepts allow the content given in sensible intuition sufficiently to 
structure the spontaneous activity of the understanding, and so to provide the rational 
constraint needed for objectivity without having to posit interaction with a supersensible 
world.  In this way, Bird’s reading avoids the sort of positive role for the noumenal that 
Kant himself was explicit in rejecting. 
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 At the same time, we can now understand McDowell’s concern not to be with 
individual instances of representation, but with the overall Kantian framework that gives 
certainty to the forms of representation generally.  Because the categorical and 
intuitional forms of individual instances of representation are justified only by their 
transcendental role in delimiting what is possible as experience, Kant requires a 
hypothetical noumenal realm of which we can have no knowledge whatsoever.  But in so 
doing Kant gives us certainty regarding the form of our knowledge of phenomena.  It is 
this overall reliance on the noumenal, even at the purely formal level, that is at the center 
of McDowell’s concern for rational constraint, and motivates his own view of an 
immanent “second nature” to replace the transcendental in Kant. 
 It should be emphasized that these readings are complimentary, each addressing 
the Kantian system from a different perspective.  And normativity plays an important 
role on both readings of Kant’s philosophy.  On Bird’s level of individual 
representations, the normative dimension operates via the way rational constraint is 
satisfied by the need for intuitional content to meet with the concepts of the 
understanding.  On McDowell’s overarching approach to Kant’s account of 
representation, the normative force is satisfied by the bifurcation of objects into 
phenomena and noumena, with the strict provision that we limit our judgments to objects 
taken as phenomena.  By recognizing the role intuitions play in supplying content to 
concepts at the level of phenomena, we preserve rational constraint on individual 
representation without the noumena playing a positive role.  At the same time, by 
recognizing that Kant requires a conceptual role for noumena in satisfying his 
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architectonic concern to supply certainty for our representations restricted to phenomena, 
and so requires us to posit a realm of unknowable things in themselves, we spell out the 
worry that commentators like McDowell have had with Kant’s transcendental story. 49  
2.7 Looking Ahead 
 
And so it does appear that the transcendental story is an ineluctable element of 
normative force in Kant’s philosophy.  Should we find the transcendental story 
worrisome, and if we’re drawn to the notion of normativity as a means to ground the 
categories we apply in experience, we shall need some other account of the origin of 
their binding force on us.  Preserving the normative force Kant’s Copernican revolution 
offers, we may be inclined to reconceive the transcendental status of certain concepts as 
immanent in the social use of language, and in so doing make our way toward the later 
Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, Searle, Dummett, and one strand in the tradition of 20th 
century analytic philosophy.  This would involve an attempt to give a socio-semantic 
account of the origin and status of the normative force binding us to concept-use.  
Divesting ourselves of transcendental story, we can nonetheless preserve a role for 
rational constraint on our use of concepts in the immanent social standards of a 
community of givers and askers of reasons. 
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 At the end of his article, Bird describes his endeavor as an attempt to shift Kant’s commitment 
to the noumenal away from the traditional account, where the noumena serve as material for sensibility, 
and toward seeing the noumena as a formal requirement for his system.  Bird likewise assents to the 
noumenal’s role in establishing the normative dimension of Kant’s philosophy.  “It [Bird’s view] 
represents Kant’s commitment to noumena not as a material commitment to a supersensible world, but as 
a commitment to its conceivability.  It claims that that conceivability is required if such features as 
normativity, even in the moral sphere, are to be properly located.  The conception of the noumenal realm 
is needed as a condition of morality, but once that is conceded then normativity, in the shape, for example, 
of practical freedom, is itself located not in a noumenal world but in that of appearances.”  Bird, 
“McDowell’s Kant,” page 243.  In this paper I hope to be in agreement with this reading, while indicating 
that McDowell is concerned with even this general commitment to a noumenal realm in Kant’s normative 
epistemology. 
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Now a semantic reading of Kant’s program is not too hard to justify, in that the 
Critique of Pure Reason defines the categories recursively with respect to the structure 
of judgments.50  One prospect that an explicit semantic reading of Kant offers is to dispel 
straightaway certain epistemological worries about our representational capabilities, 
embodied in skeptical propositions that make use of the very categories supposed to be 
semantically necessary for any communication whatsoever.  The skeptic’s argument 
would thereby be undercut by the semantic necessity of the very structure of the 
propositions in which the argument is framed; of the isomorphic relationship between 
the structure of the proposition and the categories of experience supposedly called into 
question by that proposition.51  Even in asking her question the epistemological skeptic 
makes use of the propositional resources upon which the categories are grounded, and 
thereby obviates her ability to consistently question their application.  Simply in asking 
the question the skeptic makes use of the resources she questions.  It may be that she 
does not realize her inability to consistently question the categorical structure of her 
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 Kant’s process of grounding the categories on the forms of judgment occurs in Book I of the 
Transcendental Analytic, the Analytic of Concepts, which Kant understands as the “dissection of the 
faculty of understanding itself, in order to investigate the possibility of concepts a priori by looking for 
them in the understanding alone…We shall therefore follow up the pure concepts to their first seeds and 
dispositions in the human understanding, in which they lie prepared, till at last, on the occasion of 
experience, they are developed…”  Critique of Pure Reason, A65-6/B90-1, page 103.  In Section 1 of The 
Transcendental Clue to the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of the Understanding Kant remarks “Now we 
can reduce all acts of the understanding to judgments, and the understanding may therefore be represented 
as a faculty of judgment…The functions of the understanding can, therefore, be discovered if we can give 
an exhaustive statement of the functions of unity in judgments.”  Ibid., A69/B94, page 106.  In Section 2 
Kant identifies the “function of thought in judgment” under four headings, each of which has three 
members (so, for instance, the modal heading stipulates that all judgments are asserted as either possible, 
actual, or necessary).  In Section 3 these 12 forms of judgment are correlated to the 12 pure concepts of the 
understanding or categories, divided likewise into four headings with three members each (so the modal 
character of judgments is correlated to the modal character of objects of experience—things are either 
possible/impossible, existent/nonexistent, or necessary/contingent).  The importance of the recursive 
definition of the pure concepts of the categories from the forms of judgment is central to Kant’s work. 
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 This is a point Brandom makes in Kantian Lessons about Mind, Meaning, and Rationality, 51-
3. 
 33 
experience, but the insight here is that the very propositional structure of her doubts in 
this core region ensures their falsity.52  The semantic underpinning of this account gives 
Kant’s normativity a remarkable appeal to contemporary Anglo-American analytic 
philosophers:  in the first place, the normative force attributes a structure to experiential 
judgments that purports to be necessary—it is bound up in the very possibility of giving 
and asking for reasons; second, this structure is justified through identification with the 
structure of the judgment as a proposition.  Certainty regarding the world achieved 
through an analysis of language—what a heaven for analytic philosophy! 
Thus it may be that shifting from the transcendental story of normativity to an 
immanent socio-linguistic one is not only more palatable to contemporary interests, but 
is in some crucial sense congruent with Kant’s own thought.  Still, in jettisoning the 
transcendental story of normativity in favor of an immanent socio-linguistic one we have 
moved critically beyond Kant.  Insofar as an appeal to the conditions of our social 
existence as an explanation for the licenses warranting our assertion of certain 
propositions thereby moves us toward Wittgenstein, Austin, and 20th century analytic 
philosophy generally, it would do well to realize that we are also making our way toward 
Hegel.  Whether this should be reason enough to consider the whole project problematic 
I will leave for the reader to decide, though I suspect that 21st century philosophy in the 
English-speaking world will not be as colored by a repudiation of Hegel as its 20th 
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 It would do well in this context to refer the reader to Barry Stroud’s “Transcendental 
Arguments”.   Stroud provided an important contribution to the contemporary analytic investigation of 
Kant with his seminal 1968 paper.  In it he argues that we can jettison Kant’s transcendental idealism and 
instead ground his philosophy in a class of “privileged propositions”, the truth of which being necessary 
for any sensible question whatsoever, ensures the impossibility of their falsity.  Barry Stroud, 
“Transcendental Arguments,” Journal of Philosophy 65, (1968): 241-256. 
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century counterpart was.53  It is, however, beyond the limits of the current project to 
more than gesture toward how a socio-linguistic locus for normativity invokes a 
Hegelian revaluation of Kant.  Instead, our next aim will be to specify how socio-
linguistic normativity preserves the rational constraint fought for by Kant. 
 For it would seem that if language and society were the ultimate standards of 
rational constraint, of the normative dimensions that prescribe and prohibit our 
assertions and actions, that the problem of objectivity returns full force.  Kant ensured 
rational constraint via the requirement that concepts meet with intuitions in phenomenal 
experience, and more generally via the need for a transcendental story bifurcating 
phenomena from noumena.  But to what extent can society be a non-subjective locus of 
rational constraint?  Why is this not merely an extension of the problem of one subject’s 
rational constraint to the problem of a group of subjects?  It would seem to turn the 
notion of ‘rational constraint’ into an empty label if such constraint were ensured by the 
extent to which those around us either nodded their heads in agreement or shook them 
disapprovingly in response to our assertions. 
 The discussion comprising section 3 will spell out how socio-linguistic 
normativity preserves rational constraint in the prospect for meta-normative appraisals of 
the current standards of a discourse.  These meta-normative appraisals are effected 
through the making explicit of current standards of a meta-language by articulating them 
as assertions within the object-language and criticizing them from the standpoint of 
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 One prospect for moving beyond both Kant’s transcendental story and Hegel’s absolutism lies 
in the articulation of a fallibilist epistemology that situates normativity in the socio-linguistic realm.  We 
may be able to develop a theory of the normative dimensions of epistemic representation adequate to 
escape dogmatism, skepticism, and idealism, without appealing to a transcendental story, and without 
supposing we need to grasp an Absolute, unrevisable, thing in itself. 
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alternative formulations of the discourse.  In the self-correcting enterprise of a 
community of critical language-users the prospect for rational constraint is preserved in 
the form of self-reflective appraisal.  To understand how this prospect is offered we will 
focus on specifying the role of normativity in Brandom’s inferential semantics.  We will 
come to understand Brandom’s semantics by addressing some of the criticisms recently 
brought to bear on Brandom’s program, in the belief that by addressing these criticisms 
we can gain a grip on what it is Brandom’s program offers. 
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3. NORMATIVITY AND INFERENTIALISM:  ADDRESSING A 
NORMATIVE THEORY OF MEANING 
 
3.1 Introduction:  Normativity and Propositional Content 
 Let us begin by examining how the inferentialist account of meaning operates. 54  
Suppose we are looking for an explanation of the meaning of the proposition “Richard is 
an accomplished pianist”.  One way of specifying the meaning of this proposition is by 
specifying the meaning of its component parts, giving definitions for its words or 
perhaps by providing extensional accounts of what the words refer to.  The meaning of 
“Richard is an accomplished pianist” could be effected by providing an extensional 
explanation of the name “Richard”, a definition of the logical operation of identity, and 
definitions of the predications “accomplished” and “pianist”, or, if we were intensionally 
phobic, we could account for these predications in terms of extensional set-memberships 
for all the objects to which these predications apply, one of which is the object 
“Richard”.  This would be a subsentential approach to propositional meaning—the 
                                                 
54
 Brandom takes propositional content to be the paradigm case of conceptual content: Robert B. 
Brandom, Making it Explicit, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) p. 152.  In other words, getting 
a hold on propositional content will allow us to understand conceptual content more generally.  Much of 
the discussion in this section of the thesis is focused on propositional content, but Brandom’s work focuses 
on conceptual content more generally, in that practical activity (specifically intentional action) is the sort 
of nonlinguistic behavior that nonetheless involves an implicit conceptual content.  Part of the thrust of 
Brandom’s program lies in offering a single theory able inferentially to articulate the conceptual content 
both of propositions and of intentional actions, via the explicit assertions of propositions expressing the 
content of these prior actions and propositions.  Throughout this paper I will use “propositional content” 
and “conceptual content” interchangeably, though usually adopting “propositional content” in the context 
of language users and “conceptual content” with respect to cognitive states more generally, whether 
linguistic or not—an issue that will not arise until the discussion of normativity and evolutionary 
development in section 4. 
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meaning of a whole sentence is specified in virtue of the meaning of its subsentential 
parts.   
The inferentialist adopts another approach, explaining the meaning of 
propositions not from the meaning of component expressions but from the inferential 
relations a proposition has with other propositions in the language-game its user is 
engaged in.  The inferentialist explains meaning in terms of proposition-proposition 
relations, not proposition-word relations.  To say that “Richard is an accomplished 
pianist” is to say also that Richard can play the piano, can play it well, and has played it 
well in venues that confer on him a recognition that he plays the piano well.  The 
inferentialist account works similarly for explaining the meaning of intentional states.  
The assertion that “I am angry at my sister” is to be explained by reference to the 
propositions that inferentially lead to it and from it.  Asking why I am angry at my sister 
is asking for my reasons for being in this state.  These reasons are specified in terms of 
the (explanatorily) prior propositions that license my being angry at my sister.  To ask 
what it means to say I am angry at my sister is to ask what other propositions allow us to 
infer my being angry at my sister, and to ask what my being angry at her itself licenses 
us to further infer. Understanding what our propositions mean requires keeping deontic 
score on each other’s inferential commitments in the language game, and for the 
inferentialist this deontic scorekeeping is often nonmonotonic.  To assert “It is 70 
degrees in the shade right now” tells us that if you leave your ice cream outside it will 
melt.  But if you respond “I have an outside freezer on the patio” then the truth-value of 
“your ice cream will melt if you leave it outside” will have changed in the context of the 
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further propositions you have brought to bear in this conversation, viz., that you have an 
outside freezer.  If our interlocutor responds with the assertion that the outside freezer 
has been unplugged, then once again (if true) the truth value of your propositional 
commitments will have changed, and so will have changed your practical commitments 
(assuming your aim is to keep your ice cream from melting and assuming you are 
rational in behaving so as to achieve your aims).   
The inferentialist theory of meaning is therefore holistic—the meaning of a 
proposition depends on that proposition’s relations to other propositions in the language.  
Articulating the inferential relations that obtain between a given proposition and those 
implicitly consequent from it serves to specify the meaning of that proposition.  In so 
describing this process we can understand why Robert Brandom chose the titles he did 
for the two major works detailing an inferentialist theory of meaning—Making it 
Explicit and Articulating Reasons.  Inferentialism is a method of specifying meaning by 
making explicit the propositional commitments consequent on the assertion of a 
particular proposition, articulating the reasons why we hold that proposition. 
 The inference itself is a paradigmatically normative concept.  To hold A and to 
infer from A that B is to be obliged to hold B.55  But inferentialism as a theory of 
meaning admits of different normative (or deontic) statues.  Inferentialism is a normative 
theory of meaning because the specification of a proposition’s inferential relations 
makes explicit the further propositions we are entitled and committed to consequent on 
it.  Entitlement and commitment both express an obligation of some sort, but the 
                                                 
55
 Brandom prefers the use of “entitlement” and “commitment” instead of  “permission” and 
“obligation”, insofar as the latter terms imply a degree of external authority.  See Making it Explicit, 160. 
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normativity of entitlement and the normativity of commitment critically differ.  One can 
be entitled to something without being committed to it, as when I am entitled by the rules 
of my employer to take a lunch break without being forced to do so.56  But commitment 
is a stronger form of obligation—if I am committed to a behavior or to the assertion of a 
consequent proposition I am not merely being offered an entitlement to it; I am bound to 
it in some stronger form.  To say that Richard is an accomplished pianist is to be entitled 
to the proposition that he has performed at Wigmore Hall in London without being 
committed to it.  However, to say that Richard is an accomplished pianist is to be 
committed to some proposition that specifies his accomplishment with regard to an 
appropriate venue.  Brandom spells this out in Chapter 3 of Making it Explicit: 
The fundamental normative concept required is commitment.  Being 
committed is a normative status—more specifically a deontic status.  The 
project of the central sections of this chapter is to introduce a notion of 
discursive commitment as a species of deontic status that can do much of the 
explanatory theoretical work that is normally assigned to the notion of 
intentional state.  But deontic statuses come in two flavors.  Coordinate with 
the notion of commitment is that of entitlement.  Doing what one is 
committed to do is appropriate in one sense, while doing what one is entitled 
to do is appropriate in another.  The model of linguistic practice described 
here elaborates on the Dummettian bipartite pragmatics by distinguishing on 
the side of consequences, for instance, what a particular speech act commits 
one to from what it entitles one to.57 
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 Rather than a downstream question about what propositions an individual assertion entitles one 
to assert, entitlement can be taken to be an upstream question about what warrant an individual has to 
assert a particular proposition to begin with—what entitles them to assert a given proposition.   See Robert 
B. Brandom, Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism, (Cambridge:  Harvard University 
Press, 2003), 192 and following.  In subsection 4.7 of the current work we will examine the difference 
between entitlement and commitment with respect to self-reflective critical assessments of social norms of 
behavior, and there our concern will be on the upstream notion of entitlement rather than the downstream 
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 Making it Explicit, 159. 
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At the end of Articulating Reasons, written initially as a series of lectures used to help 
instruct courses being taught with Making it Explicit, Brandom spells out the relationship 
he takes to obtain between normativity and meaning more generally: 
…we can understand making a claim as taking up a particular sort of 
normative stance toward an inferentially articulated content.  It is endorsing 
it, taking responsibility for it, committing oneself to it.  The difference 
between treating something as a claiming and treating it just as a brute 
sounding-off, treating it as making a move in the assertional game and 
treating it as an idle performance, is just whether one treats it as the 
undertaking of a commitment that is suitably articulated by its consequential 
relations to other commitments.  These are rational relations, whereby 
undertaking one commitment rationally obliges one to undertake others, 
related to it as its inferential consequences.  These relations articulate the 
content of the commitment or responsibility one undertakes by asserting a 
sentence.  Apart from such relations, there is no content, hence no assertion.58 
 
 This provides us at least a sketch of the inferentialist program—articulate 
propositional content by specifying a proposition’s inferential relations within the 
language game it is deployed in; a sentence-level account of meaning rather than a 
subsentential one; holistic rather than atomic; with the notion of deontic scorekeeping, 
normative judgments as to the entitlements and commitments consequent from and 
implicit in the assertion of particular propositions, playing a critical role in explaining 
propositional content.  With this general picture before us we can begin to examine some 
criticisms of the inferentialist program.  Our examination will begin with a detailed 
analysis of Jeff Speaks’s concern with the role propositional attitudes have in 
determining standards of assessment.  Following this analysis we will look at criticisms 
from Gideon Rosen and Jerry Fodor and Ernie Lepore.  Beginning with Speaks our aim 
is to answer the criticisms brought to bear on inferentialism and in so doing get a better 
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grip on how the inferentialist program operates, especially with regard to the notion of 
normativity. 
3.2 Sketching Speaks’s Criticism 
 
Jeff Speaks has raised a criticism of the semantic role played by normativity in 
Brandom’s theory of propositional content.59  If this criticism goes through it would 
substantially undercut the viability of Brandom’s program.  By beginning with Speaks’s 
criticism we will sketch in outline the contours of Brandom’s inferentialist semantics 
and address straightaway the most potentially damaging critique.  Following this 
discussion we will consider more general critiques of Brandom’s program, from articles 
by Gideon Rosen and Jerry Fodor and Ernie Lepore. 
The locus of Speaks’s concern are comments Brandom makes in “Modality, 
Normativity, and Intentionality” about the normativity of propositional content.60  In this 
article Brandom defends the idea that propositional content fixes standards of 
assessment, in that the meaning of a proposition is essentially related to a dimension of 
its appropriate use.  When I assert “Y” in consequence of your asking me why I have 
previously asserted “X”, Y is intended to stand as a reason for the assertion of X.  
Whether Y is an appropriate reason for X depends on the content of Y and X.  If I’ve 
asserted that “I am unhappy with this assignment” you may ask me “Why?”.  If my 
response is “Because it displeases me”, the propositional content of this reason may not 
be sufficient to license the initial assertion, especially in the case where I am your 
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 See Jeff Speaks, “The normativity of content and ‘the Frege point,’” unpublished paper 
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 Robert B. Brandom, “Modality, Normativity, and Intentionality,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, Vol. 63, No. 3. (November 2001): 587-609. 
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employee.  If, however, my response takes the form of an explication of my displeasure, 
then the propositional content of this response may be said to determine a standard of 
assessment appropriate to the context.  The appropriateness of an utterance is therefore a 
function of the content of the utterance.61  “…anything recognizable as an intentional 
state (for present purposes, we can think of these as propositional [sic] contentful states 
or as conceptually contentful representations) must underwrite normative assessments as 
to whether things are as they ought to be, according to that state…”62  Propositional 
content determines normative assessment. 
But Speaks’s paper hopes to show, in a manner similar to Geach’s attack on 
ascriptivism, that the same propositional content can be subject to different normative 
assessments depending on propositional attitude.  If this is true then it would seem to 
indicate that propositional content cannot determine a standard of assessment—for one 
and the same propositional content will be subject to different standards of assessment 
depending on propositional attitude.  Geach argues brilliantly in “Ascriptivism” and 
more broadly in “Assertion” the Fregean point that a proposition’s content must remain 
constant under different propositional attitudes, else we blatantly engage in equivocation 
whenever we appeal to modus ponens.  If propositional content is determined by 
propositional attitude, then the premise (1) “A” asserted by itself does not have the same 
content, is not the same proposition, as “A” when it appears unasserted in the (itself 
asserted) conditional (2) “AB”.  If the asserted proposition differs in content from the 
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unasserted proposition, we cannot conclude (3) “B” from (1) & (2) without 
equivocation.  Given the widespread use and apparently ineliminable status of modus 
ponens, a clearer reductio ad absurdum against the idea that propositional attitude 
determines propositional content can hardly be imagined. 
After this fashion Speaks argues that normative assessment cannot arise as a 
function of content—for a single propositional content can give rise to different 
normative assessments depending on the propositional attitude with which that content is 
expressed.  To avoid an equivocation on content when propositions are variously held 
under different propositional attitudes, propositional content cannot determine standards 
of assessment. 
Speaks makes his case by asking the reader to consider one and the same 
proposition under two different propositional attitudes.  The example he gives us 
involves considering a particular proposition as a daydream.  Suppose I am standing at 
my living room window in December in College Station, daydreaming about the snow 
on the ground in Bozeman, Montana.  Under what condition would the content of this 
daydream be subject to an assessment of whether it was the “right” one to have?  It 
appears patently absurd to expect that standing at my window daydreaming of snow is 
appropriate, but daydreaming of the beach is not.  And daydreaming is not the only 
propositional attitude that appears to obviate Brandom’s claims that propositional 
content determines the standard of assessment.  “[C]onsider entertaining the thought that 
p, wondering whether it is possible that p, assuming for the sake of argument that p.  
These are all propositional attitudes, and none of them are governed by normative 
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standards of correctness of the sort which govern judgement and belief.”63  Speaks 
argues that propositional content cannot determine normative standards without ignoring 
the Frege point argued by Geach—that the same propositional content must appear 
within a variety of propositional attitudes else we equivocate in modus ponens.  But it 
does not make sense to suppose that the content of the proposition expressing my being 
in Bozeman surrounded by snow should have any sort of invariant standard of 
assessment—for at one time I may be daydreaming this content and at another I may be 
assert it, and clearly the standards that count for (or against) the asserted proposition are 
different from the standards that count for (or against) the proposition as daydreamed.  If 
we accept the Frege Point that propositional content must be constant across 
propositional attitudes, and also accept that the standards of assessment which govern a 
proposition as judgement are different from the standards that govern the same 
proposition as a daydream, then it appears that propositional content cannot determine 
standards of assessment. 
Finally, Speaks asks us to consider the related claim that linguistic meaning is 
likewise governed by normative standards.64  Suppose we are watching a play in which 
an actor utters the sentence “My father was killed in Vietnam.”  Surely the normative 
assessment, the “standards of correctness”, for this sentence would be different from the 
normative assessment brought to bear if I uttered it sincerely.  An actor can get away 
with saying a number of things that you or I, in sincere conversation, cannot.  Yet the 
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meaning of these different propositions seems invariant.  Similarly with sentences used 
in joking—we assess them differently without taking their meaning to vary from those 
same sentences if sincerely asserted.  The impression Speaks leaves us with is that 
Brandom’s focus on propositional content as the determinant of normative assessment 
will not do—propositional attitude is in some cases just as important as content in 
determining standards of assessment. 
Surely this is true.  The meaning of a proposition remains the same despite being 
uttered with different propositional attitudes.  This is the fundamental point Geach 
makes with his Fregean exegesis regarding assertion, first in “Ascriptivism” and then 
more fully in “Assertion”.  But the reader may wonder whether this argument 
reconstructs the role for “normative assessment” Brandom has in mind for the inferential 
semantics made use of by his program.  Brandom, after all, is very familiar with Geach’s 
argument.65  Has he made such an elementary mistake?  
The purpose of Brandom’s “Modality, Normativity, and Intentionality” is to 
argue that inasmuch as modality, once philosophically mysterious, gained a measure of 
respectability through the formalization of different modal systems in the middle of the 
20th century, we can now begin to get a grip on a non-mysterious account of 
intentionality if we think of intentionality as a fundamentally normative endeavor, with 
normativity itself perhaps understood in modal terms.  This will allow us to reconstruct a 
view of intentionality via normativity understood in modal terms.  The passage Speaks 
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highlights for discussion fairly well indicates the concern he has with Brandom’s use of 
normativite assessment with regard to propositional content:  
The core idea [in the trend of philosophical development that Brandom is 
focusing on] is that anything recognizable as an intentional state (for present 
purposes, we can think of these as propositional [sic] contentful states or as 
conceptually contentful representations) must underwrite normative 
assessments as to whether things are as they ought to be, according to that 
state—whether the state is correct or successful according to the standards 
determined by its content.66 
 
Brandom appears committed here to the idea that propositional content determines 
normative standards.  And this is not an isolated passage for Brandom, a mere slip of the 
pen we could forgive him for.  This position on content as the criterion for determining 
normative assessment is at the center of his inferential semantics—it has in fact been 
central to his philosophical investigations for some time.  In his 1993 paper “The Social 
Anatomy of Inference” Brandom remarks “The conceptual content of one’s beliefs and 
claims determines what one is committed to and what would entitle one to those 
commitments [emphasis in original].”67  But Speaks has exhibited a problem with the 
view that conceptual content determines the normative character of a proposition.  If one 
and the same proposition can be now believed-true, now daydreamed, and thus be 
subject to different normative assessments without the content of these propositions 
changing, it appears untenable to hold that propositional content determines the 
standards of assessment for a proposition. 
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 Brandom, “Modality, Normativity, and Intentionality” 589. 
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 Robert B. Brandom, “The Social Anatomy of Inference,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Vol. 53, No. 3 (September 1993): 661-666, page 666. 
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 Another way to frame this issue, and in doing so to gain a broader sense of the 
conceptual landscape, is via the question “Whence propositional content?” or 
equivalently “Whence normativity?”  From one approach we have normative assessment 
as explanandum, accounted for by propositional content.  This is the approach we have 
been thus far considering—that there is something independently intelligible about the 
idea of propositional content which will allow us to get a grip on the idea of normativity.  
But an alternative method of explanation is possible.  For we can within the work on 
normativity discern a position that takes normative assessment to be an explanans 
accounting for propositional content.  In this latter approach normative assessment is 
appealed to as something that allows us to understand propositional content—in the idea 
that what a proposition means is to be understood in terms of what inferences a 
proposition commits and entitles us to. Speaks claims to be critiquing only the first 
position, taking the normativity of content to be an explanandum in need of a 
propositional explanans—he professes to be silent on a position that takes the 
normativity of propositional content as an explanans useful in some other explanatory 
account.68  Critically, however, he argues that—whatever role it might play—
normativity cannot be appealed to as an explanans made to account for normativity of 
propositional content—for then normativity is being asked to play the Herculean role of 
explaining itself.  The bogeyman of this circular explanatory account arises, for Speaks, 
through the false supposition that there is something normative about propositional 
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 Speaks, “The normativity of content and ‘the Frege point,’” p.3. 
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content in need of explanation. “And in this sense, I [Speaks] will argue, there’s no such 
thing as the normativity of meaning.”69 
My argument in this portion of the thesis will focus on three related responses in 
defense of Brandom, and in doing so flesh out Brandom’s program in preparation for 
more pointed criticism from Rosen and Fodor and Lepore.  The first defense centers on a 
clarification regarding how normativity as explanans plays a role in explaining meaning 
in terms of inferentially articulating the commitments/entitlements an assertion binds us 
to, the second from thematic considerations of Brandom’s views on normativity with 
respect to “metalinguistic deontic scorekeeping”, and finally from the role of assertion in 
his theory.   
The first defense will be directed toward explicating the precise way Brandom 
sees normativity playing its role in his semantics—via the inferential linkages that the 
use of one concept implicitly invokes, and how in the overlay of these (material) 
inferences individual concepts acquire determinate meaning.  The second defense 
involves marking a distinction between the metalinguistic role of normative assessment 
in the formalization of Brandom’s inferential semantics, as the means for fixing meaning 
within a complex of entitlements and commitments abstractly conceived, and normative 
assessment as a stage of the linguistic game of giving and asking for reasons that relies 
on an implicit grasp of meaning (however initially vague) already at hand.70  In doing so 
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 Brandom understands this initial grasp of conceptual content in terms of social education.  A 
human being is come to have some comprehension of the meaning of the terms he or she uses in virtue of 
having learned a language, but the contents of this initial stage of development then become open to self-
conscious reflection through the reflexive game of giving and asking for reasons that constitutes his theory 
of inferential semantics. 
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we will have to address the apparent circularity this dual role for normativity invokes.  
The third defense will put forward the claim that, on Brandom’s account, believing-true 
is a fundamental propositional attitude that the normative assessments of inferential 
articulation implicitly rely upon to explicate the meaning of a proposition.  While 
Brandom focuses on the speech act of assertion as the locus of inferential articulation, 
we will argue that the speech act of assertion needs to be understood via the 
propositional attitude of believing-true.  It is via our supposing that a proposition is 
believed, in consequence taking it to be asserted, and therefore only after we know (at 
least vaguely) what the proposition means, that we can begin to examine its possible 
uses under different propositional attitudes.  
3.3 Inferential Articulation, Propositional Content, and Normativity 
 
In Brandom’s inferentialism, the material inferences implicit in our use of 
particular concepts can be appealed to in giving a holistic rendering of the meaning of 
our propositions, paradigmatically by the explicit use of the conditional in explicating 
the inferential connections between different propositional contents.  In explaining this 
inferential semantics we will begin by situating normativity within Brandom’s program 
as explanans—as the normative endeavor of explicating material inferences is an activity 
that explains and accounts for propositional content.  At the same time however, 
normativity as explanans will be seen to presuppose a prior normative foundation 
resident within the social standards that serve to indicate the paths for particular 
inferential articulations.  This will lead us to an examination of the social origin of 
conceptual normativity and the prospect for metalinguistic normative assessment, in so 
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doing helping to clarify the specific way in which the normative is taken to be 
explanandum in Brandom’s program.   
 To begin with, a word or two of architectonic theme may be in order.  Brandom’s 
theory is meant to provide an account of what it means to be a member of a linguistic 
community—specifically, what it means to be engaged in (or to be in a position to be 
engaged in) the process of rationally discoursing within such a community.  As with so 
much else in this program, Brandom looks to a Sellarsian idea for motivation—in 
particular, the idea of rational discourse as the game of “giving and asking for reasons”. 
Brandom’s inferential semantics is intended to account for this practice by beginning 
from the notion of conceptually contentful propositions—the paradigmatic elements of 
rational discourse.  Thereafter his theory must provide answers to two questions: 1) what 
it means to say a proposition has content; that is, he must provide an account of the 
meaningfulness of propositions, and he must answer the question as to 2) how 
meaningful propositions are variously asserted in contexts that allow them to stand as the 
essential elements of rational discourse; that is, Brandom must provide an account of 
how meaningful propositions play the role they do in the game of giving and asking for 
reasons.  It is in the notion of normativity that this structure is knit together. 
 The meaning of a proposition in Brandom’s theory is accounted for by specifying 
the inferential links that proposition has to other propositions that, in asserting the first, 
an individual must assent to.    “For if the conceptual content expressed by each sentence 
or word is understood as essentially consisting in its inferential relations (broadly 
construed) or articulated by its inferential relations (narrowly construed), then one must 
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grasp many such contents in order to grasp any.”71  Brandom defends this idea by 
developing an inferential semantics whose role in the game of giving and asking for 
reasons serves to make explicit the content of our propositions, by showing that the 
assertion of one propositional content implicitly involves the assertion of various others.  
Brandom’s contention is that we can get a grip on the conceptual content of an 
individual proposition via the inferential linkages that proposition has to others its 
assertion commits and/or entitles us to. 
 The key to Brandom's inferential articulation of meaning lies in his incorporation 
of material inference as distinct from merely formal inference.  If the inferential 
connections one proposition had to others were merely formal then the content of those 
propositions would play no role in explicating their truth, and thus there would be no 
account of meaning derived from exhibiting inferential connections.  Only when the 
truth of an inference depends on the content of the component propositions can an 
explication of inferential relation suffice to specify meaning.  Propositional content plays 
no role in a purely formal system of inference, and thus propositional content cannot be 
accounted for by the inferential commitments exhibited in a formal system of inference.  
Make use of whatever propositions you choose—the mere form of their relation is 
sufficient to ensure the correctness (or lack thereof) of an inference from one to another.  
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 Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 29 (emphasis added).  This idea is defended in Sellars’s 
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, §19 p.45: “…there is an important sense in which one has no 
concepts pertaining to the observable properties of physical objects in Space and Time unless one has 
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we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of 
reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says.”  Ibid (emphasis in the original).  Wilfrid 
Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). 
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Only when the authority of an inference depends integrally on the content of its 
constitutive propositions, only, that is, via material in addition to formal inference, can 
meaning be exhibited in the inferential interplay of the system.   
Sellars argued in “Inference and Meaning” that any language making use of the 
subjunctive conditional (sometimes called “counterfactual conditional”) must include the 
notion of a material inference72, but the decision to make use of the material inference 
Brandom appears to consider optional.73   In the fourth section we will discuss the 
broader implications of taking the material conditional to be an optional tool in the 
modeling of natural language semantics.  For now, let us ensure that we understand the 
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and Intentionality”) with the claim made by Sellars in “Inference and Meaning” that “In short, modal 
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 Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 86.   While Brandom, characteristically modest in articulating 
his otherwise grand ambitions, seems to view the adoption of material inferences as optional, Sellars 
argues this move is not optional for any system that wishes to model natural language, replete as it is with 
subjunctive conditionals.  To my knowledge Brandom does not address the argument Sellars uses in 
“Inference and Meaning” for the necessity of material inference in a language with subjunctive 
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natural language might be possible. 
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role it plays in the inferential articulation of propositional content in Brandom's 
semantics. 
 Consider the inference “the streets will be wet” from the proposition “it is 
raining.”  On the formal inference account, there is a suppressed premise here which 
makes this inference valid; namely, “if it is raining the streets will be wet”.  But now the 
meaning of these propositions is irrelevant to the truth of the whole inference—for we 
have a simple case of modus ponens, a valid argument structure.  If the premises are true, 
then the conclusion follows, with no recourse to the meaning of the propositions 
involved. 
 On the material inference account, however, the validity of the inference “it is 
raining, so the streets will be wet” is a function of the meaning of the propositions 
involved, with no further (suppressed) premises needed.    Formalized as originally 
phrased, this inference would be of the form “A, therefore B”.  Clearly this is not a valid 
argument form.  Yet the original inference—from the fact that it is raining to the 
conclusion that the streets will be wet—seems to be acceptable (at least, it is one we 
would consider, ceteris paribus, rational to assent to).  For the original inference to be 
acceptable there must be something more going on here than the mere form of the 
inference and the truth-values of the component propositions.  Their meaning must play 
a crucial role in the authority of the inference. 
 Formally valid inference cannot play the role of explanans in an inferentialist 
account of meaning.  A formal inference is true strictly in virtue of the form of the 
inference and the truth-values of the component propositions.  Their propositional 
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content carries no force in determining the validity or soundness of the inference.  
Semantics enters into consideration only as a stipulation of truth-values.  But the 
correctness of a material inference depends critically on the meaning of its propositions.  
The crucial idea here is that the authority of a material inference depends on the meaning 
of its component propositions, whereas a formal inference can be specified as valid and 
sound strictly in terms of form (validity) and truth-value (soundness).   
Grant, then, a set of material inferences taken to be true, and we have on board an 
account of linguistic meaning, propositional content, that now only has to be unpacked 
by making explicit the various inferential linkages that constitutes the material 
inferences we implicitly assent to in uttering one proposition within the field of others 
inferentially connected to it.  The inferentialist semantic position is therefore holistic, in 
the sense that (as mentioned earlier) “if the conceptual content expressed by each 
sentence or word is understood as essentially consisting in its inferential relations 
(broadly construed) or articulated by its inferential relations (narrowly construed), then 
one must grasp many such contents in order to grasp any.”74  What this means is that 
Brandom views semantics, understanding a language, as a holistic affair.   
 Turning back to Speaks’s criticism about the normativity of propositional content, 
we can begin to see just where normativity first enters as an account of meaning in 
Brandom’s inferentialist semantics.  Speaks was careful to distinguish his position as a 
criticism of the idea that normativity is something that is explained by propositional 
content (normativity as explanandum) from the position that normativity might be 
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something that explains propositional content (normativity as explanans).  Upon 
examining Brandom’s inferentialism we discover an initial account that makes use of 
normativity as explanans in the non-threatening way that Speaks explicitly does not 
criticize.  But now we are left with the problem of how to account for Brandom’s claim 
that there are normative “standards determined by [a proposition’s] content”.75  For in 
addition to the fact that we have yet to address the way this claim appears to invoke 
normativity as explanandum explained by the explanans of propositional content in the 
way Speaks criticizes, we appear to be in a realm of circular reasoning given the fact that 
Brandom has via his inferentialism has already appealed to propositional content as the 
explanandum explained by the explanans of normativity.  How can Brandom’s 
inferentialist semantics appeal to the normative dimension of implicit inferential 
conceptual commitment as an explanation for propositional content, while also appealing 
to propositional content as something that determines the standards of a proposition’s 
assessment?  How can normativity both explain propositional content via inferentialism 
and then be explained by propositional content?  And what can this latter explanation 
involve?  In the face of Speaks’s Geachean criticism, what can it mean to say that 
propositional content accounts for a proposition’s standards of assessment?   
 The following two subsections will address these issues.  In the first place, we will 
have to make a distinction between the normative dimension that explains propositional 
content via inferential articulation, and the metalinguistic normativity that in turn 
explains inferential articulation via the standards accepted by the society in which a 
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language is being used.  What we discover is an initial normativity that operates within 
inferential articulation as the specification of propositional content, and a metalinguistic 
social normativity that explains the normativity licensed by inferential articulation.  This 
distinction will allow us to view more clearly the dual role of 1) normativity as an 
explanation for propositional content inferentially articulated, and 2) normativity as it is 
explained in terms of the social conventions that dictate what inferences are licensed 
from and obliged upon the assertion of different propositions.  This clarification will 
result in a picture of normativity in its dual role with respect to propositional content, not 
as a 2 dimensional circular reasoning, but as a 3 dimensional spiraling process of ever-
developing appeal to normative (inferential) articulation and social reflection on the 
authority of these inferential licensings/obligations.76 
 Finally, with this developed account of the relationship between propositional 
content and normativity, we will be able to address Speaks’s criticism about the apparent 
impossibility of invariant normative assessment across the same propositional content 
with different propositional attitude.  We will do so by arguing for the assertion as a 
fundamental propositional attitude which serves to stipulate the initial level of inferential 
articulation necessary for the stipulation of propositional content, and upon which 
different propositional attitudes will be seen as parasitic.  
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language offers philosophy in its role as rational discourse. 
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3.4 Implicit Normativity, Explicit Normativity, and Metanormativity 
 
 To clarify where we are in the dialectic let us summarize the relationship 
between normative assessment and propositional content at play in an inferentialist 
semantics. Determining the content of a proposition through inferential articulation 
involves specifying the further propositional commitments and entitlements we commit 
ourselves to when we assert an individual proposition.  For the inference is a 
fundamentally normative endeavor—it specifies, in the form of a rule, what we are 
further committed and entitled to in consequence of our previous assertions.  This is a 
role for the normativity of propositional content as explanans—the normative 
implications of a given proposition, spelled out via the material inferential linkages that 
proposition has with respect to other propositions, play the role of explaining 
propositional content.  At the same time, however, the inferential relationships of a given 
proposition must be explicated with respect to the content of that proposition—else how 
would we know where to look for its consequences? 
 And now it looks like the normative chain loops back in on itself.  For if the 
meaning of a proposition is spelled out in terms of the inferential linkages implicit in its 
content, then explicating these linkages must already presuppose the existence of their 
content.  If the meaning of a proposition is to be explained by specifying the further 
propositions materially-inferentially related to it, then inferential articulation seems to 
presuppose propositional content, not explain it.  Yet the point of inferential articulation 
was to provide an account of propositional content!  We resolve this problem by 
recognizing the social constitution of the content of concepts, by appealing to the social 
 58 
nature of propositional content, and in doing so point the way toward an explication of 
the dual nature of the normativity inherent in inferential articulation. 
Like all language users, we come to the table with certain presuppositions about 
the meaning of our terms.  To be competent enough to begin the game of giving and 
asking for reasons, to engage in the process of making explicit our commitments and 
checking them for their content, we must have at least a practical capability to utter the 
appropriate responses when the context calls for them, even if we don’t fully know what 
they mean.  This appropriateness is a function of the linguistic standards of the 
community—for minimally we begin to learn a language because we are educated by 
others, or we turn to a dictionary.  While Brandom takes for granted that the origin of 
propositional normativity resides in a community of language users, “no attempt will be 
made to show how the linguistic enterprise might have gotten off the ground in the first 
place.”77  This does not, however, imply that Brandom takes our understanding of 
propositional content to jump fully formed from our brains.78  Indeed, part of Brandom’s 
program serves to explain how it is we can come to be acquainted with the inferential 
articulations of the propositions we assent to, and thus to understand their content.  The 
fact that the content of these propositions is already fixed by the linguistic standards of 
the community is incidental to an individual speaker’s familiarity with them.  In the 
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 For competently making an assertion (deploying a concept the inferential implications of which 
we have a competent grasp of) may still involve further commitments of which we are unaware.  Concept 
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may well outrun what the one undertaking the commitment appreciates.”  
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course of asserting a given proposition, even though we don’t know what it means in the 
sense of being aware of all the inferential connections it has with other propositions in 
our language, our discourse within a linguistic community will serve to acquaint us with 
the meaning of that proposition by explicitly drawing out the inferential commitments 
and entitlements that our use of it binds us to.79  
This only appears viciously circular if we take a narrow view of language use 
over time.  Surely we cannot explain propositional content via inferential articulation if 
this very articulation depends upon propositional content already established by a 
community.  At best all we’ve done is push the explanation back, at worst we’ve 
involved ourselves in a circle.  The grip of this apparent circularity arises from a rigid 
account of the authority a community of language-users is thought to have on stipulating 
propositional content.  If we accept this authority as a brute fact then we’re locked into a 
vicious circle.  But the authority of a community in stipulating the inferential linkages 
between propositional contents, in fixing the meaning of our concepts, is itself 
something subject to assessment by members of the community.  For language use 
changes, whether because of conceptual clarification, empirical discovery, or cultural 
drift, and it is via this fact of inevitable change and the consequent duty to reflect on the 
inferential connections currently endorsed that the two-dimensional vicious circle 
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 If we’re learning to speak a new language this discourse will probably periodically translate 
from an understood tongue to the new one, to help facilitate comprehension.  Notice this is not required, 
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learning of our first language or the learning of another, in the absence of translatability we don’t 
understand what one proposition means until we understand what most of them mean. 
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becomes a three-dimensional ascending spiral.  Close examination of concepts can lead 
to conceptual revision (as with Russell’s Paradox), and so can new empirical 
investigations (cf. the notions of space and time) or socio-historic change (ideas of 
women’s rights or human equality).  As a result of this revision new inferences will be 
licensed and the licenses of old ones revoked.  No proposition need be fundamentally 
beyond revision in a language game, and the history of intellectual development during 
the 20th century exhibits that everything from mathematical logic to physics has been 
subject to substantial revision of foundation. 
As a matter of fact any community of language-users will have a set of 
propositional contents and (which is the same thing) inferential relationships endorsed 
by members of that community.  But these inferential relationships are subject to change 
as the licenses for endorsement periodically come up for review by members competent 
enough to investigate their inferential relationships and metalinguistically reflect on their 
value (whether logical, empirical, or social).  Depending on the discipline in question 
(replete with its peculiar methods of investigation, justification, and scope of its claims) 
these endorsements will be revised and rejected more or less frequently.80  Despite (or 
perhaps because of) the fact that we come to linguistic competence within a community 
that adopts particular standards of propositional commitment and entitlement, in virtue 
of our ability self-reflectively to criticize these standards (after we have come to 
understand what they mean) we can revise these standards and so come to license new 
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individuals whose intellectual acumen and rhetorical force enable them to encourage other thinkers within 
the discipline to revise the inferential relationships of their discourse. 
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commitments and entitlements.81  Any discipline whatsoever, no matter what its claims 
for authority, is potentially revisable in the face of new information.  The normative 
theory of rationality makes this potential explicit, and exhibits it as a duty incumbent 
upon those familiar enough with the discipline self-reflectively to critique it.82  From 
Sellars’s “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind:” “For empirical knowledge, like its 
sophisticated extension, science, is rational, not because it has a foundation but because 
it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at 
once.”83 
The claim that there is a preexisting realm of socio-linguistic meaning is not a 
foundationalist claim which the existence of the normativity of propositional content 
circularly both supports and is derived from.  Rather, the claim’s truth is simply 
something that as socio-historic language users we must come to terms with in 
understanding what we are effectively saying by uttering such propositions as, for 
instance, “I am a staunch German nationalist” or “falling objects move in a straight 
line”.  But once we understand (enough of) the current inferential constitution of our 
propositional system we can begin the second-order normative appraisal of these 
inferences themselves.    
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 I take this capacity for self-conscious revision of a discipline’s standards to be one implication 
consequent upon the position Hegel arrives at in Absolute Knowing at the end of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit.  At another time I would like to follow up this idea more thoroughly. 
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that as the propositions within ethics, science, and aesthetics (to list three categories) are all subject to the 
game of giving and asking for reasons, a normative game, the normative theory of rationality offers 
philosophy the prospect for single theory of rational discourse capable of application to the realms of 
goodness, truth, and beauty. 
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 Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind §38 page 79.  Emphasis in the original. 
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 We have before us now two complementary levels of normativity regarding 
propositional content.  On the one hand we understand propositional content by 
explicating the inferential relationships linking different propositions.  This is a 
normative game of giving and asking for reasons, and it relies on the current constitution 
of the social discourse within which the conversation occurs.  Given the assertion that 
‘P’, as a matter of the way this culture does in fact speak, then ‘Q, R, and S’ are the 
inferences that follow (they tell us what it means to utter ‘P’), the commitments and 
entitlements the speaker is bound to, the norms of use that guide us with respect to that 
assertion.  This inferential articulation proceeds by recourse to the socially constituted 
standards of meaning.  The use of one proposition in a community of language users 
implicitly commits a speaker to a variety of others, whether the speaker is aware of this 
or not.  The inferential articulation of the inferential-relationships between various 
propositions makes explicit these commitments and in doing so helps develop for us a 
sense of the meaning of our propositions.  This is the first type of deontic 
scorekeeping—the inferential articulation, the making explicit, of the various 
propositional commitments implicit in the assertion of an initial (set of) proposition(s).  
Thus it is an account via this scorekeeping of what our propositions mean.   
But once the inferential overlay of our propositional contents, socially stipulated, 
are explicit as assertions themselves standing in need of inferential justification, they are 
subject to open criticism, and the prospect for a second type of deontic scorekeeping 
presents itself.  For the use of a given concept, in committing us to the use of others we 
may not be inclined to commit ourselves to, opens up the possibility for self-reflective 
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social discourse about the various standards we take to be present in the ways we look at 
the world.84  Even more, this metalinguistic or socially reflective normative discourse 
offers us the possibility of rationally critiquing not only the conceptual commitments 
exhibited in the inferential relationships between the different concepts our society uses, 
but in assessing the types of behaviors that tend to follow from the propositional 
contents we assent to.  Pointed discussion of the prospects offered by this metanormative 
rational discourse will be postponed until the fourth section.85  For now we will turn to a 
consideration of the way assertion plays the fundamental role in assessing inferential 
connections between different propositional contents, before taking the picture outlined 
in this discussion back to our consideration of Speaks’s criticisms. 
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the implications of his inferentialist program Brandom comes to a similar conclusion.  “Critical thinkers, 
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defend the appropriateness of the material inferential transitions implicit in the concepts they employ.  In 
Reason’s fight against thought debased by prejudice and propaganda, the first rule is that potentially 
controversial material inferential commitments should be made explicit as claims, exposing them both as 
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curled up inside loaded phrases such as ‘enemy of the people’ or ‘law and order’.”  (Articulating Reasons, 
70).  Firmly wed to Brandom’s theoretical semantics (no less than to the conceptual space argued for by 
McDowell) is the suggestion that theory must be put to use “in the form of an investigation of the ongoing 
elucidative process [of our societal concepts/norms and their commitments], of the ‘Socratic method’ of 
discovering and repairing discordant concepts…” (Ibid., 75).  “It is in the context of these ideas [set forth 
in Articulating Reasons] that I have sought to present an expressive view of the role of logic and its 
relation to the practices constitutive of rationality.  That view holds out the hope of recovering for the 
study of logic a direct significance for projects that have been at the core of philosophy since its Socratic 
inception.” (Ibid., 77). 
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3.5 Belief, Assertion, and Inferential Articulation 
 
 Brandom makes the claim in a number of places throughout his work that 
assertion is a fundamental speech act in the inferential articulation of propositional 
content.  The opening sentences of Brandom’s 1983 paper “Asserting” claim “No sort of 
speech act is as important for philosophers to understand as assertion.  Assertion of 
declarative sentences is the form of cognitive discourse, and is the fundamental activity 
in which linguistic meaningfulness is manifested.”86  Chapter 3 of Making it Explicit 
develops the relationship between the assertion of a proposition and the propositional 
content the assertion asserts.  A series of quotes from this chapter may be helpful in 
illustrating the central role in Brandom’s semantics for the speech act of assertion.  Our 
task will then be to show that the inferential articulation of propositional content made 
possible by the speech act of assertion depends on an assumption of the propositional 
attitude of believing-true, and that therefore Speaks’s concern for different standards of 
assessment according to different propositional attitudes must already presume a 
propositional content determined under the act of assertion and the attitude of believing-
true. 
In the opening paragraph of Making it Explicit, Chapter 3, Brandom writes 
“…propositional contentfulness must be understood in terms of practices of giving and 
asking for reasons…The fundamental sort of move in the game of giving and asking for 
reasons is making a claim…The basic explanatory challenge faced by the model [i.e., 
Brandom’s inferential semantics] is to say what structure a set of social practices must 
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exhibit in order properly to be understood as including practical attitudes of taking or 
treating performances as having the significance of claims or assertions.”87  In the next 
two paragraphs this idea is developed with respect to the socially constituted normative 
statuses we have been discussing.   
According to the model, to treat a performance as an assertion is to treat is as 
the undertaking or acknowledging of a certain kind of commitment—what 
will be called a ‘doxastic’, or ‘assertional’, commitment.  To be doxastically 
committed is to have a certain social status.  Doxastic commitments are 
normative, more specifically deontic, statuses…Competent linguistic 
practitioners keep track of their own and each other’s commitments and 
entitlements.  They are (we are) deontic scorekeepers.  Speech acts, 
paradigmatically assertions, alter the deontic score; they change what 
commitments and entitlements it is appropriate to attribute…88 
 
A few pages later we find Brandom stating his position that “The only sort of inferential 
practice that is socially articulated in the way that turns out to be required for the 
conferral of propositional content, in the form of objective truth conditions, is 
assertional, and therefore linguistic practice.”89  And on page 157 Brandom writes: 
The leading idea of the account to be presented here is that belief can be 
modeled on the kind of inferentially articulated commitment that is 
undertaken or acknowledged by making an assertion…The role of 
propositional contents marks off discursive practice, and the role of sentential 
expression of such contents is distinctive of linguistic social practice.  In this 
way, everything comes down to being able to say what it is for what 
practitioners are doing to deserve to count as adopting a practical attitude of 
acknowledging the assertional significance of a performance: taking or 
treating is an assertion.  It is in terms of such attitudes that the pragmatic 
significance of assertional speech acts, the normative status of assertional 
commitments, and the possession or expression of propositional semantic 
contents are to be understood.90 
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For an assertion to stand as a link in the game of giving and asking for reasons it must be 
attributed a propositional attitude correlate to the speech act of assertion—the assertion 
must obtain a “pragmatic significance” sufficient for it to count as a premise or 
conclusion in inferential articulation.  What are the attitudes whose “pragmatic 
significance” stipulates the assessment criteria, the normative statuses, of the 
propositional content of our utterances? They are the attitudes of believing-true and of 
taking someone to have asserted a proposition believed-true.  In order to begin to assess 
the meaning of what someone has said we must adopt the attitude of taking them to have 
asserted something, and this requires that we attribute to them the attitude of believing 
their assertion to be true.  In endeavoring to understand what they mean by their 
assertion we question them regarding their inferential licenses, asking to see the 
propositional warrants that entitle them to the assertion in question.  When the task is 
taken up an individual offers further assertions that spell out the inferential connections 
licensing one to assert what they do.   
The act of assertion is the eternally recurring primordial act in the game of giving 
and asking for reasons.  At each stage of the game the assertion plays the role of 
developing an inferential specification that serves to make explicit the propositional 
commitments and entitlements constituting the meaning of our propositions.  Before we 
can begin to understand what it means to daydream a propositional content we must first 
understand what it means to assert it, and it is in the act of assertion that the two levels 
of deontic scorekeeping—inferential articulation and metalinguistic social critique—
occur. 
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Suppose I assert “Honor obliges no duty that tarnishes character”.  An 
interlocutor might ask me what is meant by this assertion.  In explaining its meaning I 
will offer an account of the relationship between duty and honor supposed to explain 
why anything obliged by honor cannot be such as to besmirch the character of an 
individual so obliged.  Insofar as assertion is the primordial speech act in the game of 
giving and asking for reasons, we default attribute the propositional attitude of believing-
true when playing that game.  Even if it were the case that I did not assert the original 
proposition under the attitude of believing-true (suppose I was daydreaming or 
rehearsing a line from a play), when questioned as to the meaning of this statement I can 
only articulate its inferential connections if I and the others engaged in conversation so 
adopt the believing-true attitude.  In fact my belief-attitude with respect to the original 
proposition might be other than what is necessary to articulate its meaning (I may have 
been convinced by the tension in Sophocles’ Antigone, for instance); I may assert it in 
jest while in practice believing it false. 
Now it may be important to distinguish believing-true and supposing true in 
some cases, but when asked to produce the warrants licensing this proposition in the 
game of inferential articulation, spelling out its propositional content, I must adopt an 
attitude of believing-true.  Let us quickly look at the importance of distinguishing 
between believing-true and supposing-true.  In the practice of reduction ad absurdum a 
proposition is offered under the speech act of assertion while the propositional attitude 
may not be that of believing-true.  Especially if the asserter has run through the proof 
before, strictly speaking the assertion of the first premise in a reduction ad absurdum is 
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not uttered under the attitude of believing-true, for the asserter knows that this assertion 
will in the end lead to a contradiction and thus the assertion will have to be rejected.  
From this we see that the first premise of a reductio is offered under the attitude of 
supposing-true, not believing-true.  In the practice of inferential articulation this 
distinction between believing-true and supposing-true may make sense of the attitudes 
necessary to articulate the propositional content of an assertion uttered as a jest or in 
play-speak, as it may explain the inferential articulation of an assertion uttered in a 
philosophy course where the instructor is required to explain a view she does not agree 
with.  I assume that for the purposes of responding to Speaks’s criticism from the 
problem of daydreamed propositions that we will not have to make so fine a distinction.  
It is enough to show that with assertion as the primordial speech act in the normative 
game of inferential articulation, an attitude of believing- or supposing-true is equally 
important for the normative articulation of propositional content, and is an attitude 
therefore significantly upstream from any assessments that may occur when a 
proposition is uttered as a daydream.  The question of the normative assessments of 
propositions uttered under etiolated propositional attitudes can only occur after we have 
established propositional content, which itself requires the speech act of assertion and 
the propositional attitude of believing-true.91 
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 The normativity at issue in Brandom’s inferentialist account of meaning depends 
fundamentally on the speech act of assertion, as it is only via an asserted proposition that 
the meaning-constitutive inferential connections between the proposition and its 
commitments and entitlements become explicit.  Assertions in turn are given the default 
propositional attitude of believing- or supposing-true.  Propositional contents expressed 
under the attitude of daydreaming or play-speak do not carry with them the same 
inferential commitments, the same normative implications, that these propositional 
contents do when asserted under the attitude of believing-true.  And of course they 
should not.  For it would be absurd to suppose that the inferentialist theory of meaning 
implied that the meaning of “My father was killed in Vietnam” uttered during a play had 
the same inferential consequences of my uttering it sincerely.  But this triviality should 
not obscure the fact that when we are questioning the meaning of “My father was killed 
in Vietnam” we must take the assertion as one at least supposed-true.   
There is a subtle distinction here that turns on a heteronym.  When in play-speak 
I claim my father died in Vietnam, or when I stand by the window and utter my 
daydream, an observer might ask what I mean.  But this is very different from asking 
whether I mean what it is I’ve said.  Only in the former case do we begin the process of 
inferentially articulating the content of the proposition in order to explain what it means.  
The latter question, whether what is said is meant, is a question of propositional attitude 
and it is a question that presupposes a grasp of meaning.  Knowing that someone means 
what they said is worthless unless we know what they said means.  The key issue to 
recognize is that the connection between inferential articulation and propositional 
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content depends on propositions considered under the attitude of believing- or 
supposing-true assertion, because inferential explanations of meaning depend on 
asserted propositions.  Equipped with this expanded appreciation of the normativity 
invoked in Brandom’s account of propositional content, we can return to Speaks’s 
criticism regarding the variability of normative assessment across different propositional 
attitudes. 
3.6 Returning to Speaks 
 
Consider again my standing at the window of my apartment in December in 
College Station, Texas and daydreaming that I am surrounded by snow in Bozeman, 
Montana.  There are two ways we can understand my daydreaming as operating in the 
game of giving and asking for reasons, and as therefore potentially standing in need of 
assessment in the way Brandom’s program allows.  In the first place we can ask for the 
inferential articulation of the meaning of the terms used (snowing, Bozeman, December, 
etc.).  This would involve considering the propositional content of the daydream 
independent of the propositional attitude of daydreaming, viewing it instead as an 
assertion—considering “I am in Bozeman watching the snow fall around me in 
December” as a proposition the content of which implicitly commits and entitles us to 
other propositions.  To be in Bozeman is to be in Montana, an inferential commitment 
the exhibition of which makes explicit the fact that Bozeman is in Montana, and thus 
helps clarify the meaning of my utterance of “Bozeman”.  From the assertion that it is 
snowing we can infer that the temperature is below freezing.  It being December and 
Montana being in the northern hemisphere, we know that the sun is up during the day 
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shorter than it is down during the night, etc., etc.  The normative assessments that are 
determined by propositional content become explicit, and are meaning-constitutive, only 
when the proposition is considered from the attitude of assertion.  If the proposition is 
uttered to me as a daydream but we are concerned to bring to bear on it the sorts of 
normative assessments invoked in an inferential semantics, in making explicit the 
meaning of the proposition whether uttered as a daydream or an assertion, we need to 
consider the proposition as an assertion and disregard the derivative status it has as a 
daydream.  Before we can understand what it means to daydream this proposition we 
have to know what it means when asserted.  To be able to understand an answer as to 
why a particular proposition is daydreamed is to already understand what that 
proposition means when asserted. 
But as a statement whose propositional content has been antecedently agreed 
upon, we can ask for reasons as to why it currently obtains the propositional attitude of a 
daydream.  In other words, we could ask why it is that I am daydreaming this 
proposition.  Notice that doing so does not presume that my daydreaming is right or 
wrong in this context—that kind of normative assessment (appealed to by Speaks in his 
paper) is irrelevant to inferentialism, which is focused on normativity as it explains the 
content of concepts in terms of inferential commitments and entitlements.  In this case 
we frame the daydreamed proposition as an assertion where the daydreaming attitude 
itself becomes explicit (something like the assertion “I am daydreaming that I am in 
Bozeman watching the snow fall around me in December”), and we ask for an account 
of why it is that I find this daydream appealing—we ask for an inferential overlay of 
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why I am indulging in this daydream with respect to the broader propositional 
commitments I assent to—commitments such as my longing to be with my family, the 
contrast between my struggle to appreciate an east Texas winter and my recollection of 
the beauty of pine-covered mountains blanketed in snow, and so on.  This second 
assessment, regarding the rationale behind why it is I am daydreaming this proposition, 
can only occur if we already understand what it means to assert this proposition.  
Furthermore, this new level of normative assessment, where the daydreaming attitude is 
explicitly brought out into the content of the proposition as a new assertion, thereby 
changes the propositional content (because it changes the proposition) from the initial 
proposition simply as a daydream that “I am in Bozeman watching the snow fall around 
me in December” to a proposition where the daydreaming attitude is explicit, viz., “I am 
daydreaming that I am in Bozeman watching the snow fall around me in December”.   
At first blush it may appear that the difference in propositional content between a 
proposition uttered in the attitude of a daydream and a proposition asserted as an explicit 
daydream provides a problem for the inferentialist account of meaning.  But the change 
of content would be a problem (indeed, it would be another equivocation) only if the 
normative assessments at work in the inferentialist semantics were unable to make 
explicit the propositional attitude as a component of a new proposition, and thus were 
unable to clearly distinguish between the content of the two propositions.  But 
Brandom’s semantics depends on the notion of making explicit these subtle shifts in 
meaning by characterizing them in the language we are discoursing in, and so there 
should be no worry of equivocation here. 
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Once the meaning of the proposition is clear, the reasons I proffer to explain why 
I am daydreaming are ones that must license this daydream as something I would 
indulge in, and it is only within the context of these other assertions that we can assess 
how and whether the daydream is appropriate.  These reasons are ones that help flesh out 
my broader propositional commitments.  This is the sort of normative assessment that 
Brandom has in mind—it is a normativity that in explaining propositional content makes 
explicit the resources to begin to raise second-order assessments of entitlement, not one 
that antecedently stipulates second-order assessment from the beginning. 
The normativity at issue in Brandom’s inferentialist account of meaning depends 
fundamentally on the speech act of assertion, as it is only via an asserted proposition that 
the meaning-constitutive inferential connections between the proposition and its 
commitments and entitlements become explicit.  In playing the role required of it for 
inferential articulation, the speech act of assertion must itself be taken under the attitude 
of believing- or supposing-true.  Propositional contents expressed under the attitude of 
daydreaming do not carry with them the same inferential commitments, the same 
normative implications, that these propositional contents do when asserted as true, and 
so we can understand a proposition uttered as a daydream only if we already understand 
its propositional content uttered as an assertion believed- or supposed-true.  The 
assertion is the primordial speech act, the “fundamental activity in which linguistic 
meaningfulness is manifested” as Brandom remarked in 1983,92 and the successful 
deployment of a constant propositional content uttered under different propositional 
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attitudes is parasitic on the successful uptake of a given propositional content under the 
attitude-and-act of a believed-true assertion.93 
Speaks’s concern for constant propositional content considered under varying 
propositional attitudes, and the Geachean criticism that this variability would seem to 
imply if content determines standard of assessment irrespective of attitude, runs too 
quickly past the fact that propositional content is only inferentially articulated (and thus 
a proposition can only have a settled meaning) when that proposition is taken as an 
assertion (sincerely believed or not).  The tension that Speaks perceives in Brandom’s 
semantics, a tension between the claim that propositional content alone determines 
standards of assessment and the fact that standards of assessment can vary with 
propositional attitude without varying propositional content, fails to recognize the 
primordial status of assertion as the speech act necessary for explicating propositional 
content in the first place, and of the correlated primordiality of believing- or supposing-
true.  In effect, Speaks’s daydreaming counter-example can only get its grip on our 
intuitions if the propositional content of the daydream has already been settled upon, in 
which case the normative assessments in play are not the content-explicating 
inferentialist assessments the Brandom is concerned with.  But when the normative 
assessments integral to Brandom’s semantics are under consideration, then the 
proposition in question must be taken as asserted.  Once this content is inferentially 
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articulated and thus made explicit, any further “standards of assessment” that might vary 
between attitudes of believing and daydreaming are operating at a stage of the game 
quite removed from Brandom’s inferential semantics, and thus cannot maneuver into 
position to offer a critique of his semantics.94 
In summarizing the discussion we can now be seen to have accomplished five 
tasks.  1) In the first place we have outlined the normative dimensions of Brandom’s 
semantic theory:  in the first regard as explanans at the linguistic level explaining 
inferential articulation, and with this inferential articulation itself become an 
explanandum explained by the metalinguistic socio-historical context within which 
propositions are measured as meaningful.  2) We have explained that the metalinguistic 
field of social meaning is itself capable of self-reflective assessment and change.  3) In 
doing so we have also allayed the concern expressed by Speaks that normativity cannot 
act both as explanandum for and as explanans of propositional content, by making 
explicit that the hierarchical nature of normative assessment explains the relation 
between inferential articulation and metalinguistic critique.  4) By addressing Speaks’s 
criticism regarding the apparent variability of assessment with respect to the same 
propositional content adopted under different propositional attitudes we have clarified 
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the way in which assertions stand as the fundamental speech act and believing- or 
supposing-true as the fundamental propositional attitude necessary for the inferential 
articulation of propositional content, and thus of how believing- or supposing-true 
operates for Brandom as the only propositional attitude capable of bearing the content-
constitutive normative assessments necessary for an inferentialist account of meaning.  
With this outline of Brandom’s program on board and 5) with Speaks’s threateningly 
damning criticism met and rejected, we can now turn to more pointed assessments of the 
inferential semantics of the normative theory of rationality. 
3.7 Rosen:  Constitution and Entailment 
 
 Up until this point our discussion of inferentialist semantics has been rather 
large-scale and thematic, using Speaks’s criticism of a passage from Brandom’s 
“Modality, Normativity, and Intentionality” as an entry-point into the broader 
philosophical enterprise Brandom is taking part in.  Having a large-scale picture of his 
work before us, we can now focus more narrowly and precisely on criticisms of 
Brandom’s work.  In particular, because Gideon Rosen’s critique of Brandom addresses 
the “Modality, Normativity, and Intentionality” article in detail, it is time to return to that 
piece and consider its content more thoroughly. 
 Brandom’s aim in this paper is primarily directed at understanding a 
“philosophical landscape” within which to situate an account for normativity as a non-
mysterious philosophical tool capable of explaining intentionality.95  The account hopes 
to confer on normativity a non-mysterious character in virtue of drawing an analogical 
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correspondence between normativity and the rehabilitation of the concept of modality as 
modal semantic theory was developed in the 20th century.  Quinean concerns for the 
lingering mysteries of modal notions not withstanding, Brandom sees the formalization 
of modality on a many-worlds semantic structure as a project that freed philosophers of 
the worry that modality was not sufficiently rigorous to be put to philosophical use, in 
particular in the explanation of intentionality.  “I think it is worthwhile reminding 
ourselves how surprised philosophers who lived and moved and had their being in this 
[early 20th century modally-skeptic] milieu would have been to discover that by the end 
of the century, when their successors found the intensional and normative character of 
intentional idioms problematic, their first impulse and dominant strategy would be to 
appeal to modal notions to explain them.”96  Brandom’s article is intended to help 
motivate a reconception of the current views on normativity, and to suggest that the 
notion of the normative is sufficiently capable of rigorous formulation as to perform on 
its own the work sometimes supposed to be better handled by reduction to naturalistic 
modal notions.97 
 Brandom’s assessment of the philosophical tenability of normativity, modeled on 
the tenability of modality, proceeds along two dimensions.  In the first place the 
development of formal characterizations of modal notions gave a systematic method for 
putting them to theoretical use.  In the second, an empiricist position that argued we 
must either reduce modal notions to nonmodal ones or simply do without them all 
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together came by some to be understood as a false dichotomy.98  The first issue Brandom 
takes to be a legitimate concern—it was reasonable to suppose that modality required 
systematic formalization before it could be put to concerted philosophical use.  The 
second, however, he views as a false dichotomy.  In drawing the analogy between 
normativity and modality, Brandom suggests that there are similarly two issues at stake 
in contemporary debates about the philosophical role of normative notions in theories of 
intentionality.  A legitimate issue regarding systematic formalization of normativity, 
capable of doing sustained philosophical work in a theory of the intentional, and an 
illegitimate dichotomy suggesting we must either reduce the normative to nonnormative 
notions or do without it all together.99 
 The central argument here for the ineliminable character of normativity turns on 
a transcendental argument regarding the character of descriptive discourse.  Integral to 
the ability meaningfully to utter a descriptive claim about the world is recognition by the 
utterer that the truth of this claim depends on other facts about the world not explicitly 
expressed in the descriptive utterance.  To be said to have meaningfully asserted “this 
oak leaf is green” I must be capable of asserting or assenting to certain other 
propositions that are entailed by that initial assertion—as for instance that the leaf is not 
also blue (in the same region) and that it is not also a maple leaf (genetic manipulation to 
the side).  The difference between my meaningful assertion that “this oak leaf is green” 
and the meaningless utterance that would come from a computer program or a non-
English speaker who parrots the sound is the extent to which I recognize my 
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commitment to other assertions consequent upon and inferentially related to the first.  As 
we saw earlier, the inferential relationships between my descriptive assertion and the rest 
of what I am committed to may not all be explicit for me when I make the first assertion, 
but I can only be said to have meaningfully have made the assertion, to have consciously 
asserted a particular propositional content, to the extent that I am also prepared to assert 
(at least some of) the inferential commitments consequent upon this assertion.  The idea, 
then, that we could have a purely descriptive language of discourse fails to account for 
the fundamentally normative character of even descriptive propositional content. 
Treating one descriptive predicate as applicable in a particular case obliges 
one to consider others (suitably inferentially related to it) as applicable, 
(normatively) precludes one from applying others, and licenses one to apply 
others.  Since this essential dimension of the use of even ordinary, 
descriptive, nonnormative concepts (in belief and judgment no less than in 
linguistic assertion) is what is made explicit by normative vocabulary, it 
cannot be that ordinary empirical descriptive concepts are coherent and 
intelligible in principle, but normative concepts are incoherent and 
unintelligible in principle.100 
 
With this sketch of “Modality, Normativity, and Intentionality” on the table we can now 
turn to Rosen’s criticisms in “Brandom on Modality, Normativity, and Intentionality”.101  
We will first summarize the main points of Rosen’s position and then assess them 
individually. 
 To begin with Rosen makes a claim about what criteria must be met for the use 
of a concept as an “explanatory primitive”.  “It must be intelligible in the absence of 
definition, and it must be ‘explanatorily prior’ to the idiom we seek to explain by means 
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of it.”102  Rosen then goes on to discuss theories of meaning, and that with the collapse 
of the empiricist position on meaning the acceptance of modality went hand in hand with 
the development of a use-theory of meaning.  “On a view of this sort, all it takes to 
establish the ‘intelligibility’ of a modal idiom is to point out that most of us already 
know how to use it well enough.”103  The use-theory of meaning provides an “out” for 
concerns about explanatory primitiveness—for in the absence of a defeating argument 
showing that we really do not understand how to use a notion in critical cases, it can be 
said that we understand the expression despite not being able to explain it in more 
primitive terms.  So while the use-theory of meaning may allay concerns for explanatory 
reduction, it provides its own criterion to show the inadequacy of certain concepts—
namely, we do not understand a concept if it can be shown that there are certain critical 
cases where we do not know how to apply it appropriately.  This criterion then becomes 
the focus for Rosen’s attack on Brandom’s notion of normativity.  “[W]e should 
ask…”What does it mean to attribute (implicit) normativity to a classs of claims?  How 
well do we understand the central notion in terms of which Brandom frames his 
discussion?”104  Rosen’s claim will be that we don’t suitably understand how to use the 
notion of normativity to be said to have a competent theory of its meaning. 
 Rosen then goes on to frame what he takes to be conception of normativity made 
use of by Brandom.  “A claim…counts as implicitly normative if and only if its truth is 
constituted in part by the truth of a paradigmatically normative claim…On a view of this 
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sort, to say that belief is a normative notion is to say that belief facts are constituted by 
paradigmatically normative facts.”105  With this characterization in hand Rosen begins to 
assess Brandom’s normativity thesis in terms of its ability to explain “constitution”, and 
whether such constitution is normative in character (as it would have to be for the 
normativity thesis to hold).  Rosen understands “constitution” via “correctness”, and 
comes to conclude that while there is a sense in which correctness is a normative notion, 
in the relevant sense for belief-attitudes it will not play the role Brandom requires. 
 Tracking back through Rosen’s discussion a few clarificatory points with respect 
to Brandom’s program are in order.  To begin with, the notion of “explanatory 
primitive”, while perhaps playing a role in traditionally foundational accounts of 
language, cannot be understood in the same way for the holistic inferentialism that 
marks Brandom’s semantics.  While normativity is an integral notion to his theory of 
meaning, it plays the role of an arch’s keystone more than it does a building’s 
foundation.  That is, though normativity is the keystone to the inferential semantics 
Brandom advocates, it does need not be imagined that the idea of normativity could 
subsist free-floating independent of the surrounding conceptual material within which 
normativity plays its role. 
 Second, the methodological support culled from the use-theory of meaning’s 
criterion of intelligibility—that we be able to decide how to use a concept in all critical 
cases of its employment—only partially offers an attack on Brandom’s use of 
normativity in his inferentialist semantics.  For the fact that we may not always be sure 
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of the commitments we have implicitly invoked in the assertion of a given propositional 
content could only count against our knowing what it is we have said, of having a grasp 
on the propositional content we have asserted, if meaning were an all-or-nothing affair.  
But this is not way to understand the holism of an inferential semantics.  “According [to 
the account of conceptual norms developed in Making it Explicit], the commitments one 
undertakes by making a move in a language game may well outrun what the one 
undertaking the commitment appreciates.”106  From the fact that we are not able 
inferentially to articulate all the implications consequent on our assertion of a 
proposition, it does not follow that we do not have a grasp on or understand that 
proposition’s meaning.  Now in the case of the sort of keystone conceptual content that 
normativity is supposed to play for Brandom’s system a critical (series of) argument(s) 
for the inability to suitably distinguish instances of appropriate use would certainly count 
against the sort of systematic formulation that Brandom hopes normativity can acquire 
(as modality has in the last few decades).  But the existence of ambiguous cases of 
application should not by themselves count against the possibility that this formulation 
would be forthcoming, and one of the virtues of Brandom’s semantics is that it can allow 
for these cases of imperfect understanding without denying the intelligibility of the 
concept at issue. 
 The next comment on Rosen’s reconstruction develops out of this consideration 
of clarity.  It is somewhat surprising that, given the emphasis on conceptual clarity and 
the problems of ambiguity of use that Rosen should characterize his understanding of 
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Brandom’s position on the implicity normativity of an assertion in terms of being 
“constituted in part by the truth of a paradigmatically normative claim” when in the next 
sentence he remarks that “[t]he idiom of constitution that figures in this formulation is of 
course another unexplained technical idiom”.107  Rosen goes on to say that he believes 
the idea of being “constituted in part” is “clear enough and should suffice for present 
purposes”, but the issue here seems to be whether a concept being “clear enough for 
present purposes” is good enough to play the sort of philosophical role necessary for an 
adequate account of intentionality.  Now it may be argued that the burden of clarity falls 
on the shoulders of the one constructing the theory, and that a degree of imprecision is 
permitted the deconstructionist that is impractical to grant the theorist.  Far less precision 
is required to wield a wrecking ball than is necessary for erecting a skyscraper.  As it is I 
will aim to show that Rosen’s notion of constitution is insufficient on its own terms, so 
its’ initial imprecision will not be of further concern to us.  But it may be telling to 
reflect on the disparity between one view and the other. 
 Rosen’s idea of implicit normativity being “constituted by” paradigmatically 
normative claims subtly blurs the distinction between the foundationalist picture of 
“explanatory primitives” and the inferentialist account of holistic relation.  The 
inferentialist characterization of the relationship between the implicitly normative and 
the paradigmatically normative, between an intention and its normative characteristics, is 
more properly phrased as an inferentialt-relation, not a constitution relation.  But we 
don’t want to beg any questions by simply calling this relation an inferential one—we’ll 
                                                 
107
 Rosen, “Brandom on Modality, Normativity, and Intentionality,” 617. 
 84 
have to examine why this is so.  We can come to appreciate this subtle difference more 
fully if we consider Rosen’s discussion of correctness. 
 Rosen remarks that two conditions must be met if we are to defend the 
normativity thesis via the notion of correctness:  “First, ‘correct’ must pick out a 
genuinely normative feature…, and second, the connection between belief and 
correctness must be constitutive.”108 Notice that if we were to characterize the 
relationship between belief and correctness as entailment rather than constitution then 
this issue would be solved, but again, we don’t want to beg any questions.  The burden is 
to show that it is appropriate to so characterize the relationship. 
What does it mean to call an intention (a belief or an action) “correct”?  It seems 
to involve characterizing holding that belief or acting with that intention in such as way 
as to elicit certain consequences (whether other belief or effects in the world) that are 
expected by the intentional agent, given the content of the initial belief or action.  In 
other words, we call an intention correct insofar as it is appropriately related to the 
expectations of the individual—that holding that intention entails certain other 
intentions, whether with regard to the rest of their beliefs or to events in the world.  
Intentionality is normative via the notion of correctness not because correctness 
constitutes intentionality, but because intentionality is something (normatively) assessed 
with respect to the correctness of the propositional content of an intention as it relates to 
other intentional states or facts about the world. 
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Rosen’s discussion of correctness purports to show that normativity cannot be 
inherent in the notion of correctness insofar as there are often times we think it 
appropriate to do something patently incorrect.  The examples he gives involve cases 
where, to assuage the feelings of someone we are with, we intentionally perform an 
action incorrectly.  Suppose I am teaching a student to play the piano and the student 
becomes frustrated at not being able to play the notes properly.  In this case I might 
intentionally play a piece ineptly in the attempt to cheer him/her up.  Rosen thinks that 
this fact shows the impotence of judgments of correctness in assessing intentions, insofar 
as I knew that playing the piece in that way was incorrect and yet I chose to do so 
anyway. 
But this is clearly a case where a new appraisal of correctness has come into 
play, not one where no notion of correctness is in operation at all.  Ceteris paribus it is 
correct to play a Mozart composition in a certain way, but if I see that misplaying the 
piece would bring joy to someone who is frustrated, then a new action becomes correct 
because the intention has changed.  Here the intention assessed with respect to issues of 
correctness is not the intention of playing a piece of music appropriately but the 
intention of cheering a friend.  On the account of entailment-relation between intention 
and correctness given above, the issue of correctness is resolved with respect to the 
entailments assessed according to my intention of playing the piece poorly to cheer up a 
friend, not with respect to the entailments of a less-valued intention of playing Mozart 
correctly.   
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It would be a mistake to view normative assessments of behavior or language 
used in one situation as binding on us in all cases.  All normative notions are indexed to 
particular contexts of assessment.  The inherent contextuality of assessment is as much a 
factor for the correctness of beliefs about the world (water should boil at 100 degrees 
Centigrade at sea level on earth) as it is about the correctness of moral issues (I should 
play a musical score improperly if I can cheer up a friend) as it is about the correctness 
of convention in sports-games (I should kick a field-goal if it’s the fourth-down at the 13 
yard line, there is 8 seconds to go in the game, and we’re down by 2 points).  The 
normative theory of rationality allows for a many-faceted view of the relationship 
between a given intention and the standards that determine its appropriateness.  Simply 
because there is no one standard of assessment, it does not follow that we cannot 
systematically relate particular standards to each other and determine in given contexts 
what is appropriate to believe or do, in much the same way we talk about the relative 
distances between objects in space without relying on the notion of a theory of absolute 
space to explain them.  Furthermore, with the relationship between the first-order 
inferential articulation of propositional content and higher-order metalinguistic socially-
reflective normative assessment, the normative theory of rationality provides room to 
make explicit the current hierarchical structure of our patterns of assessment and bring 
them out into the game of giving and asking for reasons themselves, thus making them 
subject to revision.  Rosen’s concern for the mutability of standards of correctness 
should not be seen as a problem for the normative theory of rationality or the inferential 
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semantics it makes use of, for the theory accounts for this mutability in the ever-
ascending nature of self-reflective conceptual assessment. 
 But it should not be supposed that Rosen’s critique of Brandom is altogether 
misguided, for his article competently addresses the relationship between proposed 
candidates for theoretical formalization and the criteria of clarity they must meet in order 
to play concrete roles in a theory of meaning.  He finishes his paper by discussing his 
hunches and what intuitively persuades him, closing with a remark that “until the 
relevant notions of nature and constitution have been clarified, it seems to me that the 
issue should strike us as obscure—perhaps to the point of intractability.”109  Were 
Rosen’s comments about constitution and correctness unanswerable we might be 
inclined to agree with his assessment.  But in clarifying Rosen’s discussion of 
constitution in terms of the entailments implicit in the successful adoption of an 
intentional belief or action, and defending the notion of success against critiques of 
ambiguity, we should come to see that the notion of normativity at least withstands the 
criticisms put forth in Rosen’s article. 
 To close out this discussion of Brandom’s inferentialism I will address some of 
Fodor and Lepore’s concerns about inferentialist accounts of meaning. 
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3.8 Inferentialism and Compositionality 
 
 Fodor and Lepore have been sharing a conversation with Brandom on the 
viability of using an inferential semantics since the beginning of the decade.  In 
“Brandom’s Burdens” Fodor and Lepore fired their first volley at Brandom’s program, 
addressing the relationship of inference to reference in the inferentialist theory of 
meaning, criticizing the extent to which inferentialism can properly account for extra-
linguistic checks from the world, and suggesting that Brandom’s attempts to account for 
productivity (the ability to create novel sentences) and compositionality (the 
composition of sentential meaning from the meaning of subsentential components) 
fails.110  In 2007 Brandom published a response in “Inferentialism and some of its 
Challenges”.111  In an unpublished paper entitled “Brandom Beleaguered” Fodor and 
Lepore offer a rejoinder.112  In this subsection we will identify some of the key points of 
contention in this conversation and endeavor to reach some conclusions. 
 At times it seems that Brandom and Fodor and Lepore are talking past each 
other.  One key dimension in which this occurs seems to be the way Fodor and Lepore 
group the explanatory priority of inferential connection in a theory of meaning with the 
ontological or metaphysical priority of inference (in a theory of mind?).113  In spelling 
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out their notion of ontological priority Fodor and Lepore claim that they hold their 
principle in a “very strong form; on the one hand, the meaning of a sentence S in a 
language L must be computable by algorithm from the meanings of its constituents on 
pain of L being unproductive or S being idiomatic.  On the other hand, we know of no 
reason why it should be possible (algorithmically or otherwise) to recover the meanings 
of the constituents of S from the meaning of S.”114  Fodor and Lepore hold that the 
meaning of sentences are ‘ontologically dependent’ upon the meaning of subsentential 
components, and—this being so—the only way to account for sentential meaning (they 
claim) is via a theory that takes subsentential meaning to be explanatorily prior to 
sentential meaning.  On the inferentialist account, where a sentential judgment is the 
fundamental datum of meaning, subsentential components cannot play the role of 
meaning-constitution they do for Fodor and Lepore. 
 Now Fodor and Lepore have in mind an essentially representationalist theory of 
meaning for subsentential components—where sentences mean what they do because 
their subsentential components refer to objects in the world, together with whatever rules 
of syntax, anaphoric replacement, and etc. are necessary to build up a theory of 
sentential meaning from subsentential reference.  Here is where the distinction between 
explanatory and ontological priority comes to be critical. 
 For the inferentialist may be committed to the explanatory priority of an 
inference used to explain propositional content without denying that subsentential 
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reference is equiprimordial on the level of ontology or metaphysics (whatever that is 
supposed to mean).115  Conflating explanatory priority with ontological priority runs the 
risk of confusing just what the inferentialist theory of meaning is committed to.  Fodor 
and Lepore argue that subsentential reference must be used to explain sentential 
meaning, and at the level of explanatory priority this is clearly in disagreement with the 
inferentialist, who holds the order of explanation runs the other way.  But the 
explanatory priority of the sentence need not commit the inferentialist to the ontological 
priority of sentences—to the “metaphysical…priority of judgments to other mental 
acts.”116  To do so would be to confuse the distinction, running at least back to Aristotle, 
between what is first in the order of explanation and what is first in the order of 
existence.  The inferentialist claims that we need to make use of the notion of 
propositional content to understand subsentential content, not that propositional content 
is ever found independent of subsentential content.  With this clarification in mind we 
can now address some more pointed criticisms offered by Fodor and Lepore. 
In “Brandom’s Burdens: Compositionality and Inferentialism” Fodor and Lepore  
identify two requirements that must be met by inferentialist accounts of meaning to be 
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philosophically viable:  first, the inferentialist must explain which inferences are 
meaning-constitutive, and second she must explain the compositionality of meaning.117   
Meeting the first demand requires specifying, in a way Fodor and Lepore don’t 
see Brandom capable of doing, precisely which inferences are to be meaning-constitutive 
in the inferentialist account of propositional content.  Representationalist accounts of 
meaning clearly do not have this problem.  Propositional content is explained 
fundamentally in terms of the word-world relations that form the center of 
representational meaning.  Paradigmatically, what a word means is what it refers to in 
the world, and if further conditions of meaning are accounted for in the 
representationalist picture (say by embedding inferences within the account), these 
conditions are parasitic upon the paradigm cases of representation.  But Brandom is 
committed to another order of explanation, where inference is fundamental and 
representation is derivative.   
Against Brandom’s suggestion that Frege and Kant can be understood as 
inferentialist, Lepore and Fodor argue that in fact Kant and Frege, while explaining 
propositional content via an appeal to inferential role, in turn explained inferential role in 
terms of specifically analytic inferences.118  “Since analyticity is truth in virtue of 
meaning, this makes these semantic properties of a concept prior to its inferential role.  
Kant and Frege were good Semantic Cartesians after all.”119  Kantian and Fregean 
appeals to a role for inferential accounts of propositional content ultimately come down 
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to analyticity, inferences whose meaning is presupposed “prior to its inferential role.”120  
“For the content of a concept to supervene on its role in analytic inferences is thus for 
the inferential role of that concept to supervene on its semantics.”121  From where do 
these analytic meanings derive Fodor and Lepore offer no story, but presumably with 
their gesture toward “Semantic Cartesianism” they read Kant and Frege as 
representationalists.  But, at least in the case of Kant, this reading seems to ignore the 
central role of synthetic a priori propositions as ones whose meanings are not 
analytically defined and cannot be traced back to representational input received from 
experience, but rather whose truth is a precondition for and provide the a priori structure 
to any experience whatsoever.  As Fodor and Lepore make no more reference to an 
adequate interpretation of Kant or Frege, and because Brandom’s inferentialism is able 
to account for an inferentialist account of meaning on its own terms, we will no further 
be concerned with their reading of Kant.  
“So, then, what is Brandom’s answer to ‘which inferences?’….as far as we can 
tell, Brandom is committed to holding that at least some of the material inferences in 
which an expression is implicated, are constitutive of its content.”122  So claim Fodor 
and Lepore, and to this point they are correct.  Brandom’s program is explicitly 
committed to semantic holism “[f]or if the conceptual content expressed by each 
sentence or word is understood as essentially consisting in its inferential relations…then 
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one must grasp many such contents in order to grasp any.”123  Fodor and Lepore have 
two problems with this response—first, it still does not address which inferences are 
constitutive in their strict sense of “which”, and second they claim it provides no way to 
ground the meaning of terms outside conventions of language: “‘Analytic ethics’ and 
‘analytic metaphysics’ and the like were quite bad enough; the prospect of an analytic 
meteorology is really more than we can bear.”124 
 To address the first of these concerns, that semantic holism still does not 
adequately specify which inferences are meaning-constitutive, we will examine a slight 
shift in emphasis in the way Fodor and Lepore have phrased the issue.  Once we free 
ourselves from the pretheoretic suggestion that the meaning of a word, or more critically 
a complex idea, should be exhaustively stipulated by a set of conditions available for 
appeal by all those who are said to understand the word or idea, then semantic holism 
can be leveraged to account for the very different suggestion that in most cases we 
understand a word or complex idea’s meaning only imperfectly, are able to articulate its 
inferential roles to a greater-or-lesser extent, and require recourse to the greater store of 
cultural knowledge that forms the basis of our linguistic practices in order to flesh out 
our meaning.125  To address the second of these concerns, that inferential semantic 
holism has no truck with an objective world whose structure shapes our words’ 
meanings, we will have to delve a little deeper into the inferentialist program. 
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 Fodor and Lepore resist the semantic holist account for the reason that it seems 
not to stipulate which inferences are carrying the weight of meaning-constitution.  But as 
a semantic holist, the proper response here would be to deny that any proper subset of 
inferential relations ever of necessity fulfills the role of meaning-fixation.  Rather, it 
takes the whole batch of inferential commitments and entitlements bound up in a 
particular assertion to fully explain what that assertion means.  One gets the impression 
that the advocate of an atomist perspective on meaning is enamored of the possibility of 
explaining content in necessary and sufficient terms.  If a word’s meaning is what it 
represents then we have a clear criterion for verifying whether an individual understands 
what it means—viz., does she know what it refers to?  The holist, however, is committed 
to the position that meaning is a more-or-less, not an all-or-nothing affair.  Only when an 
individual knows all a proposition’s inferential roles does she understand fully what the 
proposition means—grasping each and every one of a proposition’s inferential roles is 
the necessary and sufficient condition for understanding the full meaning of a 
proposition on the holist’s perspective.  In the absence of such an omniscient grasp, and 
without jettisoning the idea that we can grasp meaning, the semantic holist is left 
defending the position that knowing a proper subset of all a proposition’s inferential 
roles allows us to know what a proposition means without knowing what it fully means.  
But is this a problem?  Does not the semantic holist better account for the way we do in 
fact speak and act? 
I may not be able to articulate every inferential role consequent on a use of the 
word “tellurium” in our language, or the complex idea “Marx’s theory of capital”, but 
 95 
that alone should hardly count against the fact that I am able to understand, at least 
minimally, what the word or the idea means.  If anything, these counter-examples 
indicate the need to build into our theory of meaning the possibility of imperfect grasp of 
conceptual content, something inferentialism quite nicely accomplishes, without 
supposing that none of us are talking about the same subjects simply because we don’t 
agree on all and the same inferential roles we take our propositions to play.  With the 
stipulation that the normative dimensions of inferential roles are explained via the 
broader social sphere within which a language game is played, this theory suggests we 
think of meaning as something understood in degrees commensurate with an individual’s 
ability to offer the appropriate inferential articulations, in contrast with the suggestion 
that meaning is an all-or-nothing affair satisfied only when an individual can produce all 
the proper word-world relationships.  In place of the binary picture suggested by the 
represenationalist account of meaning, inferentialism offers us a grasp of conceptual 
content that is asymptotic, with the limit being, perhaps, the entire holistic structure of a 
community’s language.   
 But there remains to be discussed the issue of objectivity, of words meaning what 
they do in virtue of more than a community’s mere stipulation.  In this we see a return to 
the issue of rational constraint that at the end of section 2 we saw would threaten a 
socio-linguistic account for normativity.  Ultimately Brandom wants to invoke “Quine’s 
strategy of appealing to what is talked or thought about to secure an account of the 
nature of communication.”126  That is to say, though you and I may differ about what 
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inferential commitments we take to be consequent on our assertions regarding lightning 
(perhaps because we have different understandings of electromagnetism and 
meteorology), and so we may be asserting propositions with (when fully articulated) 
different propositional contents, we can still be sure we are communicating with each 
other because our word “lightning” refers to the same phenomenon in the world.  Our 
language is not spun in a void, and the world in fact plays an integral part in determining 
what inferences we are licensed to make.  The metallurgist clarifies our understanding of 
tellurium because she is familiar with the material. 
Specifying the role of reference as a means to ensure communication despite 
differences in the inferential role of different speakers’ assertions, and so different 
propositional contents among them, will also give us a grip on the way inferentialism 
accounts for the representational dimension of propositional content.  Coming to 
understand the relationship between inferentialism, reference, and representation will 
require some familiarity with the Fregean dimensions of Brandom’s program, to which 
we now turn. 
 Brandom asserts that his inferentialism is not the reductive variety for which  
First that there can be expressions or intentional states standing in inferential 
relations and playing inferential roles, hence having conceptual content, 
without yet standing in representational ones, and second, that one can then 
build representational relations and roles, and so content, out of those 
inferential ones.127 
 
In contrast, Brandom’s inferentialism holds that inferences are explanatorily primary, 
not ontologically primary.  What is needed to secure this view then is a theoretical 
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machinery that can “underwrite assessments of the representational content of 
expressions”, for this content is not to be eliminated and so must be accounted for by the 
inferentialist.128  On the following page of this article Brandom sketches in outline how 
this is to proceed 
Expressive inferentialism, by contrast [with reductive inferentialism], is a 
claim about understanding inferential and representational relations.  It is at 
the level of the senses of the concepts inference and representation, rather 
than at the level of their referents.  The expressive inferentialist 
acknowledges that nothing can stand in genuinely inferential relations unless 
it also has representational content.  There is no inference without reference.  
But it is claimed nonetheless that one can specify sufficient conditions for 
expressions to be used so as to possess conceptual content (of both sorts) in a 
purely inferential metalanguage.129 
 
Understanding the commitments being made here will require us to turn to a 
fundamental distinction Frege makes in Sense and Reference between ordinary 
discourse, direct discourse, and indirect discourse. 
 Frege reminds us, to begin with, that words and names have not only referents 
but senses or—if you like—connotations.  So while ‘Mark Twain’ and ‘Samuel 
Clemens’ as a matter of fact denote or refer to the same object in the world, they do not 
connote or mean the same thing.  They have the same reference but differ in sense.  
Frege extends this analysis to entire sentences, concluding that sentences have both 
senses and referents.  A sentence denotes or refers to a truth-value, but a sentence 
connotes or means the thought it expresses.  So the sentence “Mark Twain wrote Tom 
Sawyer” refers to the object ‘the true’, while its sense (what it means) is the thought that 
“Mark Twain wrote Tom Sawyer”.  And with the inclusion of a ‘that’ clause prefacing 
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this analysis of sense we have broached another critical distinction for Frege, and the one 
that will allow us to clarify Brandom’s passage quoted above. 
 Frege distinguishes three ways in which we can talk about sentences or words.  
In ordinary discourse a sentence or word, as a (series of) character(s) (verbal or 
otherwise), expresses a sense which is its thought or meaning, and designates a referent 
which is the object it refers to.  In ordinary discourse, then, the sign “Mark Twain” refers 
to or denotes the human being named by that sign.  In ordinary discourse this sign 
expresses the sense that Frege believes is the property of a “common store of thoughts 
which is transmitted from one generation to another.”130  What we have implicitly been 
doing, however, is speaking about the sign “Mark Twain”, not the object Mark Twain.  
This sort of discourse Frege calls direct discourse, where the referent of what we are 
discussing is not the object referred to by the sign in its ordinary use.  Rather, the 
referent of the sign “Mark Twain” in direct discourse is instead the sign itself (the letters 
M-a-r-k etc.) as they are used in ordinary discourse.  We mark off this distinction 
grammatically by putting the sign in quotation marks, to indicate that we are not 
denoting the object of the sign as it’s ordinarily used but are rather denoting the sign 
itself.   
Similarly for whole sentences, we can assert “Mark Twain wrote Tom Sawyer” in 
ordinary discourse, in which case the sign expresses the thought or sense of the sentence 
and designates its object or referent.  In the case of sentences, as was just said, Frege 
thinks the referent is a truth value, which in the case of the ordinary discourse use of 
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“Mark Twain wrote Tom Sawyer” implies that the sentence refers to the object ‘the true’.  
But again, as we’ve just done by putting the sentence in quotation marks, we can talk 
about “Mark Twain wrote Tom Sawyer” in direct discourse, where the designatum is the 
sign itself (the letters M-a-r-k etc.).  But there is a third way in which Frege is interested 
in how we speak about language. 
 Sometimes we are interested in what Frege calls indirect discourse.  Here what is 
designated is the ordinary sense of an expression.  In this way we are able to talk directly 
about—that is, refer to or denote—meaning.  In ordinary discourse meaning is 
presupposed, for what is talked about is either an object (in the case of terms or names) 
or truth values (in the case of whole sentences).  But knowing the truth-value of a 
sentence is, by itself, practically useless.  We need to know what that sentence means, 
what the propositional content, the sense of that sentence is in order to be informed by it.  
Just so, the sense or thought of a sentence alone is equally useless—we need to know if 
the thought is true.   
If now the truth value of a sentence is its referent, then on the one hand all 
true sentences have the same referent and so, on the other hand, do all false 
sentences.  From this we see that in the referent of the sentence all that is 
specific is obliterated.  We can never be concerned only with the referent of a 
sentence; but again the mere thought alone yields no knowledge, but only the 
thought together with its referent, i.e., its truth value.131 
 
We might say that, for Frege, truth without proposition is empty, while propositions 
without truth are blind.  What is critical for our story is the way indirect discourse lets us 
explicitly address the sense or meaning of an ordinary discourse locution. Grammatically 
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this sort of discourse is usually marked off by prefacing the ordinary discourse 
expression with a ‘that’ clause. 
 Perhaps an example will help clarify the relationship between ordinary, direct, 
and indirect discourse.  Suppose you and I are attending a dinner party and overhear a 
conversation across the room where a conversant has just uttered “Schnee ist weiss”.  
You have heard the utterance, and understanding German, know that the proposition 
uttered (the meaning of the German sentence when translated into English) is “snow is 
white.”  I, however, both did not clearly hear what was said and do not understand 
German.  The sentence as used by the original utterer was used in ordinary discourse, 
where its sense/meaning is the proposition “snow is white” and its reference is to “the 
true” or “truth”.  But suppose you and I begin to enquire into what was said.  Turning to 
you I ask “What did he just say?”  If you assumed I understood German your first 
response might be “He said “Schnee ist weiss””.  Here you have used the sentence in 
direct discourse (stylistically rendered by the use of quotation marks) where the 
reference of this token (the phrase in quotes) as you have uttered it is to the ordinary 
discourse utterance that the original conversant uttered.  In saying “He said “Schnee ist 
weiss”” you are using the quoted phrase in direct discourse to refer to the original 
ordinary discourse utterance.  Direct discourse allows us to use words to refer to other 
words.  The ordinary/direct discourse distinction for Frege marks the same boundary as 
the more common use/mention distinction.  In ordinary discourse we use an utterance to 
express an idea, while in direct discourse we mention an utterance to refer to (one of) 
that utterance’s ordinary discourse token(s).   
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Returning to our dialogue, however, it is clear that I was looking for something 
other than a direct discourse reference to the utterance of the original conversant.  
Because I do not speak German, it will not suffice in this context to simply repeat (to 
mention) what it was the original conversant uttered.  My response to you might be: “Oh, 
I suspected he was speaking a different language.  What does “Schnee ist weiss” mean?”  
To which you reply, “He said that snow is white”.  And here we have an instance of 
indirect discourse, marked off stylistically by prefacing the explanation with a “that” 
clause.132  With indirect discourse we are able to refer to the sense or meaning of an 
expression as it occurs in ordinary discourse.  Recall that “Schnee ist weiss” refers to 
“the true” and expresses the sense (has the meaning) of the proposition “snow is white”.  
When in indirect discourse you say “He said that snow is white” you are referring to the 
propositional content, the meaning, of “Schness ist weiss”.  It is with indirect discourse 
that we can refer to the meaning of utterances as they are used in ordinary discourse. 
 And so returning to our discussion above, the sentence “Mark Twain wrote Tom 
Sawyer” refers to the object ‘the true’ (ordinary discourse), while it means the thought 
that “Mark Twain wrote Tom Sawyer” (indirect discourse).  Indirect discourse lets us 
refer to the meaning of a sentence expressed by its sense in ordinary use, and so the 
expressive inferentialist, as Brandom characterizes himself, is concerned with marking 
this distinction and adopting a theoretical metalanguage at the level of indirect discourse 
that allows us to account for the meaning of propositions in the object-language of 
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ordinary discourse by talking about, referring to, their senses.  The inferentialist quite 
happily admits that expressions in ordinary discourse have representational dimensions 
in terms of their reference to objects in the world, but the metalanguage that 
characterizes the inferentialist theory of meaning is a language of indirect discourse, 
where what is referred to are not objects in the world but thoughts or meanings; 
senses.133 Indirect discourse as the primary linguistic tool in an inferentialist account of 
meaning preserves a role for reference. 
Consider the sentence “I saw a unicorn last night”.  There are many ways this 
sentence might be read, many thoughts or senses it might express—perhaps its utterer 
really means she saw a unicorn last night, but perhaps she meant that she had a vivid 
dream of a unicorn and we who overheard her missed the context.  The referent of this 
sentence considered in indirect discourse is its sense or meaning in ordinary discourse, 
whatever we decide was meant by the individual who has asserted they saw a unicorn 
last night.  Adopting the standpoint of indirect discourse will allow us to understand how 
to spell out a sentence’s meaning, for what is referred to in indirect discourse, what is 
talked about, is the sense or connotation of that sentence as it is used in ordinary 
discourse.  Now for the inferentialist this sentence’s sense, its’ meaning, in ordinary 
discourse depends on the other assertions its utterer is prepared to commit to—whether 
the utterer would assert that she dreamt of a unicorn last night or whether in a variety of 
situations she makes other claims that indicate she believes in the existence of unicorns, 
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for instance.  Thus while the inferentialist is committed to the need for an ordinary 
discourse account of the assertion “I saw a unicorn last night” to specify whether or not 
“unicorn” is meant to refer, the reference of the indirect discourse assertion is specified 
with respect to its ordinary discourse sense, itself cashed out in terms of inferential 
articulation.  This is what allows the inferentialist explanation to be an explanation of 
meaning.  The inferentialist accounts for the meaning (the sense) of an ordinary 
discourse assertion by focusing on it in indirect discourse where reference is not an issue 
of representation.  Instead, the referent of an expression in indirect discourse is its sense 
in ordinary discourse.  Thus the indirect discourse explanation of meaning for “I saw a 
unicorn last night” depends on the sense that assertion has in ordinary discourse, which 
as we saw depends on its inferential connections to the other assertions its’ utterer is 
committed to.  These assertions themselves will, ordinarily considered, invoke 
referential relations between words and objects, but no such referents need be included 
in the semantic machinery of the metalanguage, the machinery that explains meaning via 
inferential role.  This is because reference does not directly contribute to the sense of a 
sentence.   
The ordinary discourse sense of “I saw a unicorn last night” remains the same 
whether or not unicorn refers—all that the reference of the term determines is the 
referent of the whole sentence, which is its truth value.  The referent of the sentence in 
indirect discourse is its sense in ordinary discourse, and so this sentence maintains a 
common indirect discourse referent regardless of whether its ordinary discourse terms 
refer.  The only thing affecting the indirect referent of this assertion—its sense in 
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ordinary discourse—is the inferential relations surrounding it in the language game 
within which it is employed.  For the expressive inferentialist, representational reference 
plays a subsidiary role in accounting for propositional content.  This does not require 
that representation plays no role, as the reductive inferentialist would hold.  Rather, the 
expressive inferentialist adopts a metalanguage of indirect discourse within which the 
reference of an expression is to the sense of that expression in the object-language of 
ordinary discourse, not to the object-language’s representational referents. 
This is precisely what an inferentialist account of meaning would be expected to 
offer—a distinction between the object-language of ordinary assertion where the 
meaning of terms (and their referents) are taken for granted as they are deployed in 
language games, and the same sentences considered in the theoretical metalanguage of 
indirect discourse where focus is on the senses or meanings these sentences have in their 
ordinary uses, which senses are specified with respect to the inferential relationships 
invoked by those sentences within the larger corpus of their utterers’ commitments.  
Reference and representation have not dropped out of this explanation—for a sentence 
considered in indirect discourse refers to the sense that sentence has in ordinary 
discourse, and this sense itself presupposes an ordinary discourse sentence whose 
subsentential terms (perhaps) purport to refer to or represent objects in the world.  The 
key idea is that the reference of the inferentialists’ theoretical metalanguage of indirect 
discourse is to the senses of sentences and not to their representational dimensions, while 
the locus of representational reference, reference to objects in the world, occurs within 
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the object-language of ordinary discourse and not within the inferentialist 
metalanguage.134   
It is in this way I propose we understand Brandom’s remark that “It is at the level 
of the senses of the concepts inference and representation, rather than at the level of their 
referents [that the expressive inferentialist proposes we understand these concepts].  The 
expressive inferentialist acknowledges that nothing can stand in genuinely inferential 
relations unless it also has representational content….But it is claimed nonetheless that 
one can specify sufficient conditions for expressions to be used so as to possess 
conceptual content (of both sorts) in a purely inferential metalanguage.”135 
 So what are we to make of the problem of compositionality and productivity—
can inferentialism account for these desiderata of Fodor and Lepore?  They certainly 
form a key and recurring theme in their criticism of Brandom.136  “It’s important—we 
think it’s centrally important—whether an inferentialist can tell a convincing story about 
the compositionality of natural languages.”137  Brandom has offered some indication of 
how to understand subsentential meaning in virtue of substitution relations.138  It remains 
to be seen whether the approach he has outlined there can be sufficiently developed to 
account for the subsentential meaning relations necessary to account for the productivity 
of novel sentences and the compositionality of sentence-meaning from subsentential 
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meaning as Fodor and Lepore require.  But more pressing is the question of whether this 
approach should concern the inferentialist.  Certainly Fodor and Lepore think this is 
“centrally important”, but need the inferentialist? 
 I do not want to step on the toes of any philosophical interests here, but the 
intuition that underlies the emphasis on compositionality seems so connected to the 
intuition that drives a representationalist theory of meaning that one wonders whether 
the two intuitions could be separated, and so the concern for compositionality imported 
by an inferentialist, without enervating the notion of compositionality altogether.  
Indeed, Fodor and Lepore have remarked “…we sometimes rather doubt that Brandom 
means by ‘compositionality’ anything like what we have in mind.”139  The question is, 
should Brandom be expected to have in mind anything like what Fodor and Lepore do?  
Is, for instance, our use of language to express new thoughts by conjoining words into 
sentences that have often never before been encountered by an audience, and indeed 
often never expressed before at all (as, for instance, is likely the case with this sentence) 
an issue of semantics?  Why is it not a psychological phenomena?  As a matter of 
learning a language most people learn individual words and are taught methods of 
combining them to create whole sentences.  But a theorist should be careful to 
distinguish what is of practical value and what is theoretically viable as an explanation 
of that practice.  It may be that the issue of compositionality is of more value for the 
practical linguist or psychologist than it is the philosopher of meaning.   
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Finally, one might make the case that with their emphasis on representation 
Fodor and Lepore are focusing on a fundamentally different datum of explanation for 
compositionality, one that obscures any sense in which Brandom could be thought to 
provide an account of intentionality satisfiable to their theoretical tastes.  In Fregean 
terms Fodor and Lepore are focusing on the references of words to give an account of 
compositionality, not on their senses.  But of course the expressive inferentialist is going 
to argue that we understand the sentence above “Is, for instance, our use of language to 
express new thoughts…” in terms of an expression of sense instead of representation.  
There seems to be something to this supposition.  I’ve seen much the same thought as 
the above quoted sentence expressed by Brandom twice, once in discussion and once in 
Articulating Reasons.140  Yet all three sentences use different signs to convey this 
thought.  Why should an inferentialist account be expected to focus on compositionality, 
itself connected to a notion of decomposition and recomposition at the level of 
subsentential representation, when what interests the inferentialist is an account of whole 
sentential thoughts or judgments? 
Fodor and Lepore are looking for a back-tracking account of semantics, 
deconstructing propositional meaning into subsentential terms and clauses that have 
content in virtue of, paradigmatically, representation.  From this a reconstructional 
account of compositionality can hopefully proceed.  But Brandom’s perspective is a bit 
different.  The inferentialist proposes that we approach meaning with the recognition that 
our feet are already wet—that we’re confronted with all sorts of propositional 
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commitments the meanings of which while ultimately lodged in the linguistic standards 
of the tradition in which we’re raised, are nonetheless capable of inferential articulation 
in the course of criticizing those standards (socially, scientifically, logically, etc.) and so 
self-consciously engaging in the rational revision and development of it.  If Fodor and 
Lepore are interested in a deconstructive semantic picture capable of accounting for the 
reconstruction of individual propositions, Brandom is rather concerned to show that the 
inferential relationships of propositional content supply us with a method for projecting 
not the construction of new propositions but the criticism of the methodologies that 
underpin what counts as a warranted proposition within a particular discipline.  What 
should motivate a predilection for one of these research programs over the other?  
Insofar as both are capable of meeting the criticisms supplied by the other, why not 
suppose we pursue both programs and see which offer the best results for the purposes 
they’re being put to use for? 
 This is a thorny issue and I do not suppose to have resolved it.  Of all the 
critiques of inferentialism we’ve canvassed in section 3 it seems that the problem of 
compositionality is the most difficult to meet, but I suspect it is also the most misguided.  
Without presuming to have settled the issue I propose that we follow Quine’s advice, 
given in a similar discussion about the theoretical specification of linguistic and 
metalinguistic ontologies, and suggest “tolerance and an experimental spirit.”141  It may 
be the case that inferentialism proves capable of accounting for the compositionality and 
productivity of natural languages.  On the other hand it may be that a knock-down 
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argument showing both the necessary centrality of compositionality in a theory of 
meaning and the inability of inferentialism to meet this requirement will be offered.  In 
the absence of either of these conditions being met research should be encouraged in 
whatever directions inroads along other problems can be made.  For it may be that this is 
one problem not so much to be solved as it is to be dissolved.   
 What is critical to reflect on at the end of this section, however, is the more 
obvious criticisms that the inferentialist program has met and repulsed.  The literature on 
this subject is profuse, but a representative sample has been arrayed here and the main 
problems addressed.  On the condition that inferentialism offers a viable theory of 
conceptual or propositional content, making explicit the role of normativity both in the 
inferential articulation of propositional content and in the metalinguistic reflection on the 
normative standards implicit in the judgments articulation of this content, the next 
section will focus on addressing the ways in which this theory of meaning, and more 
specifically the notion of normativity, can be connected to a naturalistic account of 
human existence. 
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4. WHENCE NORMATIVITY? 
NORMATIVITY AND NATURALISM 
 
4.1 Introduction:  Returning to Rational Constraint 
 We have been motivating the view that we can deploy the notion of normativity 
as one of rational constraint.  In section 3 our focus was rational constraint on linguistic 
behavior as an explanation for semantic content, insofar as the propositional 
commitments implicit in the assertion of a given proposition can be inferentially 
articulated as a method of explaining that proposition’s meaning.  But linguistic behavior 
is not the only sort of behavior capable of being characterized via normativity.  Part of 
the appeal of a normative theory of rationality lies in the suggestion that the notion of 
normativity gives us a theory of rational behavior across a range of activities—ethics as 
what we should do, epistemics as what we should believe, and aesthetics as what we 
should value.  Though an extension of the notion of normativity to the treatment of 
rational behavior in these disparate areas of human life would be a valuable contribution 
to an understanding of ourselves and our activities, so bold a project will have to wait for 
another day.  Instead, our task here will be to endeavor to prepare the foundation for 
such a future treatment by offering an account by which normativity can be understood 
as a natural phenomenon.  In section 3 we argued for a theory of linguistic meaning that 
took normativity to be a fundamental explanans in accounting for propositional content; 
now it is time to see if this theoretical postulate is one we are in general licensed to make 
use of. 
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 From this point forward the discussion will proceed on the supposition that the 
most pressing worries over an inferentialist theory of meaning, as canvassed in section 3, 
are either misplaced or less important than their advocates suppose.  The articles to be 
discussed in section 4 therefore fall into the category of those generally in agreement 
with Brandom’s program, but whose authors have specific concerns for situating 
normativity in a broader naturalistic account of the world.142  Specifically our concern 
here will be to address some of the worries regarding Brandom’s explanatory account for 
the existence of the norms appealed to in the inferentialist theory of meaning.  Brandom 
makes clear that he is concerned with conceptual content, and so normativity, 
fundamentally as it obtains in linguistic practices, and this makes society the locus of 
original normativity.143 Daniel Dennett and Ruth Millikan, on the other hand, are 
interested in giving an account of how norms can be understood to extend beyond 
society into the natural realm of evolutionary development.  Their concern is to show 
that in appealing to norms we are not merely appealing to a realm of normativity that 
leaps like Athena fully-formed into existence, but that by providing an account of rule-
following that extends beyond linguistic behavior into evolution we can, in Dennett’s 
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words, “go some way to removing the suspicious residue of magic that purports to 
ground meaning in community and then, having done that, declares victory.”144 
 In the first regard we might remark that there are methodological reasons for 
lodging conceptual content, and so normativity, in the socio-linguistic realm.  Doing so 
will give us clear conditions for determining whether or not an entity is making use of 
conceptual content, and ways for determining what that content is.  We can engage in 
conversation with the entity and see what he or she tells us.  We obviously cannot do this 
with nonlinguistic animals, or with our suppositions about how conceptual content may 
have developed in prehistoric human groups.  One might suppose that sticking to this 
clear criterion is reason enough to restrict our examination on the origin of normativity 
to the ways in which language-users are acculturated within particular socio-linguistic 
systems and leave unanalyzed the murky issue of where societies as a whole acquire 
their norms and the conceptual content they delimit. 
But I share Dennett and Millikan’s intuitions—while there will be problems of 
where to draw fine-grained distinctions for conceptual content, and how to determine 
what that content is when all we have to go on is behavior and physiological similarity, I 
propose that connecting an account of the origin of norms to the naturalistic explanations 
of the physical sciences, especially evolutionary biology, is crucial in motivating the 
view that a normative theory of rationality is capable of application across ethical, 
epistemic, and aesthetic disciplines.    
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It furthermore seems entirely plausible that the biological explanations we have 
for the behaviors we engage in are just as important for an analysis of what norms we 
adopt in our approaches toward the world as it is to recognize that we are not merely a 
collection of biological impulses.  For language is not the only source of the norms that 
we bring to bear in the world.  Behavior exhibits implicit normativity as well, and the 
evolutionary origin of self-consciousness requires we be willing to consider the ancestral 
analogues of our current norms, the more so because evolutionary forces have fitted us 
with all sorts of automatic circuitry that disposes us to behave in ways that instantiate 
norms we may not want to endorse self-reflectively. Anyone who's been in a romantic 
relationship must know this by heart.  In short, I propose that it is just as important for 
the application of a theory of human norms that we connect normativity to evolutionary 
biology, and so let our theory be informed by the research being done in biology, as it is 
important that we establish this connection in such a way that the theory can be deemed 
acceptable as something amenable to naturalistic accounts of human existence.  
In this we are following a suggestion made by Sellars in Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind.  In that work Sellars reminds us that the entities posited by a theory 
operate at two levels of consideration—on the one hand, internal to the theory itself, 
these entities are purely theoretical, postulated to make sense of the observations the 
theory wishes to explain.  On the other, theoretical entities deserve a place within the 
larger picture of the world currently in play.  
We have, in effect, been distinguishing between two dimensions of the logic (or 
‘methodologic’) of theoretical terms: (a) their role in explaining the selected 
phenomena of which the theory is a theory; (b) their role as candidates for 
integration in what we have called the “total picture”…What we can say is that 
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the less a scientist is in a position to conjecture about the way in which a certain 
theory can be expected to integrate with other specialities, the more the concepts 
of his theory approximate to the status of pure theoretical concepts.145 
 
This sets before us a bilateral program; on the one side to posit norms, values, intentions 
as theoretical entities invoked to explain certain human activities and articulated by a 
theoretical machinery able to systematically put these entities to use.  On the other, to 
provide an account of the status of these theoretical entities within the larger domain of 
our understanding of the world.  As I see it, this is just the program that Robert Brandom 
and John McDowell have inherited from Wilfrid Sellars, and it represents an attempt to 
reconcile, within one picture of the world, the normativity of human thought with the 
naturalistic events that form the subject of the physical sciences.146  Brandom and 
McDowell can productively be seen as working toward the two Sellarsian desiderata of 
this program—McDowell in motivating an overall conception of the logical space within 
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and World with Brandom’s semantic project, note that McDowell ends with a discussion on the 
importance of language as the focal point for our cultural initiation (126). 
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which to ground this reconciled view of the natural and normative, and Brandom in 
articulating a theoretical machinery able to work in this space.147 
So now the question becomes, what constitutes a “naturalistic account”?  As it is 
the literature on naturalism is incredibly diverse in its characterization of what exactly 
“naturalism” is supposed to be.  In part this is because many people want to ensure their 
views aren’t accused of “non-naturalism”, an accusation which seems to bear a 
resemblance to the accusation of being a mysterian.  As Jeffrey W. Roland recently put 
the point in a presentation given at Texas A&M (on January 17, 2008), “Given the 
default status of naturalism in contemporary philosophy (i.e., when naturalistic and non-
naturalistic views compete for our confidence, ceteris paribus the naturalistic view 
wins), there is considerable rhetorical weight attached to the identification of a position 
as naturalistic.”148  Our focus here will be first to characterize some naturalistic positions 
representative of the options, to stipulate which approach will be ours, and then by these 
lights to provide a naturalistic account of normativity. 
4.2 Varieties of Naturalism 
 
It may be helpful to think of the naturalist debate along two dimensions—
linguistic and ontological.  Along both these dimensions there are grades of commitment 
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presented at the Western Canadian Philosophical Association’s 44th Annual Meeting, University of 
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Brandom’s view on norms to the philosophical work of John Dewey, for whom the very notion of an ideal 
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running from puritanism to hedonism.  At the puritanical linguistic and ontological 
corner lies someone like Quine—refrain from hypostasizing ontology from language and 
posit only those entities necessary for the pursuit of physical science.  To do otherwise is 
to run the risk of multiplying ontology ad infinitum.  At the diagonal corner lies someone 
like Larry Laudan, who holds that we can understand normativity as playing a role not 
only in our ontological accounts of human existence but in the metatheory that 
characterizes the sorts of discourse leveraged to explain that existence.149  Linguistically 
puritanical but ontologically hedonistic, David Papineau has defended a truth-functional 
account of meaning that does not rely on normativity in linguistic content, yet allows for 
the naturalistic presence of norms as the ends we hold personally valuable.150  
Conversely, someone like Bart Streumer holds that normative properties are 
linguistically necessary but ontologically eliminable.151  We see that the notion of 
naturalism with respect to normativity covers the spectrum of ontological and linguistic 
commitments to both hedonism and puritanism.   
Now while I am sympathetic to Quine’s concern that we do not allow the 
hypostasization of linguistic forms to swell our ontology, and with his worry that once 
we begin it is difficult to know when to stop, I am perhaps more suspicious of a claim 
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 Larry Laudan, “Normative Naturalism,” Philosophy of Science, Vol. 57, No.1 (March, 1990):  
44-59.  From page 45: “[Some philosophers], like myself, who understand science to involve a much 
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 Bart Streumer, “Are there Irreducibly Normative Properties?” in the Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, forthcoming, available currently at 
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that entities are linguistically necessary but ontologically eliminable (Streumer’s 
position).  For all the difficulties potential in the former approach, the latter strikes me as 
a repeat of the transcendentalism that in section 2 we saw left Kant’s notion of 
normativity unpalatable.  If we can avoid being committed to accepting as necessary for 
a theory of language a particular class of entities while at the same time denying that 
class in our theory of the world, I propose that we are advised to do so, if only for our 
own cognitive harmony.  Furthermore, as will become clear in the course of our 
discussion, I think there are important implications to be drawn from treating norms as 
entities capable of examination and revision.  Insofar as section 3 showed us a way to 
conceive of a linguistic role for normativity, we are with this view already committed to 
linguistic hedonism about the status of norms.  To avoid the dangers of slipping into a 
Kantian transcendentalism if we allow hedonism linguistically but deny it ontologically, 
the naturalism defended here will be in the vein of Laudan’s approach.  The articulation 
of this defense will show that the linguistic reliance on normativity in an inferential 
semantics can be supported by an account of the existence of norms as naturalistic 
entities.152  First, however, it may be useful to canvas Laudan’s role for normativity in 
scientific explanation. 
Laudan suggests we can understand normative rules as hypothetical imperatives 
linking means to ends, put to use in a theory empirically sensitive to whether or not these 
hypothetical imperatives function successfully as the means to acquire the desired ends.  
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 Millikan asserts on page 6 of “The Son and the Daughter” that “…on Sellars’s view the 
presence of normative rules in the natural world appears in the end as just one more level of fact in that 
world.”   
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“[S]o construed, epistemic norms or rules are grounded on theories about how to 
conduct inquiry, and those rules behave functionally within the system of knowledge in 
precisely the same way that other theories (for example, straightforward scientific ones) 
do.”153  Insofar as the ends toward which we deploy a theory often change given a 
perceived need to initiate revision consequent on the discovery of new data, Laudan 
argues that “the rules guiding theory choice in the natural sciences have changed and 
evolved in response to new information in the same ways in which scientific theories 
have shifted in the face of new evidence.”154  In so conceiving norms Laudan concludes 
“epistemic doctrines or rules are fallible posits or conjectures, exactly on a par with all 
the other elements of scientific knowledge.”155  Laudan’s characterization of naturalized 
normativity gives prescription a role in critiquing the relative value of different scientific 
theories by taking norms to be the “hypothetical imperatives” against which a theory’s 
application is checked by measuring whether that theory is a successful means to achieve 
the ends its’ users put it to.  Insofar as a theory is not useful in achieving the ends it is 
supposed to be a means toward, scientists make the normative injunction that it is not a 
good (or the right, or the best) theory.  “From which it follows,” Laudan asserts, “that a 
thoroughly naturalistic approach to inquiry can, in perfectly good conscience, 
countenance prescriptive epistemology, provided of course that the prescriptions in 
question are understood as empirically defeasible.”156 This takes us some way toward 
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understanding a theoretical role for normativity beyond its use in explaining meaning in 
a theory of language.   
 So what role is there for normativity in a naturalistic account of the world?  
Following a suggestion made by Roland in discussion after his talk this January, I will 
take for granted that norms are natural theoretical entities if they play a causal role in 
explaining the phenomena for which the theory is a theory.  But human behavior is not 
usually thought of as being caused by norms per se.  One might adopt a Davidsonian 
approach here and characterize norms as reasons appealed to by actors, with the 
argument being that “rationalization is a species of ordinary causal explanation.”157  Our 
approach will be a little more detailed, however, insofar as our desire is not merely to 
give a causal account of norms as natural but to also be able to tell a story of how we can 
understand norms as subsisting within a natural conception of the world.  Toward this 
end we will characterize human behavior as something to be understood in terms of 
intentionality.  Thus to characterize Jane as having walked to school because she wanted 
exercise is to say that her desire for exercise was the cause of her behavior.158   
But now it may look like we have traded one mystery for another.  For 
intentionality seems as difficult to characterize in natural terms as does normativity.  
This trade, however, turns on an assumption regarding the plausibility of our intuitions.  
We characterize other people as having intentions, we often behave as if animals do, and 
the explanatory account offered in the next subsection is put forth as a theory by which 
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we can clarify just what it is we are doing when we say that we or others intentional—
we are essentially following rules we, our society, or our biology has prescribed for us.  
It aims to eliminate the mysteriousness of both normativity and intentionality, not to 
trade one mystery for another.  In order to do so and be considered naturalistic the theory 
must both offer a causal account of the theoretical entities it posits, and its theoretical 
entities must be capable of integration within the larger corpus of our understanding of 
the world.   
Our task in the next subsection is to explain the relationship between intentions 
as causes of behavior and norms as theoretical entities used to explain intention.  
Following this, in subsection 4.4 we will explain how to model norms on laws, and so to 
provide an explanation of norms and intentions as natural developments among natural 
entities within the universe.  Subsection 4.5 will offer a clarification of the relationship 
between the normative explanation of intentionality developed in subsections 4.3 and 4.4 
and the self-reflective norms of sociality.  In subsection 4.6 we will return to the 
literature on normativity and naturalism and see if our case can be made to cohere with 
the research of others in this area.  Subsection 4.7 will conclude with some assessments 
about the practical consequences of this view in terms of its implications for the rational 
revision of social and individual norms. 
4.3 A Normative Theory of Intentionality 
 
 In Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind Sellars characterized his approach 
toward positing the attribution of intentional states as “methodological behaviorism”.159  
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In “The Structure of Knowledge” Sellars describes his position as “verbal 
behaviorism”.160  What this view involves is the attribution of intentionality in virtue of 
the behavior, paradigmatically verbal behavior, of the entities to which intentionality is 
attributed.  Based on the way Frank behaves during his lunch break we attribute to him 
the intention of being hungry, and of desiring to satiate his hunger.  Mary’s telling us she 
is terrified of spiders is a criterion by which we attribute to her the intention of terror in 
the presence of spiders, further supported by the fact that she is invariably startled, with 
an increase in heart rate, breath rate, release of adrenalin, etc. whenever in the presence 
of spiders.  But behavior, whether verbal or physical, provide only a methodological 
basis for the attribution of intentional states—behavior does not provide an explanatory 
reduction for intentionality.  What the methodological or verbal behaviorist proposes is 
that we understand an entity’s behavior as a criterion upon which we can ground the 
attribution of intentionality, and further that these intentional states are to be modeled on 
the semantic categories of linguistic behavior, without supposing that intentions reduce 
to dispositions to either speak or behave.  As Sellars says in Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind, one of his aims is to “see if I can reconcile the classical idea of 
thoughts as inner episodes which are neither overt behavior nor verbal imagery and 
which are properly referred to in terms of the vocabulary of intentionality, with the idea 
that the categories of intentionality are, at bottom, semantical categories pertaining to 
overt verbal performances.”161   
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Intentional terms are introduced in explanatory accounts on the basis of 
behavioral (sometimes verbal) considerations, but for this very reason intentionality 
explains behavior—it is not explained by it.  Intentionality is therefore seen as a 
theoretical entity posited to explain the behavior of self-conscious organisms.  One 
problem to be addressed in this portion of the thesis is how to understand the attribution 
of intentional states to nonlinguistic organisms.  Verbal behavior offers the most direct 
criterion for the attribution of intentionality—an individual gives us a teleological 
answer to a question as to why they behaved as they did.  This criterion is clearly not 
available in our characterization of nonlinguistic animals, and so our reliance on the 
complexity of behavior (and on empirical studies of behavior) will be more important.  
Physiological correlations between the neurochemistry of human beings and other 
supposedly intentional animals may play a critical role as well, in this case affecting 
behavioral studies that aim to determine whether an animal is capable of self-conscious 
behavior. 
The view that self-consciousness is to be characterized in terms of intentionality 
goes back to the medieval scholastics, but its role in contemporary thought is owed to 
the work of Brentano.  Including a place for intentionality in naturalistic accounts of the 
world has been difficult for some philosophers to countenance, however.  As mentioned 
the current account proceeds on the supposition that any theoretical entity postulated as 
having a causal role in explaining phenomena is a natural entity.  If intentions are 
appealed to as causes in explaining behavior, intentions are by this light naturalistic.  
 123 
Our task now is to explain how to understand intentionality in terms of normativity 
where this causal role is made explicit. 
 We must give a theoretical account of what it is we are doing when we attribute 
an intention to an organism.  The theory to be offered runs as follows:  An intention is 
understood as a quadruple relation between an actor, a prescription, a behavior, and an 
event or state of affairs in the world.  The actor is the entity in question to which the 
attribution of intentionality is applied.  The behavior is understood as causally effected 
by the actor.  The event is understood descriptively as the characterization of a particular 
state of affairs in the world to be caused by the behavior.  The prescription is a 
normative characterization that indexes the actor as cause of the behavior to the event 
as the hypothetical end to be caused by the behavior.  On this account, to say “A intends 
to ”, where  is a complex description of an event or state of affairs x and a behavior , 
is thus to be understood as “A should  to cause x.”  Ascribing an intention in casual 
discourse is theoretically explained as the prescription of a behavior causally connected 
to an event.  The prescription is therefore ascribed on the basis of the causal efficacy of 
the behavior as it relates to the event as a hypothetical end.  To say that “A should  to 
cause x”, translated back into the language of intentionality, is to say that if A desires x 
then A should . 
Equivalently from the subject’s perspective, “to intend ” is to be understood as 
“to prescribe for oneself  to cause x”, exhibiting the self-conscious component of 
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intentionality—to intend something is to prescribe for oneself a behavior.162  To say “I 
desire ” is by this theory to be explained as “I should  to cause x.”  The intentional 
characterization “Frank intends to eat the sandwich” is to be understood through the 
causal, descriptive, and prescriptive characterization “Frank should eat the sandwich to 
cause his hunger to abate.”163  In doing so we explain intentions as normative relations 
between actors and events linked causally by behavior.  The explicitly 
causal/prescriptive explanation of an attribution of intentionality allows us to attribute 
intentions to systems without supposing that in doing so we are attributing a mysterious 
non-natural state. 
 The analysis of apparently non-behavioral intentions is handled similarly, and the 
analysis exhibits something important about the causal efficacy of intentions.  To handle 
intentions such as “A hopes that ” or “A wants that ”, we have to lean heavily on our 
understanding of the physiological composition of intentional entities and the situations 
in which they are.  An antelope making zig-zagging motions in a field to draw attention 
from a wolf after inducing her fawn to lie down in the tall grass can be said to “hope that 
the wolf won’t find her fawn.”164  But the intention of “hope” in this context is an 
                                                 
162
 Strictly speaking therefore, to say that I desire end x but I do not think I should act so as to 
acquire it is to say that I have another desire which trumps the first, and so I do not intend to see x 
realized. 
163
 Equivalently, if the intentional characterization is phrased “Frank intends to abate his hunger 
by eating the sandwich” (of the form “A intends x by ing”) the normative explanation will still run “A 
should eat the sandwich to cause his hunger to abate” (A should  to x).  We see therefore that even if 
there is room at the level of intentional attribution to offer different intentional characterizations (whether 
Frank’s intention is characterized as eating the sandwich or abating his hunger), the theoretical account is 
constant.  Regardless of whether we characterize the intention as directed toward the sandwich or toward 
the end-state to be realized, the theoretical account indexing the actor, the behavior, the prescription, and 
the event remains the same. 
164
 This example is taken from Gordon G. Brittan Jr.’s “The Secrets of Antelope,” Erkenntnis 
Vol. 51 (1999): 59-77. 
 125 
indirect intention, insofar is it is not connected directly with the behavior the antelope is 
engaging in.  Instead, the direct intention explaining the antelope’s behavior is the 
intention of leading the wolf away from her fawn.  The normative explanation of our 
attribution of the intention “hopes that” relies on the substitution of indirect intentions of 
the form “hopes that” with direct intentions that make explicit the subject’s causal-
behavioral relation to the event the intention is directed toward.  “The antelope hopes 
that the wolf will not find her fawn” is to be analyzed first into a directly intentional 
assertion that “the antelope intends that the wolf won’t find her fawn” which, as above, 
is to be understood as “the antelope should  to prevent the wolf from finding her 
fawn.”165   
What this indicates is that an intention not connected to a behavior (an action) is 
an explanatorily useless—because causally inert—intention.  In attributing such an 
intention we are explaining nothing more than a purported phenomenological 
experience—the fear or hope of the antelope, for instance—which must be connected to 
the entity’s situational context and a physiological account of the entity’s brain 
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chemistry if to serve as a respectable attribution within what we understand as the 
constraints on which entities are capable of intentional states.  Critically, however, this 
permutation of the theory under discussion makes explicit the need to connect intention 
to behavior if a change is to be effected in the world.  The indirect intentions “hopes 
that”, “wants that”, or “fears that” are only causally efficacious when linked to a 
behavior.166  We must be the agents of the changes we wish to see in the world.  I 
suppose all this is obvious—but one strength of this theoretical formulation of 
intentionality is that it derives these obvious results as a matter of the structure of the 
theory. 
Finally, we might suppose that, when there is no behavior to be considered at all, 
an individual is in an intentional state strictly in virtue of its physiology and situational 
context.  Where an actor is not engaging in any behavior that would support the 
attribution of intentionality, and yet where there are reasons for attributing intentionality, 
we again must rely on our understanding of physiological constitution and the situational 
context of the actor.  Suppose Frank is sitting in a prison cell and he has not eaten for 
three days.  Though Frank is giving no behavioral cues as to his desire to eat (he is just 
sitting on his cot, conscious but not calling out for food, for instance), it would seem 
reasonable to attribute to him a desire for food.  This is an attribution licensed by this 
account, because built into this theory is the condition that in addition to behavioral cues 
we must have recourse to situational and physiological factors in support of an 
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attribution of intentionality.  The decoy which happens to lure the wolf away from the 
fawn has no hopes.  In analysis Frank’s desire to eat is still given the theoretical 
explanation “should  to cause x”, though in this case there is no ing behavior open to 
cause x.  The absence of this causal-behavioral route explains Frank’s lack of activity 
despite being in the relevant intentional state.   
4.4 Prescription, Norms, and Explanatory Perspectives 
 
Though this may provide us with a causal theory of intentionality making use of 
the normative resources already in play through the theory of meaning given in section 
3, there are a few issues that need to be addressed.  In the first place, we can disobey 
these norms.  In using the word “should” there is implicit recognition of the fact that the 
actor in question may not so behave.  This account understands intention in terms of 
prescription, whereas the assertion “A intends ” seems to be descriptive and, if causal, 
on a par with the laws of the physical sciences.  To say that “A intends ” is in many 
cases to say not only that A desires  but that A will  or is ing.  To suppose “A 
intends ” is to be understood as “A should  to cause x” is prima facie to say something 
with much less explanatory power than “A is ing”.  While at the moment this may look 
problematic, the next subsection will spell out why we should not be concerned about 
this difference between norms as prescriptive accounts of intentional behavior and laws 
as descriptive accounts of physical behavior.  In fact, the very capability of our 
disobeying a norm is what gives us the self-reflective capability to constantly assess their 
value and so revise them.  What this theory commits us to is a difference between the 
explanatory power of norms and the explanatory power of physical laws.  What laws are 
 128 
as theoretical postulates that license the deduction of observed phenomena in 
explanations of the physical world, norms are as theoretical postulates that license the 
deduction of observed phenomena in explanations of the social world.   
What I hope we can see our way toward accepting is that the existence of norms 
as theoretical postulates used to make sense of intentional and ultimately social behavior 
should be no more mysterious or nonnatural than the existence of laws as theoretical 
postulates used to make sense of physical behavior.  By developing a case for this view I 
am going beyond Brandom’s use of normativity in explaining conceptual content and 
intentional states.  More than an appeal to normativity as a way to make sense of 
concepts and intentions, 167 I am suggesting that a theoretical account of explaining what 
it means to attribute an intentional state can be grounded on a causal-prescriptive 
account of an actor’s behavior indexed to a hypothetical end.  Furthermore, in subsection 
4.5 I will endeavor to show how we can understand the existence of prescriptive, 
normative, behavior to have arisen in the natural development of biological evolution, 
and to provide a warrant for the above assertion that intentional and social norms are no 
more mysterious an explanatory resource than are physical laws. 
But at this point a crucial distinction should be made.  The analysis of intentional 
states offered above adopts prescriptive terminology, and in doing so is essentially a 
normative terminology.  But the norms implicit in the explanation of intentional 
behavior need not be the norms we think of in terms of full-blown social conventions.  It 
may be that the prescription implicit in an intentional action is socially normative, as 
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when we intend to drive on the right side of the road.  But some prescriptions are more-
or-less individual.  Indeed, connecting this account to the biological sciences requires 
that in some cases we understand intentions as a function of biological imperatives 
“programmed” by our genes—as in the case of mother love, for instance.  Clearly some 
of these biological proto-norms may become enshrined in social practices, so that my 
intention to call my mother on the second Sunday of May (Mother’s Day in the U.S.) is a 
function of both a biological imperative and a social convention.   
Intentional behavior as implicitly prescriptive is not yet the home of social norms 
in the way we are socio-linguistically interested, though reflection on implicit 
normativity by individuals acting intentionally forms a substantial locus for the genesis 
of social norms proper.  The ape who shows anger at a sexual partner caught in a liaison 
with a competitor is, if said to be acting with intention, on this model to have his 
intention characterized in prescriptive, normative terminology.  From this it does not 
follow that the ape’s intentional/normative behavior represents anything like our norm of 
marriage and fidelity, a self-conscious and explicit pattern of activity in our society.  For 
we should not expect the proto-norms that characterize intentional behavior via 
prescriptive explanation to be anything so developed as the norms that characterize 
human socio-linguistic behavior.  But these proto-norms implicit in the simplest 
intentionality are the seeds from which, by the germination of time and the light of self-
reflection, will shoot forth the tree of normative self-knowledge. 
The task of social self-reflection, exhibited paradigmatically in the criticism of 
the standards of a discourse, is to make explicit the normative patterns that guide 
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judgments within the discourse and offer them up for criticism.  At an individual level 
this process obtains as a function of our willingness to criticize self-reflectively the 
norms implicit in our intentional behavior and likewise subject them to rational revision.  
For intentionality exists only as indexed to the values, the norms, by which it is 
constituted.  The movement from mere prescription to self-conscious normativity, from 
proto-norms to social norms, is one link in the chain from inert physical matter to 
biological regularity to normative intentionality to social normativity.  Because our 
actions are directed by our momentary intentions to realize particular ends, and we often 
fail to reflect on the fact that our actions implicitly embody norms in the very activity of 
intending these ends, it is incumbent upon us to self-consciously engage in this process 
of rational reflection, both at the individual level of intentionality and at the social level 
of the standards of our discourses.   
Finally, the reader may have another concern about the difference between 
intentional characterizations and prescriptive ones.  “A intends ” is a description, 
making use of no overtly prescriptive terminology.  But its theoretical counterpart “A 
should  to cause descriptive state x” includes a prescriptive component.  It might 
appear that the smuggling in of this prescriptive category obviates the sense in which 
this really is an explanation of the phenomenon under consideration.  But the inclusion 
of a new category for the explanation of a phenomenon should not by itself be a 
problem—introducing a new explanans (in this case normativity) to account for an 
explanandum (intentionality) is indeed necessary to avoid circularity in the explanation.  
The question to be addressed if this substitution is a worry, rather, is whether a 
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normative explanans can serve to account for the intentional explanandum without 
leaving anything unaccounted for.  I will leave addressing that question to another time, 
and suppose we are satisfied for current purposes that this schema provides us a way to 
understand intentionality in normative terms as a causal relation between actors, events, 
and behavior.  What this account suggests is that at the level of theory we can explain 
the descriptive characterization of behavior in terms of intentionaliy by characterizing 
these intentional descriptions as implicit prescriptive judgments about the effects of that 
behavior.  Providing this explanation is precisely what allows us to continue using 
intentional terminology, now divorced of its mystery.  We can still descriptively 
characterize actors as intentional, for in doing so we need commit ourselves at the level 
of theory to nothing more than hypothetical prescriptions.  Furthermore, with intentional 
attributions understood as prescriptive behaviors indexed to particular ends, we have in 
play a theoretical discourse that allows us to understand intentional attributions in such a 
way as to make sense of their social nature in the construction of full-blown social 
norms.  At this stage we are ready to meet Sellars’s second desideratum offered above.  
With a theory on board that makes use of normativity as a theoretical entity postulated to 
explain both linguistic meaning and human intentionality, we turn now to an 
examination of how this theoretical entity can be understood as a natural one, locating it 
within the larger corpus of our understanding of the world.   
4.5 Norms, Laws, and the Development of the Universe 
 
 I propose that we can get a grip on the notion of a norm by modeling normativity 
on the theoretical generalizations that characterize lawlike discourse in the physical 
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sciences.  That is, what laws are as descriptions of the causal relationships among 
physical entities, norms are as prescriptions of the causal relationships among 
intentional entities.168  A critical implication of the conclusion we arrive at regarding the 
common explanatory role of laws and norms will lie in a crucial difference between 
them—while no physical object need intentionally dispose itself toward the maintenance 
of the physical laws that constrain its existence, the intentional origins of social norms 
requires that human beings have an obligation to reflect on and self-consciously endorse 
and propagate those norms that constrain the existence of their own intentional states.  
No star has ever had to focus on gravity to ensure its existence, but critical self-reflection 
on the social rules they wish to see realized is an obligation incumbent upon all mature 
citizens of a society, integral as these rules are to their own intentional states.  To 
motivate the acceptance of this modeling of norms on laws I will tell a story of the non-
mysterious emergence of normative systems within a world of lawful ones; or what 
amounts to the same thing, a story about the emergence of intentional entities from a 
world of non-intentional (physical) ones.   
 The natural sciences provide us with a remarkably tight and encompassing 
account of our existence in the universe, and of the existence of the universe itself.  
Leaving open the question “why not nothing?”, what we do know is how most of what’s 
here got here, at least in broad detail.  Looking into the sky we are capable of observing 
the frequency and wavelength of the light emitted from stellar objects in the galaxy and 
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 What this model makes explicit is the fact that norms can be violated—they prescribe our 
behavior but we need not hold ourselves to them.  A significant portion of the following discussion will be 
concerned to spell out the implications of this difference between the laws of physical systems and the 
norms of intentional ones. 
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universe around us, and through spectroscopic analysis we are capable of inferring the 
compositions of many of these objects.  Knowing what we do about the way different 
elements give off light, we can compare our assessments of composition with the 
electromagnetic wavelength emitted by these stellar objects.  In doing so we discover 
that everywhere we look in the universe the light we see is shifted in wavelength toward 
the infrared end of the spectrum.  This redshift indicates that the objects we’re looking at 
are moving away from us, and consequently that the universe is expanding.  The redshift 
of stellar objects was first observed in the middle of the 19th century, but its 
incorporation as part of the explanation for the Big Bang would not occur for over 50 
years.  In 2006 the Nobel Prize in physics was awarded to the American physicists John 
C. Mather and George F. Smoot for their work on cosmic microwave background 
radiation, the incredibly faint omnipresent afterglow of the intense heat and energy that 
characterized the universe as it was still small and condensed immediately after the Big 
Bang. 
 Our understanding of cosmology and particle physics has provided us a cogent 
account explaining how (though not why) there came to be something rather than 
nothing after the Big Bang.  Immediately after the Big Bang the universe was an 
incredibly hot, dense, and energetic system.  As the universe underwent rapid expansion 
during those first few moments it began to cool, and through this cooling process the 
first elementary particles began to form, like vapor in condensation on the inside of a 
glass.  Eventually the universe was large and cool enough to allow for the emergence of 
the first atomic elements, and during this period the only elements in existence were vast 
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quantities of hydrogen, some helium, and a very tiny amount of lithium.  But because of 
the unequal distribution of atoms in the universe different clouds of hydrogen mixed 
together, and when there was enough mass in a localized area of space the first stars 
began to form.   
A star is a long, slow, balance between the tendency of gravity to cause the 
matter of the star to implode, pulling itself inward, and on an atomic level the fusion 
occurring in nuclei as a result of this gravitational implosion causing the release of vast 
amounts of nuclear energy tending the star to explode outward.  The life of a star is 
measured by this slow process of nuclear fusion caused by gravitational implosion, while 
in the cores of stars heavier elements are formed as a result of this fusion.  Depending on 
the initial mass of a star a number of different “deaths” are possible.  If the initial mass 
was sufficiently small the star will eventually fizzle out when all the elements 
susceptible to fusion have been burned up and there is no more nuclear fuel to be 
produced by the star’s gravity.  When this occurs gravity will force the star down to a 
point where the atoms composing it will be so closely packed together gravity cannot 
condense it any further.  If the star is heavy enough, however, then the possibility for a 
nova or supernova presents itself.  In either of these cases the gravity of the star will be 
such as to cause the star to implode beyond the ability of the packed atomic structure to 
offset the force of gravity, until eventually the star reaches a critical mass/volume ratio 
and violently explodes outwards, ejecting into the universe the heavier elements created 
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during the stellar furnace’s existence.169  The energy released in this process also leads to 
the formation of heavier elements than were produced in the star during its period of 
nuclear fusion, a process only capable of creating elements up to the atomic weight of 
iron. 
To telescope the discussion rather greatly, when the conditions are right, two or 
three generations of stellar formation down the line, a star might form in a nebula of gas 
within a field of some of these heavier elements ejected from the deaths of earlier stars, 
and so as in our case, eventually lead to a solar system containing not just a sun but a 
number of solid inner planets composed of this stardust.  Again if conditions are right, a 
planet with the right material composition might form in an orbital sweet-spot around the 
star, in a region warm enough to melt frozen water but not so hot as to burn it off.  
Eventually a planet in this situation might give rise to living organisms, which organisms 
might themselves develop according to natural processes of trait heritability, variation, 
differential reproduction, and competition for resources.  In the right situation we might 
have social self-conscious organisms, capable of looking back out into the universe and 
having a sense of whence they came.  Beginning from the rapid expansion and cooling 
that occurred after the Big Bang, one can look at the universe’s development as a long, 
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 A black hole is the other death-track of a star.  If the initial mass of the star is sufficient, then 
the implosive force of gravity will contain even the tendency to nova and supernova, causing the star’s 
matter to condense into a singularity, a point of immense mass and little volume (perhaps infinite mass and 
zero volume), around which is an event horizon that marks the outer boundary of the singularity from 
which not even light can escape its gravitational pull. 
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slow process of condensation, from subatomic particles to hydrogen to atoms to planets 
to life to society.170   
The development of self-conscious entities (and so intentional states) in turn can 
be understood as a function of the selection pressures that operated on complex 
biological systems as they evolved in ever more constrained and resource-competitive 
environments.  That is, some biological systems had to functionally discover that they 
should  to cause event x, where event x was beneficial for their survival.171  The need 
to be able to differentiate self-and-world, and just as critically self-and-other-self, 
necessitates the adoption of intentional dispositions as the means of anticipating the 
consequences of behavior (ours and others) and also anticipating the intentions of 
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 Indeed, I think we can view each particular in the universe as a condensation of the cosmos as 
it spreads out in all directions, each particular condensation ontologically on a par with the condensations 
of the first subatomic particles formed during the cooling of the Big Bang’s initial expansion.  The fact 
that many of these particulars share certain properties (universals if you will) should be no more 
mysterious than the fact that in a moment before time all things now in the universe were united in one 
spec of being; in other words, it should not be too surprising if particulars that share this common ancestry 
should also be capable of sharing universal properties.  These are just some inferences predicated on the 
notion that the evidence we currently have is a good ground for making them.  But I think in this account 
there is a case to be made for a modern version of the Enlightenment encyclopedia, beginning from the 
everyday observation statements of human life and detailing how this account coheres, from astronomy to 
physics to chemistry, biology, and sociology, each section written by experts in their respective fields.  
Call it a Philosophical Encyclopedia of the Sciences. 
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 The phrase “functionally discover” is ambiguous at best.  In describing the conceptual content 
held by so-called intentional entities in such a way as to explain intentionality in non-intentional terms one 
runs into the difficulty of having to avoid ascribing intentional comprehension in the very act of 
attributing that content to them.  So, for instance, it looks suspicious to say an organism knows that they 
should  to cause event x, because “know” itself is intentional.  What is critical to recognize is that when 
linguistic interrogation is not available (that is, when we can’t just ask them what their intentions are) the 
entity in question must be one for which we are justified (behaviorally and physiologically) in believing 
they apprehend the thought “I should  to cause event x”.  Thus while from our perspective we implicitly 
attribute intentionality in applying to them predicates like “apprehend”, “discover”, and “know”, from the 
subject’s perspective the explanation is strictly normative, causal, and descriptive “I should  to cause 
event x”.  And for our explaining that intentional state, of course, the schema is the 3rd person non-
intentional attribution that “The entity should  to cause event x.” 
 137 
others.172  The survival value of deceit, for instance, was critical in the development of 
the higher animals.  Understanding intentionality in terms of a theoretical discourse of 
normativity gives us a grip on how to understand the intentional states that characterize 
at least the higher forms of biological existence on this planet.  On this account then 
normativity plays a role as a theoretical postulate used to account for, not just meaning 
in language, but intentionality more generally. 
We are now in a position to understand the role of normativity as it exists in a 
realm of natural law.  Notice that at each stage of the universe’s development we can 
talk about the objects and properties that emerged as deducible given the natural laws 
that constrained their emergence.  Grant an ontology (say hydrogen atoms dispersed in a 
given concentration throughout space) and a set of laws (say gravity, strong and weak 
nuclear forces, and electromagnetism) and the initial formation of stars and subsequent 
formation of planets, life, etc. becomes understood as deducible consequences indexed to 
these laws.  The existence of stars is not a deduction tout court but the presence of 
matter capable of nuclear fusion under the force of gravity is deducible on condition of 
the constitution of the world we inhabit.  We could imagine a different possible world 
where different objects would have formed, but in our world our laws make possible the 
objects and properties this world has. 
So the formation of stars is a lawful consequence of a balance between gravity's 
tendency to cause vast quantities of closely grouped hydrogen atoms to implode and the 
tendency toward explosion as the nuclear fusion of these hydrogen atoms releases vast 
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 In effect a contemporary correlate, couched in evolutionary terms, of the Kantian position 
discussed at the beginning of section 2, subsection 2.3; that “there is no I without an it.” 
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amounts of energy caused by the force of gravity. Given the laws and objects in play, 
stars are deducible consequences of prior states of existence in our universe.  The same 
relationship holds between norms and intentional social systems as does between laws 
and non-intentional physical systems.  
That is, grant an ontology (human beings in geographical distribution, economic 
and industrial affluence, constraints from the non-intentional world) and a set of norms 
(freedom of expression, liberal capitalism, totalitarianism, mother-love, brother-envy, 
etc.) in different measures and regions and the sorts of intentional entities and social 
systems that will come to exist under these conditions are deducible as well.  The 
intentional states that come to be in society are critically dependent on the normative 
structure that constitutes the society’s standards.173  The selection pressures that operate 
among biological systems developed on this planet toward a direction where successful 
exploitation of an environment’s resources required complex self-and-other 
differentiations posited by some of these organisms; required these organisms to 
intentionally dispose themselves to the world and each other.  In doing so they came to 
anticipate both the consequences of their actions and the intentions and consequences of 
their fellows, thus enabling them to compete successfully in this environment.174  In the 
course of coming to form social organizations the norms exhibited in intentionality 
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 The relationships that would explain the deduction of intentional states from social norms 
would have to be probabilistic to account for outlying datapoints, individuals who for one reason or 
another diverge from the norm.  This divergence can be accounted for in at least three ways:  genetic 
variation that disposes an individual to behavior counter to the social norms of the group; environmental 
conditioning that have inculcated norms other than those of the group; self-reflective assessment of the 
value of the norms in question with a conscious decision to behave differently. 
174
 Millikan adopts the view, which she connects to Sellars, that norms have survival value.  
Millikan, “The Son and the Daughter,” 10-12. 
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became susceptible to broader application—they became the basis not only of my 
activity but of our activity.175  Just as physical states of the universe can be deduced 
from physical laws, intentional states can be deduced from social norms.176  
Equivalently, just as physical laws give us an explanation of the physical states of the 
universe we happen to perceive, social norms likewise give us an explanation of the 
intentional states we attribute to other people. 
 The critical difference is that while none of us needs to focus on gravity to ensure 
we have stars or stay on the planet, we are collectively responsible for the maintenance 
of the social rules that govern our intentional existence.  For the prescriptive norms that 
bind us into social groups are ones we are free to question, to revise, and to outright 
reject.  In so doing we are essentially reorganizing the social conditions that will give 
rise to new intentional states, even if our individual contribution is only minimal.  But 
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 As we will see, it may be more appropriate to suppose the relationship between individual 
intentionality and social life developed in tandem. 
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 In this admittedly quick discussion of an evolutionary account enabling us to posit intentional 
states as capable of causal roles in a theory of behavior I have ignored many issues worth discussing at 
some point in more detail.  Not least of which is the problem of distinguishing between sapient organisms, 
sentient ones, and those merely living.  Brandom, it will be remembered, classifies sapience in terms of 
language-use and leaves it at that.  I however would like to leave open the possibility that we can 
justifiably attribute conceptual content at least to the higher non-linguistic animals.  And the mere fact that 
we cannot always define a clear boundary between, say, sapience and sentience does not imply there is no 
distinction worth making.  Certainly at the extremes we mark a distinction between what is sapient and 
what is merely living, as for instance between humans and plants.  But the fact that there are plenty of 
undecided cases does not in itself indicate the theory is untenable any more than the first microscope’s 
inability to see inside a cell told against the viability of perfecting the design.  A behaviorist account of the 
attribution of intentionality, patterned after Sellars’s methodological behaviorism, is one way to proceed.  
On this method the complex behavior of an entity is a criterion for the attribution of intentional states, but 
this does not mean intentions just are dispositions to behave—for as I’ve argued we can understand 
intentions instead as norms regarding what behavior will cause what ends.  I suspect we are best advised to 
hedge our bets by adding to the behavioral criterion the stipulation that only organisms developing from 
natural selection pressures can have original intentionality—this will, as a matter of practice, help us avoid 
ascribing intentional states to thermostats and light sensors (although I do know of some ontological and 
linguistic puritans who in denying the existence of intentionality go on to characterize thermostats as 
intentionally on a par with humans—a clearer reductio against the supposition that we can do without a 
coherent theory of intentionality I can’t imagine). 
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we are always making ourselves available for the self-reflection of others, and the norms 
implicit in our behavior become potential sources for the intentional behavior of our 
audience—a lesson a parent knows all too well.  So long as we are willing self-
reflectively to assess the norms implicit in our values and behavior, this indicates the 
incredible freedom we have as norm-deploying entities.  And because these social norms 
invariably will change over time, it is incumbent upon us, it is one of our duties, to 
engage in this process of change and revision with a self-reflective index assessing what 
sorts of human intention we wish to see realized in our societies. Otherwise we're no 
better off than animals or plants, living by the whims that impel us unreflectively and 
changing only as the conditions around us change. 
 This is a conclusion from the natural status of norms consonant with the 
implications derived from the linguistic account of normativity offered in section 3; 
namely, that socio-linguistic existence brings with it an obligation to reflect on the 
norms implicit in the concepts and behaviors we bring to bear on the world.177  Under 
the conception being developed here we can understand the duty to reflect on the norms 
of linguistic discourse as a species of the obligation to reflect on the norms that 
constitute our intentionality in general.   
                                                 
177
 C.f. McDowell’s claim that learning to use a language is initiation into “a repository of 
tradition, a store of historically accumulated wisdom about what is a reason for what.  The tradition is 
subject to reflective modification by each generation that inherits it.  Indeed, a standing obligation to 
engage in critical reflection is itself part of the inheritance” (Mind and World, 126), and Brandom’s 
assertion that  “Critical thinkers, or merely fastidious ones, must examine their idioms to be sure that they 
are prepared to endorse and so defend the appropriateness of the material inferential transitions implicit in 
the concepts they employ.  In Reason’s fight against thought debased by prejudice and propaganda, the 
first rule is that potentially controversial material inferential commitments should be made explicit as 
claims, exposing them both as vulnerable to reasoned challenge and as in need of reasoned defense.  They 
must not be allowed to remain curled up inside loaded phrases such as ‘enemy of the people’ or ‘law and 
order’.”  (Articulating Reasons, 70). 
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4.6 Returning to the Literature on Normativity and Naturalism 
 
 If the emergence of intentionality is essentially a function of behavior and 
evolutionary development, and intentionality itself is to be understood in causal and 
normative terms, then we can begin to understand the relationship between the norms of 
society, original intentionality, and individuality.  Allan Gibbard’s “Thought, Norms, 
and Discursive Practice:  Commentary on Robert Brandom, Making it Explicit” will be 
helpful in this regard.  In one sense society plays an integral role in accounting for the 
origins of conceptual content.  The evolution of individual intentional human beings 
depended upon their social existence; our neurophysiology evolved as a result of the 
processes that selected for this neurophysiology in tandem with our social existence—we 
evolved in social groups, not as individuals.  In this sense we can mark sociality as a 
constraint on intentionality.  But pace Brandom’s emphasis on the social origins of 
conceptual normativity for individuals, Gibbard thinks this evolutionary account allows 
us to assert that individual human beings, as the result of this extended process of 
socially-dependent evolution, nonetheless develop and mature with the gray-matter 
hardware that allows them to be intentional independent of social education.178  I think 
this is correct.179  At the same time we must recognize that the determinate forms of 
intentionality open to particular human beings today depends integrally on their 
acculturation within a social order.  Though we might expect a “feral child” to be able to 
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 Allan Gibbard, “Thought, Norms, and Discursive Practice:  Commentary on Robert B. 
Brandom, Making it Explicit,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.56, No.3 (September 
1996):  699-717, p.706-7. 
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 Millikan makes the case for individual intentionality from the other direction:  “…if we ask 
whether the survival value of the concepts we acquire from learning a language are at root benefits gained 
only through the community by means of social cooperation, the answer seems to be no.  Clearly there are 
benefits to the isolated individual as well.”  Millikan, “The Son and the Daughter,” 11. 
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(non-linguistically) behave in such a way as to warrant the attribution of intentions and 
so to justifiably characterize her behavior as following norms, we would not expect her 
behavior to approach anywhere near the full potential open to socio-linguistic existence.  
More to the point, the norms that are internalized by an individual will depend critically 
on what sort of social environment they mature in.  The social norms that govern my 
intentional states are hardly the norms of a Wahabi Sunni fundamentalist.  What this 
leaves us with is an account for which intentionality is dependent upon social existence, 
where nonetheless individual human beings can be in intentional states independent of 
social existence, and yet where social maturation profoundly impacts the contours of the 
norms of intentionality that develop for an individual. 
 And so I am generally in line with Dennett and Millikan’s position that an 
explanation of the norms of sociality must go beyond the social sphere, even if this 
means relinquishing the clear criterion of linguistic behavior as a metric for the 
attribution of conceptual content.  There is however one point of disagreement important 
to point out in my reading of Millikan, as clarifying this dispute will help reinforce the 
sense in which normativity is the locus classicus of human intentionality, and the 
freedom and duty this brings with it. 
 Millikan’s position on the evolutionary origin of conceptual content and 
normativity, a position she calls ‘teleosemantics’, distinguishes between what she calls 
conventional and prescriptive or evaluative norms.  On Millikan’s account the norms of 
language are conventional, “not prescriptive or evaluative norms.”180  They are “merely 
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 Ibid, 10. 
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a measure from which actual facts can depart…”181  I will argue that characterizing 
linguistic norms as merely conventional, in contrast to evaluative, obscures the 
difference between a socio-linguistic norm and a biological regularity or proto-norm.  
But first let us see why Millikan is inclinded to posit such conventions or, to use a term I 
prefer, proto-norms.   
Recall that Millikan is interested in providing an evolutionary account of the 
origin of normativity.  To do so she must be able to connect the lawlike regularities of 
physical objects with the genuinely normative dispositions of human beings.  Her efforts 
here center on the way biological organisms exhibit behavioral regularity that is subject 
to evolutionary change without being normative.  The behaviors of biological organisms 
are constrained by the physiological constitution that evolution has equipped them with.  
Biological constitution is therefore a sort of regularity or norm.  Owing to the possibility 
of genetic mutation these regularities can change, but it is not prima facie the case that 
such change is licensed to normative censure—we cannot say that a mutation in a gene is 
wrong, merely that it is less advantageous.  Rather offering standards of normative 
evaluation, the evaluation of evolutionary change is measured by the evolutionary 
success of such change.   
While this is all well and good, her extension of the non-evaluative nature of the 
proto-norms of biological evolution to the linguistic norms of social conversation would, 
if accepted, rob us of the normative theory of conceptual content so hard fought for in 
section 3—for a “merely conventional” norm not subject to evaluative appraisal is not a 
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norm capable of playing a role in rationally articulating warranted assertions.  Thus it is 
incumbent upon us to provide a response to Millikan’s claims if we are to continue 
relying on the linguistic role for normativity, all the more so because we’ve made such 
liberal use of her thinking in connecting normativity to an evolutionary account of 
human development. 
In her discussion of convention Millikan has in mind the sort of biological 
regularities that constitute a species’ physiological composition while being subject to 
change because of evolutionary mutation across generations.  As a sort of norm these 
conventions are nonetheless not the sorts of changing regularities subject to evaluative 
assessment.   
Behavioral forms that have had past survival value are a measure from which 
actual behavioral dispositions, both past and present, can depart, but such 
departures are in no sense proscribed.  Indeed, departures sometimes prove 
advantageous.  What a biological or psychological or social form has been 
selected for doing, through natural selection, through learning, or through 
selection for social transmission, is a norm against which the form’s actual 
performances can be measured.  It is the “natural purpose” of the form to 
fulfill this function, purposes, like norms, being essentially things that are not 
always fulfilled.182   
 
So to mark her proto-norms as a link in the causal chain from physical law to intentional 
norm Millikan must have a category of regularity that while not being law-like is also 
not evaluative.   
At this point I am not in objection—this seems to me the right way to proceed in 
conceptually trying to bridge the gap between prescriptive norms and descriptive laws.  
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 Ibid, italicized emphasis in the original was underlined, changed for stylistic purposes to 
italics. 
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The problem enters in when she extends this biological account of conventional proto-
norms to language use. 
Language conventions are best thought of merely as lineages of behavioral 
patterns involving a speaker’s utterance and a hearer’s response.  They do not 
correspond to rules, and certainly not to prescriptive rules.  It is true that 
many conventions are ways of doing things to which one ought to conform, 
given that there are such conventions.  For example, conventions about which 
side to drive on and whether to stop at the red or the green are conventions 
with which one ought to conform.  Moreover, in traditional cultures, doing 
things in unconventional ways is often proscribed quite generally.  But this 
evaluative kind of normativity is something added to mere conventionality.  
Decorating for Christmas with red and green is conventional, but surely in no 
way required. 
 
I must confess that I fail to grasp the distinction between conventions that are “ways of 
doing things to which one ought to conform, given that there are such conventions” and 
an “evaluative normativity [that] is something added to mere conventionality” (emphasis 
added).  It seems to me that the distinction between conventional norms and evaluative 
ones is a distinction of degree, not kind.183  The fact that something is a convention is 
datum enough to ensure that violating it is liable to bring some kind of censure down 
upon the individual.  If I stand close to you in conversation it may be that I’m violating a 
convention of some sort, and I am liable to censure for it.  But if you don’t censure me 
it’s not because the convention doesn’t bring with it a license to censure, it’s because 
you either haven’t adopted the convention or you choose not to prosecute its violation in 
this case.  Similarly with a Christmas tree draped in skulls and painted black.  One’s 
natural inclination might be to judge “that isn’t right”, but in discourse we could 
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 At least at the level of language—for the reasons mentioned in the preceding paragraph I think 
it is important to keep distinct evaluative norms from the proto-norms that constitute biological regularity.  
The problem, as I’m attempting to articulate here, is that calling these non-evaluative biological proto-
norms ‘conventions’ and extending this treatment to the norms of language is problematic. 
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probably convince an individual to understand the practice as merely conventional, and 
so subject to revision according to the tastes of its practitioner.  Coming to recognize this 
does not mean that traditional decoration of the Christmas tree is “surely in no way 
required;” it merely means that it is in a very weak way required—required via the social 
standard of the convention. 
 If this treatment is right then at the level of language-use conventional norms are 
just as surely standards of evaluation, indexed to their hypothetical ends of intentional 
realization (à la Laudan) or their institutions (à la Gibbard) as are stronger norms like 
moral injunctions.  The difference is that what Millikan calls conventional and 
evaluative norms are subject to different standards of metalinguistic revision, depending 
on how entrenched the hypothetical ends and institutions are that enshrine them.  For the 
purposes of marking the distinction between those that are better enshrined than others 
we may want to call some norms “merely conventional”.  But conventions are as subject 
to evaluative appraisal as are any other norm, and all are potentially open to revision.184   
This distinction then would be an artificial one drawn within a theory of language that is 
wholly subject to evaluation, but a useful distinction in that it allows us to mark the 
disparity between those norms indexed to weakly revisable ends (convention, as how to 
decorate a Christmas tree) and those whose ends are more integrally indexed to the 
selves we collectively wish to be.  And for the purposes of separating variable but 
regular-tending behaviors in the biological sciences from full-blown norms it is probably 
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 Unless there are some categorical ends that are beyond revision for self-conscious language-
users, as perhaps Kant can be thought to have held. 
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better to adopt a term like “proto-norm” than to use one as evaluatively-loaded term like 
“convention”. 
4.7 Social Norms and Intentional Self-Reflection 
 In concluding section 4 I wish to offer some final assessments regarding the 
notion of rational behavior with respect to society this view of normativity leaves us 
with.  
 If a normative model of intentionality as developed here is a viable model for the 
explanation of intentional states, it is a model that also brings with it certain implications 
about the obligations of intentional entities within a socio-linguistic system—obligations 
that apply to human beings with respect to their roles in society.  Because each of us is 
inextricably bound up in the social order that conditions our self-identity, the intentional 
states available to us, we owe it to ourselves and to each other to reflect on the relative 
value of the norms that structure our society, for in so structuring our society they 
structure our self-identity as well.  Societies invariably change over time, whether by 
internal revolution, external shock, or as a more moderate function of the shifting trends 
between generations.  The younger generations that grow up in a society are engaged at 
once in the process of being conditioned by its norms, internalizing them as self-
prescriptions for their behavior, and revising the social structure through their responses 
to different stimuli.  One of the guiding themes of this thesis has been the supposition 
that the normative forces that constrain our behavior, the norms that we internalize in 
shaping our own self-identity, are subject to rational revision given self-reflective 
assessment.  
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 But what does it mean to rationally revise a norm that guides society?  In the first 
place it means to be willing to spell out the propositions that lead inferentially to it in the 
game of giving and asking for reasons, those propositions that entitle us to accept the 
norm as one that guides a social order, whether it be in the rigid form of a social law that 
codifies behavior or in something more conventional like standards of dress at a social 
function.  In the articulation of entitlement relations we provide warrants that show our 
norm is one we are justified in appealing to as an explanation of behavior, or as a 
prescription for it.  In some cases it may be found that the entitlement-articulation of a 
given norm leads us to discover it is an ineffectual standard, whether because the norm 
has been explicitly revoked (as in the case of the prohibition of alcohol in the United 
States), because it has been superseded by some other norm (as protecting our children 
from danger gradually gives way to allowing them freedom to make mistakes as they 
age), or because the norm itself has become irrelevant (as the duty to pay compensation 
by a State to a Native American Tribe would cease to have any relevance if the Tribe no 
longer had any living members). 
But concurrent with an investigation of the entitlement-articulation of a society’s 
norms, its members are obliged to investigate the commitment relations of their norms as 
well.  If entitlement relations are upstream from a proposition, in that producing such 
entitlements serves to warrant the proposition as one that is licensed by the utterer, 
commitment relations lie downstream and articulate what further propositions the utterer 
is obliged to assent to.  It is in the investigation of commitment relations that a society 
determines the worth of its norms.  Believing that women should not vote implicitly 
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commits one to the belief that women are in some sense incapable of performing the 
role, evidently fit only for men, of helping to shape the nature of a democracy.  
Believing that America should adopt the practice of renditioning to transfer suspected 
terrorists to places that practice torture implicitly commits one to the belief that torture is 
an acceptable means to acquire information.185  Social norms are incessantly changing, 
and as they change so too do the intentional systems capable of coming to self-
awareness within the societies these norms structure.  Being a mature member of a 
society critically requires reflecting on and engaging in the process of revising the norms 
that constitute one’s social structure. 
We all come to maturity in a time and condition peculiar to our age, and in 
coming to maturity we are obliged to begin to reflect on the constraints that have served 
to dispose us toward the world in the ways we do, to reflect on the norms we have 
implicitly internalized and begin to self-consciously assess their value.  Only in doing so 
can we earnestly engage in that aspect of the cosmos’s development that is our own to 
direct—in the formation, sustaining, revision, and rejection of the norms that guide our 
intentional existence. 
“This Becoming [this awareness of self through the historical conditions that have 
shaped us] presents a slow-moving succession of Spirits, a gallery of images, each of 
which, endowed with all the riches of Spirit, moves thus slowly just because the Self 
has to penetrate and digest this entire wealth of its substance.  As [the self’s] 
fulfillment consists in perfectly knowing what it is…this knowing is [the self’s] 
withdrawal into itself… and this transformed existence…now reborn of the Spirit’s 
knowledge—is the new existence, a new world and a new shape of Spirit…So 
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 Again we can see the way a normative explanation of intentionality operates here:  “I intend to 
rendition Mustafa” is to be understood as “I should send Mustafa to a prison in Saudi Arabia to cause him 
to divulge information”.  On this account the intention is implicitly prescriptive, it serves to institute a 
norm directed toward the hypothetical end of acquiring information, and it prescribes the activity of 
renditioning and torture to causally achieve that end.   
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although this Spirit starts afresh and apparently from its own resources to bring itself 
to maturity, it is none the less on a higher level that it starts.”186 
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 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §808, page 492.   
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5. CONCLUSION:  RATIONAL DISCOURSE, RATIONAL 
REFLECTION, AND NORMATIVITY 
 
 The is/ought distinction has become a hallmark of philosophy in the English-
speaking tradition.  So well established is the distinction that some of us take it to be a 
truism.  There is a discourse of facts, propositions regarding the world that are true and 
false—with it we carry on our scientific investigations, the epistemic disciplines 
concerned with what we know.  Set opposite the discourse of facts is a discourse of 
values, propositions concerned with what our obligations are—with value-discourse we 
offer pronouncements on what we should appreciate aesthetically and how we are 
obliged socially to behave.  G.E. Moore helped enshrine this pathos of Anglo-American 
philosophy by christening it a fallacy, the naturalistic fallacy.  There is a discourse on 
factual things and there is a discourse on valuable things—and never the twain shall 
meet. 
 But one might wonder whether this is/ought bifurcation is more philosophical 
chaff than wheat.  Certainly the view that led Moore to identify the so-called naturalistic 
fallacy is not one that has been shared by all philosophers, or even all English-speaking 
ones.187 
 John Dewey examined two general historical approaches to facts and values in 
The Quest for Certainty, one before the rise of the physical sciences and one afterward.  
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 The next 7 paragraphs, in slightly different form, originally appeared in my paper 
“Pragmatism and the Normative Theory of Rationality” given at the Western Canadian Philosophical 
Association’s 44th Annual Meeting at the University of Saskatchewan in October 2007. 
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In this work he criticizes the pre-scientific revolution notion of a fixed realm of 
immutable being, the categories of which are thought to provide the only measure of 
certainty for knowledge worthy of the name.188  Opposed to this realm of ideal being 
philosophers have historically placed the messiness of becoming, the constant flux of the 
phenomenal world.  There is a manifest strain in this conception.  Human life obtains in 
the realm of becoming, the world of constant flux and transition, yet knowledge on this 
view requires access to the fixed and immutable categories of being.  Such a bifurcated 
relationship might have lasted far longer had not the rise of physical science undermined 
its plausibility.  For Dewey, the rise of science is the story of our freedom from 
intellectual authoritarianism.  As the growth of the empirical sciences dismantled the old 
conception of an immutable ideal realm, and in the absence of authoritative standards 
drawn from that realm, Dewey cautions us that we must come to recognize that we give 
standards to the world, that we are the ultimate bearers of meaning, and thus that we are 
ultimately responsible for the values we take to be real.  We must come to recognize that 
norms are tools we bring to bear in facilitating our interaction with the facts of the world, 
that it is essential to the existence of an ideal that it be made real through human 
activity. 
For Dewey the philosophical instability brought on by the growth of the sciences 
impels the rejection of the extreme polarity that motivated the fact/value, real/ideal 
distinction to begin with.  The problem lies not in our inability to proffer an account of 
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 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, (New York:  Minton, Balch and Company, 1929), 26-7. 
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immutable Being’s realm of ideals related to the shifting facts of Becoming, but in the 
suggestion that the two realms were so distinct in the first place. 
The assumption of the antecedent inherent identity of the actual and the ideal 
has generated problems which have not been solved…[But] there is an 
idealization through actions that are directed by thought…Nature thus 
supplies potential material for [the] embodiment of ideals…It lends itself to 
operations by which it is perfected.  The process is not a passive one.  Rather 
nature gives, not always freely but in response to search, means and material 
by which the values we judge to have supreme quality may be embodied in 
existence.  It depends upon the choice of man whether he employs what 
nature provides and for what ends he uses it.189 
 
Dewey encourages us to view ideals as instruments through which human activity may 
be directed in the world.  Norms are not the sorts of things that obtain transcendentally, 
available to the philosophical investigations of Ivory-towered academics.  Norms are 
instruments, tools made use of in the practical activity of human life.  Ideals do not stand 
above and opposed to the real world.  Rather, ideals are made real through being put to 
use.  It is the very meaning of a thing being real that it be made real through 
becoming.190  Instead of an ideal realm held off from the realm of nature, Dewey offers a 
view of values whose “maintenance is dependent upon the intentional activities of an 
empirical agent”.191  
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 Dewey, The Quest For Certainty, 301-2. 
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 “Why should the idea that knowledge makes a difference to and in things be antecedently 
questionable?  If one is already committed to a belief that Reality is neatly and finally tied up in a packet 
without loose ends, unfinished issues or new departures, one would object to knowledge making a 
difference just as one would object to any other impertinent obtruder.  But if one believes that the world 
itself is in transformation, why should the notion that knowledge is the most important mode of its 
modification and the only organ of its guidance be a priori obnoxious? From p. 210 “The Practical 
Character of Reality,” The Philosophy of John Dewey: Two Volumes in One, ed. by John J. McDermott 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981b): 207-222. 
191
 From p.207 in “Experience and Objective Idealism,” The Philosophy of John Dewey: Two 
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The normativity that Brandom and McDowell draw from Kant is channeled 
through socio-historic development in just the way that Hegel—and Dewey—
advocate.192  Indeed, while Sellars thought of himself as moving contemporary 
philosophy from its Humean to its Kantian period, Richard Rorty’s introduction to 
Sellars’s Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind remarks that Brandom’s work “can 
usefully be seen as an attempt to usher analytic philosophy from its Kantian to its 
Hegelian stage…”193  What this refers to, in the context of the normative approach 
Brandom adopts, is the shift in emphasis from a transcendental status for the norms that 
underwrite rationality, to an immanence where these norms are lodged in the social life 
through which human beings come to maturity, embodied in coming to learn and use a 
language. 
This maturity is the “second nature” that McDowell appeals to in grounding our 
capability to apprehend the world through conceptual norms.  Second nature is 
acculturation, and it is through social education that we come to adopt particular norms 
in our interaction with the world.  Social life is constitutive of human nature, and it is 
                                                                                                                                                
Darwin’s work undercut the old idea of fixed and unchanging species, but even the word itself spelled a 
certain death-knell for classical philosophical commitments.  For “species” is the Latin translation of the 
Greek eidos—Plato’s forms and “the essence of each thing and its primary substance” for Aristotle 
(Metaphysics, 1032b1-2 in The Basic Works of Aristotle, Richard McKeon, ed., (New York: The Modern 
Library, 2001), page 792).  In arguing for an origin of species, Darwin was (perhaps wittingly) arguing for 
an origin of essences as well.  “There are, indeed, but two alternative courses,” in the aftermath of Darwin, 
Dewey writes.  “We must either find the appropriate objects and organs of knowledge in the mutual 
interactions of changing things; or else, to escape the infection of change, we must seek them in some 
transcendent and supernal region.”  From “The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy,” McDermott, The 
Philosophy of John Dewey, 34.  Dewey, of course, argues we should cut our moorings from the 
transcendent realm and ground ideals in our “mutual interactions [with] changing things.” 
192
 Dewey would remark in “From Absolutism to Experimentalism” that his exposure to Hegel 
“has left a permanent deposit on my thinking.”  See p. 8 of “From Absolutism to Experimentalism” in The 
Philosophy of John Dewey: Two Volumes in One, ed. By John J. McDermott (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1981c), 1-13. 
193
 Richard Rorty, “Introduction” to Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, 
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thus natural on this conception that through our sociality we come to make normative 
judgments.  Our social life is permeated by normativity, to the point that (as Brandom 
and McDowell argue), human nature is itself normative—or as Sellars said it is “fraught 
with ought.”  The social norms we come to apprehend through acculturation are 
constitutive of the human nature of, at least, all language-using human beings.  Though 
some cultures may exhibit a greater or lesser wealth of normative standard to reflect 
upon, owing to their respective historical traditions and the records that preserve them, 
we all turn to and reflect on cultural standards in coming to comport ourselves to the 
world.  Our traditions form a foundation upon which to craft our dispositions, our 
interpretations, and the justifications we levy to support them.  As language is the 
primary means whereby norms, values, and ideals are communicated and transmitted 
from generation to generation, this program of pragmatic normative rationality makes 
explicit our duty to self-reflectively criticize the linguistic formulations through which 
we inevitably participate in our ongoing cultural enterprise.194 
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 It may do well to reconsider some comments made in a footnote given in Section 3, now with 
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“It is in the context of these ideas [set forth in Articulating Reasons] that I have sought to present an 
expressive view of the role of logic and its relation to the practices constitutive of rationality.  That view 
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Normative values are tools we adopt to work within the world’s ceaseless 
becoming.  Norms are things the presence of which is inimitably connected to the world 
of facts and causes, not immutable objects inhering in transcendence above it.   Through 
self-reflectively adopting these normative tools we come to rework the world of facts 
into an image of our own likeness.  Adopting norms is an inevitability of human life—in 
any social interaction (and indeed, I would argue, in any interaction with the world by 
self-conscious subjects whatsoever) we use norms, values, and ideals to pattern our 
activity.  Making explicit this inevitability, and engaging wholeheartedly in its cultural 
manifestations, is one task for philosophical thought.  Indeed, it is an obligation 
exhibited by the contemporary normative investigation of language and rationality.  
Though under the old conception of norms and facts we could not derive an ought from 
an is, under the new we are compelled to make explicit a should from a must. 
This thesis has focused on normativity, but with a particular specification of its 
role in mind.  What we have been moving toward (perhaps too frequently in fits and 
overzealous leaps) is a position at which rationality can be understood as a 
fundamentally normative notion—a process of articulating our positions as ones we are 
committed to in virtue of the reasons we levy in support of them.  What this thesis 
suggests is that we are acting rationally only insofar as we bind ourselves to the norms 
that constitute our reasons for action—whether linguistic or behavioral norms.  The 
process of articulating the rationality underpinning our linguistic behavior is a process of 
articulating the inferential warrants that entitle us to assert certain propositions, and 
                                                                                                                                                
holds out the hope of recovering for the study of logic a direct significance for projects that have been at 
the core of philosophy since its Socratic inception.” (Ibid., 77). 
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being willing to reflect on the commitments we have implicitly adopted via these 
assertions.  The process of articulating the rationality underpinning our practical 
behavior is a process of articulating the social norms that entitle us to so behave, and 
ultimately in articulating the hypothetical social ends these norms serve to help realize in 
our society by guiding our intentional behavior.  Articulation of the rationality of our 
linguistic and practical behavior is a process of offering reasons that serve to license that 
behavior as justified given the ends we set before ourselves.  But consequent on this 
initial articulation comes a further obligation—to assess whether the commitments we 
have taken up are ones we self-reflectively wish to bind ourselves to.  The initial 
articulation of the norms guiding our linguistic and practical behavior comes by recourse 
to the social setting within which we are acculturated, but that setting is not static.  It 
changes as a result (though not exclusively) of the revisions given it by thoughtful 
members of the community, those who are willing to reflect on the relative value of the 
propositional and behavioral entitlements and commitments licensed by its current 
structure.  As a society’s structure of linguistic and practical norms change so too do the 
assertions and behaviors licensed by that structure.  While initially rationality is a 
process of articulating our obligations given the current structure of our society’s norms, 
this activity brings with it the obligation to reflect on and be willing to revise this 
normative structure itself—whether for better empirical data, changing environmental 
contexts given a set of norms and ends held fundamental, or a change in those norms and 
ends themselves. 
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Making an assertion in aesthetics or ethics should be seen as no more arational 
than making an assertion in the physical sciences.  In each case the assertion is justified 
by recourse to the standards according to which it is licensed in that community.  What 
makes a discipline rational is the capacity of its conversants to produce warrants for 
their assertions within the discipline’s discourse in the face of questions of license, up to 
and including engaging in revision of the axioms and ends that heretofore have 
structured the discipline.  A discipline is by itself neither rational nor arational—
rationality is a function of the behavior (linguistically or otherwise) of a discipline’s 
disciples.  What propositions are rational to assert within a discipline depend upon the 
standards of discourse for that discipline—but even these standards are up for rational 
revision. 
Consider a recent study on the behavior of cleaner fish in the waters off the 
southern end of the Sinai Peninsula.195  The author observed a number of species of 
“client fish” who frequented the site for access to cleaner-fish, and noted the frequency 
with which certain cleaner fish bit the client fish (instead of removing detritus and 
parasites), the subsequent behavior of these cleaner fish in apparently “deceiving” other 
client fish to frequent their location by engaging in altruistic “tactile stimulation” of 
smaller client fish far more regularly than non-biting cleaner fish, and the behavior of 
larger client fish in consequence.   
As  bystanding clients decide whether or not to interact with a cleaner based 
on how it treats its current client, it seems plausible that the function of the 
altruistic acts is to attract larger resident and choosy clients to the cleaning 
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 Redouan Bshary, “Biting cleaner fish use altruism to deceive image-scoring client reef fish”, 
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 159 
station…In the cleaner fish system, cheating individuals [that is, those who 
bite their clients] use one class of clients for altruistic behaviour to produce a 
signal that allows them to exploit another class of clients not despite but 
because of image scoring.  I suggest that biting cleaners make use of 
variation in pay-offs between interactions.  They might behave altruistically 
in low pay-off interactions (smaller clients) and exploitatively in high pay-off 
interactions where mucus is easily accessible (larger clients).196 
 
What is impressive here is the degree of deceit apparent in the behavior of the cheater 
cleaner fish.  “With respect to the function of tactile stimulation, the data suggest that 
biting cleaners use this behaviour as a signal out of context:  it is not directed towards 
the current client but towards observers.”197  That is, the cheater fish use tactile 
stimulation of small client fish as a means to lure in large score-keeping client fish, who 
being larger offer more food for the cleaners.  It would prima facie appear there are 
indications of cognitive deception at work here, as cheater cleaner fish need to engage in 
tactile stimulation with small clients (which behavior they engage in more frequently 
than non-cheating cleaner fish)198 in order to offset the tendency of score-keeping client 
fish to avoid feeders seen to engage in biting behavior.   
But in a very careful discussion of the apparent score-keeping of client fish who 
observe particular cleaner fish biting previous clients and their subsequent “deception” 
so as to lure new clients, the author of the article is very clear to avoid 
anthropomorphizing the behavior of the fish.   
As observers that approach are readily exploited, the altruism of biting 
cleaner fish seems to function as tactical deception of image-scoring clients.  
Tactical deception is the use of a signal from the normal repertoire out of 
context, so that it induces the usual response in receivers, to the signaller’s 
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advantage and to their own disadvantage…Note that the definition is purely 
functional and does not assume specific cognitive abilities…[S]imple 
conditioning processes may be enough to associate the production of a signal 
out of context with reward, thereby increasing the probability that the 
rewarded individual will repeatedly produce the signal under similar 
circumstances.199 
 
Surely we can account for the behavior of the cleaner fish in positive-reinforcement 
functional terms, and in doing so avoid anthropomorphism.  Whether the score-keeping 
client fish can be so accounted for is another story, given the apparent necessity of 
representing to themselves the behavior of bitten fish as being displeasurable, and also 
representing to themselves the tactilely-stimulated fish as enjoying pleasure, such 
representational capacity being necessary for the client fish to count as keeping score on 
cleaner fish at all.  Indeed one, wonders in cases like this if the danger of 
anthropomorphization has become so severe as to have oscillated into a countervailing 
pathos—a tendency to remove all reference to cognitive capability in order to respect a 
discipline’s perceived need for objectivity.200  Though it is an ugly word, one might 
suppose that the urge to avoid anthropomorphization has given rise to a tendency to 
anthroprojection, in the sense of projecting onto other species the research 
methodologies currently in vogue in the journals of anthropos. 
Regardless of whatever we might have to say about the relative merits and 
pitfalls of anthropomorphization and anthroprojection, for the purposes of our discussion 
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the point is made.  What counts as a warranted assertion in the context of a particular 
examination of the behavior of cleaner fish depends on the standards currently in place 
within the discipline to which the examiners belong.  200 years ago there would have 
been little—if any—concern with a natural scientist describing the behavior of cleaner 
fish in unabashedly cognitive terms of deception and intention.  Insofar as the cognitive 
inferences available to the author (Redouan Bshary) of the cleaner-fish study mentioned 
above were licensed by the contemporary norms of the discipline, the assertions made 
within the discourse can be understood as rationally constrained—inferentially 
licensed—by these norms.  But rationality offers us a second-order assessment of the 
norms that delimit warranted propositions within a discipline as well.  While granting 
that Bshary was constrained by the current norms of his discipline to eschew cognitive 
explanations in the context of this study (which explanations another study might be 
explicitly addressed), we can also question whether these norms are ones worth 
preserving (as such a further study might help us address). 
 The claim in the fourth section of this thesis was that normative explanations of 
human behavior better explain our experience than explanations supposed to be non-
normative in character, and that furthermore an understanding of the relationship 
between intentions as implicitly normative and social norms as guiding our behavior 
equips us with a means (individually and collectively) to rationally revise the standards 
that delimit our social order.  For many of the norms that govern our activities in society 
are in place because of repetitive intentional behavior, not always subject to the rational 
reflection necessary to say they are norms we have chosen for ourselves.  The disparity 
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between the way America is treating its soldiers during the Iraq war, compared with how 
its soldiers were treated during the Vietnam war, must in part be seen as an implicit 
reflection on and reevaluation of the way Vietnam veterans were treated.  So despite the 
fact that veterans of the Iraq war are voluntary soldiers (issues of socio-economic 
constraint notwithstanding), whereas soldiers in Vietnam were drafted and had no choice 
but to fight, American citizens collectively make a distinction today between opposing 
the war and supporting the troops.  Over time our intentional behavior collectively 
institutes norms that dispose others to behave in alignment with these norms, and an 
unreflective intentionality is a rudderless contribution to a society’s standards.  Whether 
in ethics, epistemics, or aesthetics, a disciple is rational in her discipline insofar as she is 
willing to articulate the reasons supporting her assertions, and to assess the relative 
worth of those reasons and to revise them in the face of new information and new ends 
taken to be imperative. 
Though this view should bring with it an aesthetic wonder at our place in the 
world, though it should encourage the view that philosophy, science, ethics, and art are 
not so rationally far apart, though it should bring epistemics and aesthetics closer 
together, and in so doing emphasize the ethical dimensions of our epistemic and 
aesthetic standards as they are put into practice, I suppose our notion of rationality is 
capable of handling this extension and reappraisal.  In making explicit our duty to reflect 
on and critique the norms we are always already bringing to bear on the world this view 
at least offers us a peculiar role to play in society, by self-consciously engaging in the 
rational development of those disciplines we wish to be disciples of.  In so doing perhaps 
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we can offer philosophy a concerted return to its interests in goodness, truth, and beauty, 
reclaimed for rational enquiry. 
Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and 
reverence, the more frequently and persistently one’s meditation deals with 
them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.201 
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